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Overview 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Journey/Rationale 
The eight publications that comprise this dissertation cover a subset of research 
that I undertook, including with colleagues at the Central Bank of Ireland, from 
the mid-2000s until 2016.   The articles are all in the area of monetary economics.   
Within that field, their focus is on how the money stock (that is, the stock of media 
that are widely accepted in payment for goods and services and also act as a store 
of value to their holders) affects other economic variables, in particular inflation, 
asset prices and uncertainty.   The research covered in the dissertation has both a 
traditional focus (of looking at the relationship between money and goods prices) 
and an emphasis on a topic that has gained a lot of attention since the mid-2000s 
or so (of how money and asset markets are interacting with one another in recent 
times).    
Monetary economics has always been an area of economics that has been of 
particular interest to me since I first studied the subject at undergraduate level.   
While my Masters’ dissertation focussed on financial economics, my subsequent 
employment as an economist at the Central Bank (Ireland’s monetary authority), 
from 1992 onwards, provided the opportunity to engage in research in monetary 
economics as well as in other related areas such as payments and banking.   Not 
only is this branch of economics fundamental to central banks’ work (they do, 
after all, exercise monetary policy) but Ireland has been party to the euro which 
eleven EU member states adopted as a single currency in 1999 (and in cash form 
in 2002).   With the new currency, the Bank became part of the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB), within which a monetary policy based on a “two pillar” 
strategy was in place from the outset.   Under this strategy, the ESCB members - 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and national central banks (NCBs), of which 
the Central Bank of Ireland is one - set monetary policy, with the aim of 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
maintaining inflation close to but below 2 per cent, by assessing both economic 
developments (the first pillar) and monetary developments (the second pillar). 
For my initial years in the Central Bank, I worked in its research function 
(considering, among other projects, the implications of electronic money for 
banking and monetary systems; modelling bank retail interest margin 
determination; quantifying the impact of derivatives trading on spot markets).  
Later, I was the Bank’s public finance analyst and delegate to the ECB Fiscal 
Experts’ Group.   I moved to the Central Bank’s monetary policy division, on 
internal transfer, as a senior economist in 2003.   Not only was monetary research 
a longstanding focus of that department but there was also a need to respond to 
the new ESCB monetary policy framework and strategy that had come into effect 
only four years earlier with the introduction of the euro.   Since my undergraduate 
days, I had been attracted to the type of analysis that occurred under the ESCB’s 
second pillar, that is assessing money’s influence on inflation and output.   David 
Laidler’s (1988) observation that “money matters” to macroeconomic 
developments and Milton Friedman’s dictum that inflation was always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon had stuck with me over the years and, on 
transferring to the monetary policy division, I was anxious to undertake research 
that would explore money’s influence on the economy and financial markets. 
Notwithstanding its prominence in the ESCB monetary policy strategy, money 
had started to lose its standing in macroeconomics by the mid-2000s, with the 
New Keynesian Phillips Curve providing the dominant model of inflation.   This 
shift reflected both fresh theoretical developments and new empirical 
observations.   Models of output and inflation that do not include money 
aggregates were developed and promoted at the same time as the relationship 
between those aggregates and economic activity became more difficult to observe 
and predict in empirical work.   The ECB, through its two-pillar monetary 
strategy, however, gave analysis of monetary aggregates equal standing to that of 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
real economic variables in its assessment of general price and output 
developments.1   
That the ECB and NCBs in the ESCB considered money important to its 
monetary policy strategy gave my head of division, Frank Browne, and me the 
opportunity to undertake research on money’s influence on inflation and related 
areas, although I believe we would have pursued it anyway.2 3   Conjunctural 
developments also happened to provide interesting subject matter to consider.   
Research and thinking emanating from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) from the early 2000s onwards proved of interest and was encouraging to us 
in its view that money and credit developments were having a strong influence 
on asset market developments and so ought to be of interest to policymakers.   
Claudio Borio and other BIS economists argued that excess money and credit 
growth arose in developed economies and posed a threat to financial and 
economic stability.4   They were concerned that a surplus of liquid balances was 
driving asset prices away from values consistent with their economic 
determinants.    
The BIS view suggested to us that while the traditional focus on examining 
money’s influence on inflation and output remained relevant (particularly to 
researchers working within the ESCB), a contribution to the literature and policy 
debate by examining money’s relationship to asset market developments was also 
                                                 
1 See European Central Bank (2010). 
2 Frank Browne and I had worked previously in the Bank’s research function in the early-to-mid 
1990s where we had collaborated on papers considered the regulatory and monetary consequences 
of electronic payment devices such as debit cards, prepaid cards and internet-based payments.   
3 In due course, I was able to present some of our research output at various fora within the ESCB, 
including at an ECB monetary analysis workshop in Frankfurt in October 2006 and a workshop 
of European and Latin-American central banks in Paris in December 2008.  The Journal of 
Economics and Business (2010) article included in this dissertation was initially published in the 
ECB Working Paper series in 2007 after its presentation at the ECB.   I was also invited to be a 
discussant at another monetary analysis workshop in the ECB in 2005 where I commented on 
Deutsche Bundesbank and European Central Bank papers on measuring longer-term trends in 
money.   My attendance at a Bundesbank workshop in Eltville-am-Main in 2007 alerted me to 
ESCB research on money and uncertainty and stimulated the research later published in the 
Empirica article included in this dissertation.     
4 See, for example, Borio and Lowe (2002) and Borio and White (2004).   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
possible.   Three articles in the Financial Times in 2004 and 2005 were important 
too in framing a work agenda.5   Those articles suggested that excess money 
growth at that time might be causing strong growth in commodity prices, 
particularly oil prices.   The relationship between the money stock and commodity 
prices is of particular interest to monetary economists given that changes to both 
are often seen in the economics literature as alternative causal influences on final 
goods price inflation (with that arising from commodity markets being described 
as a cost-push influence on final good prices, such as consumer goods).   There 
was also a view, as suggested in the Financial Times articles, that changes in 
commodity prices are driven by changes in money supply and, thus, 
commodities’ influence on the consumer price index is monetary in nature.      
Bringing these various influences together (the ECB monetary policy, the new 
BIS research, the Financial Times articles), the genesis of a line of research was 
in place, summarised as a consideration of money’s influence on inflation, output 
and asset market developments.   In later years (from 2009 onwards), the 
enactment of quantitative easing programmes – where central banks buy financial 
assets with settlement balances (base money) at the central bank -  in response to 
the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath also proved important, 
reemphasising the need to examine the money-asset prices relationship in 
particular.  
Assessing money’s influence on the real economy and financial markets would 
require me to use time series data and to learn new quantitative skills.   My 
M.Econ.Sc. dissertation (completed in University College, Cork in 1991) had 
utilised times series econometric methods and, on moving to the monetary policy 
division, I was eager to learn new methods and to apply them to data.   In the mid-
2000s, data availability was improving and becoming more accessible.   This was 
particularly the case for US data.   The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED 
                                                 
5 Those articles were: “More to oil shocks than the Middle East” (Clover and Fifield, 29 July 
2004); “Too much money to blame for rising price of oil, economists claim” (Fifield, 18 August 
2004); and “How real interest rates cast a shadow over oil” (Frankel, 15 April 2005).   Clover and 
Fifield are financial journalists, while Jeffrey Frankel is a Harvard economics professor.   
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database at its website had series on US narrow and broad money stocks (and 
their opportunity cost), US inflation rates, and US national output going back to, 
at least, the late-1950s.   Bloomberg and Datastream services also provided US 
asset price data (and some euro area and UK data) for utilisation in econometric 
studies.   Over the years, I combined my growing knowledge of these data sources 
(and the series therein) with learning and applying time-series techniques (in 
particular, the Johansen cointegration/ vector error correction model (VECM) and 
vector autoregressions (VAR), using the Microfit and RATS econometric 
packages) to conduct research in the monetary sphere (as well as in other areas of 
research).   I was aware that delivering research that would meet high editorial 
and peer-review standards would require the meticulous application of up-to-date 
econometric methods.  
On data issues, seven of the eight articles contained in this dissertation focus 
exclusively on US data (while the eighth uses US data alongside euro area and 
UK data).   Large samples are needed for the efficient estimation of VARs and 
VECMs.   US data were preferred because time series (at a quarterly or higher 
frequency) are available for the relevant macroeconomic variables (CPI, GDP, 
interest rates, and money aggregates) back to 1959 for that country.   Data for 
those variables for the euro area are not as long-dated and any data available 
before 1999 are synthetic in nature given that the euro only came into being in 
that year.   For the study of the interlinkages between money and asset prices, US 
data were again preferred because of both the relative long length of the series 
and the wide coverage of asset classes available for that country. 
It is against this background of a work requirement to conduct monetary research, 
a personal desire to learn new time-series econometric techniques and apply them 
to data, and a stimulating international economic and financial environment that 
the research contained in this dissertation was conducted.   Its written output took 
the form of eight articles, variously published in peer-reviewed economics 
journals, in other periodicals, and in an edited book volume.   The eight articles 
are presented in two tranches below.   The first tranche of four publications 
concerns the relationship between money, asset markets and uncertainty, while 
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the second tranche, also of four articles, focusses on the transmission of changes 
in the money supply to final goods prices and output.    
1.2 Research overview 
In relation to the first tranche, the literature on the relationship between monetary 
policy and asset market developments in the mid-2000s, when the research 
recorded here commenced, was focussing on scoping out hypotheses and 
questions for testing and explanation.   There were few, if any, formal models of 
the relationship and the employment of econometric techniques was rare.   
Contributors, such as the aforementioned BIS economists mentioned above, were 
making their case predominantly through graphical analysis of data.   The oldest 
article, published in the 2005 edition of the Central Bank of Ireland’s Financial 
Stability Report, among the eight in this dissertation takes a similar approach to 
other studies of the time.   It compares patterns in how variables under the 
influence of the central bank (in particular, money stocks) had behaved over time, 
including through periods of recession, and compared them to concurrent 
developments in asset market variables.   That article informed other lines of more 
formal enquiry that followed, with the results of that research recorded in the 
other three articles in this tranche of publications.  
One of those three, published in the journal World Economics, focusses on a 
particular money-asset relationship – that between the US broad money aggregate 
M2 and US stock prices – and analyses how the relationship responds to changes 
in the economic environment (including elevated uncertainty), again, by 
graphical means, but also by the application of statistical and econometric tools 
to data.6   The second article, published in the Journal of Macroeconomics, 
considered a wider spectrum of money aggregates and asset classes.   Whereas 
the aforementioned two contributions identified prevailing economic conditions 
a priori (based on, for example, the NBER’s categorisation of periods of 
                                                 
6 The term “uncertainty” has both colloquial and technical meanings, with it often used 
interchangeably with the words ‘risk’ and ‘volatility’ when a more careful choice of word(s) 
should be made.   I endeavour to qualify such words where they arise in the articles discussed 
here. 
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recession in the US economy), the econometric methodology used in the Journal 
of Macroeconomics article allowed the data to identify critical events and 
developments.   Episodes of increased economic or financial volatility were 
shown in that article to have an impact on the money-asset price relationship.    
The final article in this tranche, published in the journal Empirica, does not use 
or address asset data but ties in with the other articles by examining the 
relationship between money and uncertainty by econometric means.   This 
particular topic was one that I was exposed to at an ECB workshop I attended in 
the mid-2000s.7   Following attendance at the workshop, it occurred to me that a 
multivariate GARCH technique focussing on money growth and output growth 
series, combined with Granger causality tests, could make a contribution to the 
money-and-uncertainty literature.   The application of these techniques to, again, 
US data was recorded in the Empirica article.      
The second tranche of research in this dissertation, also comprising four 
publications, focuses on a topic long familiar to monetary economists, that of 
inflation determination.   The neglect of money in models of inflation in the 2000s 
literature provided a lacuna in the literature for those who believe that money 
matters: could new formal models and econometric techniques show that money 
developments explained goods and services price developments?   Two distinct 
contributions were made in that research among the articles in this tranche of the 
PhD dissertation.   The first is contained in three articles published between 2008 
and 2012 in the Journal of Economics and Business, in the Central Bank of 
Ireland’s Quarterly Bulletin, and in a chapter in a book considering inflation-
sensitive assets.   All three rely on a formal model outlined in the Journal of 
Economics and Business article based on the hypotheses that commodity prices 
exhibit overshooting behaviour in response to a money shock and that the extent 
of that overshooting (measured as a commodity-price gap) has explanatory power 
for subsequent final goods inflation.   A reading of an article by Alvarez, Lucas 
and Weber (2001) was influential in the formulation of the formal model in the 
                                                 
7 Greiber and Lemke (2005) was a paper discussing the topic at that workshop.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
Journal of Economics and Business article.   It was also obvious to me that the 
Johansen procedure with its tests of cointegrating relationships among the 
variables and impulse response functions could test the predictions of the formal 
model, which indicated there should be two long run relationships in the data: 
between consumer prices, money and output, and between commodity prices, 
money and output.   The econometric and statistical evidence presented in that 
journal article and in the other two publications proved supportive of the 
theoretical model.    
The second contribution in this tranche was made in the final article, recently 
published in the journal Empirical Economics, of the four in this tranche.   It also 
supports a monetary determination of inflation.   It applies a new variant of VAR-
based forecast error variance decompositions (owing to Diebold and Yilmaz 
2009, 2012) to the monetarist-based P-star model of inflation introduced in an 
American Economic Review article by Hallman et al. (1991) and provides fresh 
backing to the relevance of the monetary variables identified there.   In common 
with the first tranche of articles, it finds money variables having particular 
prominence in explaining the behaviour of other variables (in this case, inflation 
and output) at times of increased economic instability. 
Before discussing the two tranches of articles in turn in sections 4 and 5 of this 
overview, section 2 discusses the monetary theory and academic studies that 
influenced the monetary research recorded in this dissertation.   Conjunctural 
developments, that is what was going on concurrently in the economy and in 
financial markets, helped orientate the research undertaken and in making it 
relevant to both academic and policy audiences.   Those developments are 
discussed in section 3.   Both sections 2 and 3 may then help in reading sections 
4 and 5, where each tranche is considered in turn, by setting out the background 
against which the articles comprising this dissertation were written.   Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Money’s Impact on Inflation and Asset Markets: Theoretical 
Influences        
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An important starting point for economists when commencing research in this 
area is to be cognisant of what money is and what services it provides to its 
holders.   The study of these roles of money has helped shape the development of 
monetary economics over time.   At a basic level, money can be defined as the 
medium that settles payments (i.e., it acts as the medium of exchange) within an 
economy.   It is used in the purchase of goods and services, and of assets.   With 
that comes the ancillary functions of providing the economy with a unit of 
account (a unit of the medium of exchange defines prices) and a store of value to 
its inhabitants (possession of money confers purchasing power on its holder 
whenever he/she wishes to spend it).8   In the latter capacity, it is an asset to its 
holder.    
The quantity theory of money was a central part of the monetary economics 
course that I took as an undergraduate and it made a lasting impression on me 
with its long historical legacy (dating from, at least, Hume, 1752) and the support 
it receives in numerous studies (e.g., Lucas (1980), McCandless and Weber 
(1995), Gerlach (1995)).   Fisher (1911) provided the equation of exchange (“the 
Fisher equation”) that assists in explaining the quantity theory.   It is shown here 
as: 
𝑀𝑀.𝑉𝑉 = 𝑃𝑃.𝑌𝑌      
Where 𝑀𝑀 is the money stock, 𝑉𝑉 is the average rate at which a unit of money is 
used to settle transactions within the economy in a given period, 𝑃𝑃 is the general 
price level, and 𝑌𝑌 is the output of goods and services within the economy.9   While 
                                                 
8 The possibility that the unit of account could be defined as something other than a unit of the 
medium of exchange has been the subject of articles that I have written or co-written on alternative 
monetary standards (Browne and Cronin, 1995, 1997; Cronin and Dowd 2001; Cronin 2012; 
Cronin 2017).    
9 Fisher used ‘T’, denoting the total volume of monetary transactions in the economy within a 
given year, instead of ‘Y’ in his outlining of the quantity theory.   The difficulty is that T is 
unobservable and so the modern version of the Quantity Theory (the income version, as opposed 
to the earlier transactions version) uses national output, i.e. Y above.   
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𝑌𝑌 is the measure of real output, 𝑃𝑃.𝑌𝑌 provides the measure of nominal output, i.e. 
the monetary value of the goods and services produced within the period.   
The equation is a tautology, or truism, because if money intermediates, or settles, 
all goods transactions within the economy in a given period then 𝑃𝑃.𝑌𝑌 (net national 
income) must equate with the amount of money in the economy (𝑀𝑀) multiplied 
by the average number of times (𝑉𝑉) that money is used in transactions.   The 
equation can be used as the basis for a theory of how the price level is determined 
when certain assumptions are imposed, in particular that 𝑉𝑉 and 𝑌𝑌 are pre-
determined while the money stock, 𝑀𝑀, is exogenous.10    The price level, 𝑃𝑃, is 
then the endogenous variable among the four and will adjust pari passu to 
changes in 𝑀𝑀 to maintain the equality.   Thus, the price level is determined by the 
money stock.    
The quantity theory of money caters for a richer determination of the interaction 
between output and prices by recognising that 𝑃𝑃 will not adjust instantaneously 
to its new equilibrium level when there is a change in 𝑀𝑀.   Relaxing the 
assumption that 𝑌𝑌 is pre-determined, 𝑌𝑌 will vary in the short run after changes to 
the money stock occur; specifically when the money stock increases (decreases), 
output will rise (fall), maintaining the equality above.   Over time, as the price 
level rises in response to a larger money stock, output will start to revert to its 
original level and be at it when the price level has adjusted fully to its new 
equilibrium value.   Consequently, a change in the money stock will have a short 
run impact on output but will not affect it in the long run.   The quantity theory 
then provides an explanation of long run price determination and of why output 
varies over the short-to-medium term (business cycle theory) but remains neutral 
to changes in the money stock in the long run. 
Milton Friedman (1968) restated the quantity theory of inflation by maintaining 
that changes in the money supply have an impact on aggregate demand in the 
                                                 
10 The pre-determination of 𝑉𝑉 and 𝑌𝑌 reflects in the case of 𝑉𝑉 the state of payment technology in 
the economy, while 𝑌𝑌 will depend on labour, capital and productivity. 
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short term but have no long-term effect on output.   The form of the quantity 
theory put forward by Friedman – monetarism – argued for the stability of the 
public’s demand for money.   An excess supply of money (or real money 
balances) would transmit itself to final prices with a long and variable lag as that 
excess is not easily cleared within the economy.   In the short term, prices are 
sticky and so output would initially be affected by a change in the money supply.   
Over time, prices would rise and the temporary effect on output would recede.   
The proportional rise in prices (to an increase in the money supply) could take 
years to complete but inflation would be always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon, i.e. owing to money growth differing from that of output.   The 
implication of this theory for central banks is that they need to estimate the 
public’s demand for money balances.   Monetary growth in excess of increases in 
that demand will lead to inflation.   Another implication of monetarism is that the 
appropriate policy response to high inflation rates is to exercise restraint on 
growth in the money supply.    
----- 
While the quantity theory and monetarism emphasised money’s role as the 
economy’s medium of exchange, the Keynesian focus on the characteristics of 
money as an asset was also an influence on the research in this dissertation 
(particularly, the first tranche of articles dealing with the money-financial assets 
relationship).   Money provides a store of value to its holder and has a property 
lacking in other assets: constant nominal purchasing power.   Its standing as the 
economy’s medium of exchange also means money has the property of deferred 
payment: the holder does not have to spend the money immediately but can allow 
a period of time to elapse before using it in the purchase of goods and services, 
or other assets.   These properties make money attractive as an asset to hold, 
something that would make it particularly appealing if there was a downturn in 
economic activity, a rise in macroeconomic volatility, or a fall in financial asset 
prices.   In such circumstances, economic agents could exercise liquidity 
preference, i.e. a desire to hold liquid assets, of which money is the most liquid.   
Holding money, however, has a cost in terms of interest foregone and so the 
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amount of money held by the public is affected by the yield on competing 
financial assets.    
This perspective would be one to which Frank Browne and I would turn as we 
sought to understand the linkages between money and asset market developments 
through the 2000s and into the current decade.   Any views Milton Friedman had 
on the money-asset price relationship were ones we also sought out in the 
literature.   One important article that we found was Friedman (1988).   It 
identifies four factors affecting the nature of the relationship between stock prices 
and money velocity.   Three of those factors will generate an inverse relationship 
between stock prices and money velocity (that is the nominal output of the 
economy divided by its money stock) with velocity falling as stock prices rise, 
and vice versa.   Those factors are that (i) money is a luxury good (so that an 
increase in stock prices increases the demand for money, causing velocity to fall); 
(ii) a rise in stock prices requires a greater amount of money to facilitate asset 
transactions; (iii) higher stock prices make them appear riskier and this generates 
a greater demand for the safe asset of money.   Friedman (1988, p. 221) argues 
that these are the dominant factors in the money velocity-asset prices relationship 
and that they explain “the close inverse relation between the level of the Dow 
Jones stock market index and the velocity of the money aggregate now designated 
M2 by the Federal Reserve System” over the period 1961 to 1986.   The fourth 
and final factor identified by Friedman is a substitution effect between money and 
equities.   It operates by an expected rise in stock returns leading agents to switch 
their wealth holdings out of money and into equities (or vice versa).   Thus, this 
factor leads the velocity of money to rise when stock prices are increasing, and 
vice versa.      
3. Monetary Developments in the 2000s: Setting the Research 
Agenda 
Alongside these academic influences, particular economic events of the previous 
thirty years were important to Frank Browne and me in identifying a monetary 
research agenda.   First, the money supply’s influence on inflationary 
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developments and its importance for monetary policy was emphasised to us by 
the success of the so-called Volcker disinflation in the United States in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.   After taking up the position of Federal Reserve chairman 
in 1979 against a background of high inflation rates prevailing in the US, Paul 
Volcker indicated that he would focus on restraining the growth of the money 
supply to improve US economic performance.   The Federal Reserve changed its 
monetary policy operational framework from day-to-day management of the 
Federal Funds rate of interest to managing the amount of bank reserves held by 
the Federal Reserve System.   The purported advantage of this strategy was that 
it would prove easier and quicker to taking control of money supply growth and 
reducing inflation rates.   Although greater variability in interest rates was an 
outcome of this policy, the new policy procedure succeeded in bringing inflation 
rates down substantially from high levels in a little over two years.    
Inflation rates in developed economies fell from double-digit rates to low, single-
digit rates from the late-1970s through to the early-1990s.   Money’s relative 
importance in monetary policy then declined (to be replaced by a greater focus 
on developments in the real economy, such as in unemployment and in the 
deviation of output from trend) in parallel with central banks being mandated to 
keep inflation close to the low rates that had been achieved, with specific 
numerical targets being set in some cases.   In part, this reflected difficulties in 
understanding monetary dynamics occurring at that time, with a breakdown in 
the stability of money demand functions – a critical proposition of monetarism - 
being observed.11   This made it more difficult to gauge what rate of money 
growth would be consistent with price stability. 
A monetary policy strategy – inflation targeting – started to find greater favour 
over monetary targeting (which involved setting a target for money growth as a 
basis for keeping inflation close to a preferred rate) with many central bankers 
and academics.   As its name suggests, inflation targeting involves a central bank 
seeking to achieve a particular rate of inflation, often set by government, as a 
                                                 
11 See Carlson et al. (2000). 
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medium-term target.   Inflation targeting operates on the premise that general 
price developments – whether the consumer price index is rising or falling, and 
at what rate – originate in the labour market and that providing a specific 
numerical target for inflation can help maintain inflation expectations at low 
levels.   A variant of the Phillips curve (Phillips, 1958) plays the main analytical 
role within this “New Keynesian” paradigm, with the size of the output gap 
capturing the extent of inflationary pressures within the economy.   From this, a 
Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1993) showed how central banks appeared to set the short-
term interest rate as a function of the deviation of the actual inflation rate from its 
target rate and the deviation of output (GDP/GNP) growth from its long-run 
potential growth rate.   The Taylor Rule came to play a prominent role in 
analysing monetary policy in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Within the inflation-targeting paradigm, there is no need for a money demand 
function or, indeed, any money variable.   The focus is on how real economy 
variables (e.g., output, unemployment) are behaving.   The inflation-targeting 
framework’s attraction to its advocates lies in what they see as its parsimonious 
but integrated and realistic description of aggregate demand and inflation 
determination.12   For policymakers, it proved helpful at a time when a breakdown 
in the stability of money demand functions was being observed, making a money-
based analysis of inflation developments more difficult.   In the United States, the 
demand for money among the public proved hard to estimate accurately from 
about the early-1990s onwards, owing, at least in part, to the arrival of near-
money substitutes such as transactions balances held with mutual funds.   The 
information coming from the monetary sphere then was not as helpful to 
monetary policy formulation as previously. 
                                                                      ----- 
At the turn of the 21st century, the inflation-targeting framework, focussing on 
analysis of the real economy, was to the fore in how monetary policy was 
                                                 
12 See Bernanke and Mishkin (1997). 
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practised by many central banks.   Inflation targets were being broadly met and 
monetary developments took a backseat in policy-making.   Some academics and 
policy-makers, however, continued to stress monetary variables’ role in monetary 
policy.   Contributors such as Issing et al. (2001) and Hafer et al. (2007) argued 
that monetary developments remained crucial features of the transmission of 
monetary policy and were often better leading indicators of inflation than non-
monetary variables.   Commenting in the mid-2000s, Robert Lucas acknowledged 
that central banks that did not make explicit use of money stock data had 
impressive recent records in controlling inflation (Lucas, 2006).   He stressed, 
however, that this was still but a “brief period of success” and that any attempt to 
render monetary analysis “superfluous” would “lead monetary policy analysis 
back to the muddled eclecticism that brought us the 1970s inflation” (Lucas, 
2006, p. 168).   
In contrast to the more doctrinal adherents to inflation targeting (see, for example, 
Woodford 2003, 2008), who often argued for dispensing with assessing 
developments in the money stock entirely, the position of many advocates of 
monetary analysis was not to counter that it should dominate real economy 
analysis or be used on its own to determine monetary policy.   The New 
Keynesian approach to monetary policy did not adequately meet the needs of 
monetary policymakers, not least because it did not make use of all available 
information.    The ECB took a broad approach to monetary policymaking from 
its inception with the intention of capturing all available information that could 
be used as an input into policy decisions.13   It had a numerical inflation target, 
albeit a slightly imprecise one of maintaining inflation below, but close to, two 
per cent over the medium term, and it monitored monetary and economic 
developments in assessing at what level to set official interest rates.   For the ECB, 
analysis of monetary variables, such as assessing the behaviour of the euro area 
broad money aggregate, M3, served as a means of cross-checking, from a 
                                                 
13 For example, new money data observations are available more frequently and with less of a 
delay than output data and, therefore, could help the policymaker understand macroeconomic 
developments more quickly.  
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medium- to long-term perspective, the short- to medium-term indications coming 
from the economic analysis.   This so-called two-pillar approach sought to use 
the full information set of economic and monetary analysis available when 
making monetary policy.14   It also provided a well-formulated and broad basis 
for communicating in a consistent manner with the public (compared to the more 
simplified representation of inflation targeting).     
The ECB perspective and the views expressed by eminent economists like Robert 
Lucas proved encouraging to Frank Browne and me.   What we took away from 
those viewpoints was that money should still matter but that it might require new 
techniques, particularly econometric methods, to be applied to data to bring out 
its relationship to inflation.   This was the basis for the overshooting model 
developed and tested in the Journal of Economics and Business article.   The need 
to compare quantity theory-based models of inflation to other models of inflation 
was also noted, and applied in the Empirical Economics article published in my 
own name.     
                                                                      -----  
Besides striving to maintain inflation at low levels, a new, related issue came into 
focus for central banks in the 2000s: the need to understand better the nexus 
between monetary policy and the stability of the financial system.   A concern 
arose that with many central banks maintaining a narrow focus on price stability, 
financial imbalances would be ignored and that these could eventually prove 
disruptive and pose a threat to the general well-being of economies.   The 
“democratisation” of financial markets in the 1990s and 2000s would have played 
a role in awakening economists’ interest in the money-asset prices relationship.   
A series of deregulation measures took place in financial markets from the early 
1980s onwards.   These included interest rate deregulation, the phasing out of 
Regulation Q, and the elimination of portfolio restrictions on thrifts in the United 
States.   Financial markets responded to this new regulatory environment by 
                                                 
14 The practical difficulties in measuring potential output and other economic variables, 
particularly in real time, also provide a role for the use of more-timely monetary data.   
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providing new financial products to the public, giving households and firms 
cheaper and easier access to financial markets.   It gave them greater latitude in 
using their money holdings (in particular, any excess real balances) to purchase 
assets.   New financial products, such as mutual funds, also made it easier to shift 
wealth between money and financial assets.       
A narrow focus of monetary policy on the short term, such as occurs under 
inflation targeting (with the Bank of England, for example, having an inflation 
rate target of two per cent), might pose risks to price stability in the longer run if 
financial stability issues were overlooked.15   This reflected episodes of severe 
financial distress, with serious macroeconomic implications, having increased in 
number since the 1980s, at a time when inflation had declined substantially from 
1970s levels, and as financial markets had been liberalised at the same time.   
These economic and financial crises often took place after a period in which 
inflationary pressures were absent.   In the BIS economists’ view, financial 
market liberalisation in conjunction with the near-term, price-stability focus of 
monetary policy changed the dynamics of economic and financial market 
interactions.   In such an environment, the maintenance of low and stable inflation 
would mean that excess demand pressures would manifest themselves in strong 
credit aggregate and asset price growth, rather than in higher final goods inflation.   
Financial imbalances (such as in the form of large debt-to-income ratios or 
highly-inflated asset price-to-earnings ratios) could develop and build up before 
eventually unwinding rapidly and at great cost to both the economy and financial 
system.16   Such developments were not picked up by New Keynesian models 
whose basic form comprised three equations representing, in turn, an IS curve, 
Phillips curve and interest rate-based monetary policy rule.                
                                                 
15 Bean (2004) makes a similar point in saying that the build-up of financial imbalances in 
conjunction with asset price cycles poses a challenge to conventional inflation targeting 
frameworks. 
16 Economists based at the ECB were also raising these issues in the early 2000s.   Detken and 
Smets (2004) show how real credit and money growth are quite strong before and during asset 
price booms.   The asset price collapses that prove most costly are preceded by stronger pre-boom 
and early-boom real money growth and real credit growth than at other times.  
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The views of the BIS economists proved to be prescient when the financial and 
economic crisis of 2007/8 and subsequent years came to pass, with large rises in 
money, credit and asset prices in the preceding years playing their part in the 
crash.   This brought into focus a sharp questioning of the inflation-targeting 
approach from economists who would have been considered to be in the 
mainstream of 1990s-2000s macroeconomic thinking.   For example, John 
Taylor, the originator of the eponymous monetary rule, acknowledged that part 
of the blame for the financial crisis that emerged in 2007 was due to “monetary 
excesses” in the years preceding it (Taylor, 2009).   There was an 
acknowledgment that the inflation-targeting monetary policy framework could 
not have foreseen, or catered for, the build-up in asset prices or excess money and 
credit growth that occurred in the years prior to the crash because of its not 
allowing for asset market developments in monetary policymaking.   
After the financial crisis, a renewed interest in the role of changes in money and 
credit in consumer price, output and asset market developments took place.   Not 
only had the crisis raised the issue of the role of money in economic and financial 
developments once more but central banks started to pursue a form of monetary 
policy – quantitative easing – that expanded the size of the monetary base in an 
effort to tackle deflationary pressures within the economy.   The effects of such a 
novel policy have been the subject of research in recent years, including on how 
it has affected asset prices and how it feeds through to inflation and output 
developments.   It plays a prominent role in the analysis of money-financial asset 
relationships in the Journal of Macroeconomics article published in my own 
name.  
                                                                   ----- 
It is against this background that the articles in this dissertation were written.   The 
academic and conjunctural developments summarised above provided a number 
of avenues to explore in setting out on a research path.   First, although money’s 
influence on inflation and real economy developments was being discounted, or 
minimised, by many in the economics profession at that time, money should still 
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matter but discerning its influence in the data might be more difficult than in the 
past.   A goal of the research then was to show through statistical and econometric 
work that money, inflation and short-run fluctuations in output were connected.   
The Keynesian perspective on money as an asset and Friedman’s (1988) study of 
the money-financial asset relationship was also an important source of reference.   
There was now greater scope for households and firms to substitute between 
money and financial assets and that raised the question of how that substitutability 
affected the relationship between the two and whether it was complicating the 
transmission of changes in the money supply to final goods price.   If the 
motivation for substituting between money and assets was owing to greater 
economic uncertainty then that variable needed to be borne in mind in empirical 
work.    
Some of the output from that research is the basis for this dissertation.   As with 
all research, the direction it took developed and changed as papers were 
completed and new ones commenced but each article contained herein follows 
from the influences outlined above.   I have chosen to present the papers in two 
tranches in the dissertation and discuss each in turn in the next two sections.   
Section 4 then deals with the first tranche, comprising four articles, and 
addressing the relationship between money aggregates and asset prices.   The 
second tranche, also involving four articles, examines the monetary determination 
of inflation and is considered in section 5.   The concluding section to the 
dissertation discusses the contribution to knowledge of these articles.     
4. Money and Asset Prices Tranche 
The article, “Recent Developments in Asset Prices and Liquidity in the 
Context of an Evolving Relationship”, published in the Central Bank of 
Ireland’s Financial Stability Report 2005 (FSR), addresses the money-asset price 
relationship.17   It can also be viewed as a ground-clearing article for the other 
                                                 
17 “Recent Developments in Asset Prices and Liquidity in the Context of an Evolving 
Relationship.” With F. Browne and E.J. O’Brien, Central Bank and Financial Services Authority 
of Ireland Financial Stability Report 2005, pp. 93-110. 
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three articles covered in this section.   It establishes some of the major themes 
examined more rigorously in the later contributions: a pattern of substitution 
between money and assets being evident during the 2000s, and the level of 
uncertainty in the economy playing a role in that substitution.   At its outset, the 
FSR article initially notes that rising prices were being observed across almost all 
asset classes in the early 2000s; it asks whether asset prices were becoming 
detached from economically-determined, or fundamental, values at that time, or 
not; and it sets out to assess how money aggregates’ behaviour may help explain 
asset price performance during that period.    
The initial part of the FSR article illustrates that an excess amount of money arose 
in the global economy by the mid-2000s.   This is done by examining the 
behaviour of broad monetary aggregates since the early 1980s in three economies: 
the United States (through its M2 money aggregate), the euro area (its M3 
aggregate) and the UK (its M2 money stock).   Real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) 
money growth rates are shown in all three cases to have been rising over the 
previous ten years or so, i.e. from the mid-1990s onwards.   Those money growth 
rates are compared to those of output growth.   To do this, the rate of nominal 
GDP growth is subtracted from the nominal broad money growth rate.   The 
residual for each economy shows strong percentage growth rates in the 2000s 
compared to earlier years, pointing to excess money balances arising at that time.   
Having concluded that there was an excess of liquid balances in all three 
economies by the mid-2000s, the FSR article asks what might be the reasons 
behind this development and what consequences it might have.   One possibility 
is that firms and households were building up money balances to hoard, i.e. to be 
used in transactions in the future rather than immediately.   The velocity of money 
(measured as nominal GDP divided by the money stock) can give an indication 
as to whether that was the case or not.   Plots of the velocity of money for each of 
the three economies indicate a trend decline in it from the mid-1990s onwards, so 
that consumers and firms seemed to have been holding more liquid balances than 
were needed for trade in goods and services.   Historically, the velocity of money 
tends to decline when the opportunity cost of holding money falls.   In the early-
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
2000s, however, the opportunity cost of holding money is shown in the article to 
have been rising.   An interest elasticity effect does not seem then to explain 
velocity developments.   It is concluded that an increased desire to hoard money 
may explain at least some part of the rise in liquidity observed at that time. 
With the supply of goods and services being relatively inelastic, an excess supply 
of money would have been expected to lead to a rise in final goods and services 
prices.   The FSR article shows that by the mid-2000s CPI inflation was well 
below money growth rates in the three economies and that the gaps between 
money and price growth rates were larger than the historical norm.   Strong money 
growth was not then having the expected effect on inflation. 
If money was not being used for the purchase of goods and services then it could 
have been used for the acquisition of assets.   The FSR article examines price 
developments across six asset classes: government bonds, corporate bonds, 
equities, commodities (oil), property, and emerging market (bond and/or equity) 
indices.   The analysis of asset prices is undertaken over the horizon 2000Q1 to 
2005Q2.   Within that five-year-long window, 2002Q3 is adjudged to be a turning 
point in the perceived level of uncertainty and risk aversion in financial markets 
and, thereof, in asset price developments.   From 2000Q1 to 2002Q3, there was a 
diverse performance across asset classes, with some seeing declining prices and 
others experiencing rising prices.   Thereafter, a generalised increase in asset 
prices is observed with, for example, aggregate asset prices in the US rising, on 
an unweighted basis, by close to 40 per cent from 2002Q3 to 2005Q2.   Over this 
entire period, as the earlier part of the FSR article shows, an excess supply of 
money arises.    
It is argued in the FSR article that roughly the first half of the five-year period 
from 2000 to 2005 was marked by political and economic instability, following 
the US stock market reversal of 2000 and the September 2001 terrorist attacks.   
The public was inclined at that time to hoard its liquid balances, given the 
uncertain environment.   When economic circumstances appeared to be 
improving in late-2002, agents started to dishoard their money holdings by 
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buying assets, as opposed to purchasing goods and services.   This would help 
explain CPI inflation remaining low, while the prices of different asset classes 
rose sharply and broadly together in all three economies. 
----- 
The second article in the dissertation, “The New Dynamic Between US Stock 
Prices and Money Holdings”, published in World Economics (WE) in 2012, 
examines the relationship between asset markets (through the behaviour of the 
US stock market) and money and complements the FSR contribution.18   It argues 
that the new, democratised financial market setting of recent decades, whereby 
households and small firms have easier and cheaper access to financial markets, 
has implications for the relationship between money and financial assets.  
Whereas the FSR article examines the money-asset price relationship over a 
relatively short period marked by shifts in the state of the economy, the WE article 
is more specific in focussing on the relationship between money and one asset, 
stocks, and in using US data over a relatively long period.   Both articles, 
however, share the view that an effect of a more liberalised and democratised 
financial market environment has been to generate patterns of substitution 
between money and financial assets that are dependent on economic performance.    
While the FSR article describes money and asset price developments, the WE 
article is more specific in using Friedman’s (1988) identification of four factors 
governing the relationship between money and one asset class, stocks, as the 
theoretical basis for its empirical analysis.   In that article, Friedman argues that 
there are three factors that will act to produce an inverse relationship between 
stock prices and money velocity, while a fourth factor generates a positive 
relationship between them.   The WE article contends that the importance of this 
fourth factor, based on a substitution of wealth between money and stock holdings 
dependent on stock market performance, would have been strengthened in the 
                                                 
18 “The New Dynamic between US Stock Prices and Money Holdings.” With F. Browne, World 
Economics, 2012, 13, 1, pp. 137-156.   
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wake of the liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets in the 1990s and 
2000s.   This process would have enhanced the demand for money as an asset, or 
a store of value, and made substitution of wealth between money and stocks much 
easier.   Thus, Friedman’s contention, under the fourth factor, that an expected 
increase in stock returns would cause a substitution from money into stocks, and 
vice versa, should be observed in the data from the 1990s onwards.   The WE 
article adds that substitution would not be dependent on expected rises or falls in 
stock markets alone but on economic and financial conditions more generally.    
In writing the article, the empirical challenge was to see whether the observed 
relationship between money velocity and stock prices had changed from that 
reported in Friedman (1988), where his first three factors were shown to dominate 
the fourth, to one where the substitution effect prevailed.   As with the Friedman 
article, the data examined in the WE article are the real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) 
Standard and Poors 500 (S&P 500) price index and real US M2 money holdings.   
The data cover the period 1967Q2 to 2010Q2, with the starting date dictated by 
it being the first quarter in which observations of the third variable employed, the 
Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), became available.   The CCI is a consumer 
sentiment indicator calculated from survey data by The Conference Board.   Its 
inverse is used as a measure of uncertainty in the WE article.   From the overall 
sample, data between 1985Q1 to 1992Q4 are removed from the analysis to 
provide a buffer between two sub-periods.   The first of those, 1967Q2 to 1984Q4, 
was a period when households’ participation in financial markets was repressed, 
while the second period, 1993Q1-2010Q2, was one when US financial markets 
were liberalised and increased household participation in those markets arose (as 
argued in Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2001).          
Initially, the relationship between the CCI measure of uncertainty and the income 
velocity of the US M2 money stock across the two periods is assessed.     A 
positive relationship between the two exists in the first period (a 
contemporaneous correlation of 0.36) and a negative one (a correlation of -0.81) 
in the second period.   The explanation put forward for these changes is that in 
the earlier period a rise in uncertainty (i.e. a deterioration in consumer sentiment) 
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would have reduced the need for money as a transaction medium, be it to buy 
goods and services or to engage in financial transactions.   In the later period, an 
increase in uncertainty would have seen investors taking the new option available 
to them, owing to the democratisation of financial markets, of substituting out of 
equities and into broad money aggregates (and vice versa) depending on the level 
of uncertainty in the economy.   A greater demand to hold liquidity by the public 
when economic conditions deteriorated would be accommodated by the central 
bank to avoid interest rates rising at a low point of the economic cycle.    
Having assessed the relationship between uncertainty and money, the next step 
taken in the WE article is to see if the observed interaction between M2 velocity 
and the S&P 500 index is consistent with the view that Friedman’s fourth factor 
had become the dominant influence on the money-stocks relationship.   Plots of 
the movement of both over time reveal that in the earlier 1967Q2-1984Q4 period, 
a large negative contemporaneous correlation (of -0.70) arises between the two 
variables.   In the later, 1993Q1-2010Q2 period, a low, positive correlation value 
of 0.16 occurs.   When the pre-2000 quarterly observations are trimmed from this 
later sample (i.e. the sample becomes 2000Q1-2010Q2), the correlation between 
the two rises to 0.85.   The stark change in the relationship between the velocity 
of money and uncertainty between the earlier and later periods was accompanied 
then by a distinct change in the relationship between that money variable and the 
stock market index.   A further examination of the data reveals that when 70-
quarter rolling window estimations are undertaken over the entire 1967-2010 
sample period, an increasing correlation between changes in the S&P 500 index 
and changes in M2 velocity arises, from a value of -0.26 in the first window 
(1967Q3-1984Q4) to a value of 0.41 in the last (1993Q1-2010Q2). 
The empirical analysis is completed by vector autoregressive (VAR) econometric 
estimations, involving the quarter-to-quarter changes in M2 velocity and the 
quarter-to-quarter changes in the (real) S&P 500 index.   Estimating separately 
for the 1967Q2-1984Q4 and 1993Q1-2010Q2 periods, the impulse response 
output from the VARs shows how each variable responds to a shock in the other.   
The results indicate that a positive shock to the money stock (stock price) has a 
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negative, short-term impulse effect on the stock price (money stock) in the earlier 
period.   In the later period, the opposite holds, with a positive impulse arising.   
In the earlier, 1967-1984 period, the effects of a positive S&P 500 shock can be 
interpreted as generating a demand for money and a lower velocity of money, be 
that for any of the first three factors put forward by Friedman, such as higher 
stock prices increasing the transaction demand for money.   A positive M2 
velocity shock leads to a contemporaneous fall in the stock index, as a lower 
transactions demand for money coincides with fewer stock trades and lower 
equity prices.    
For the later, 1993-2010 period, a positive shock to velocity causes a relatively 
long-lasting rise in equity prices, while a positive change in the S&P 500 index 
initiates a positive response from M2 velocity.   The results for this period are 
consistent with a dishoarding (hoarding) of money balances occurring alongside 
an increase (decrease) in the price of equities, while the second indicates rises 
(declines) in equity prices causing investors to dishoard (hoard) money balances.   
The econometric evidence then is supportive of Friedman’s fourth factor now 
being dominant in the money-stocks relationship owing to money’s store of value 
function having gained much greater importance in recent years.      
----- 
The relationship between monetary variables and financial assets is also the focus 
of the third article in this particular stream of work: “The Interaction Between 
Money and Asset Markets: A Spillover Index Approach”, published in the 
Journal of Macroeconomics (JMACRO) in 2014.19   It shares with the WE article 
the assessment that households readjusting their wealth between holdings of risky 
financial assets and nominal-certain money is an important factor at play in US 
financial markets in recent times.   The focus is on the interaction between asset 
prices and two US money aggregates: M2 and the monetary base.   The M2 
                                                 
19 “The Interaction between Money and Asset Markets: A Spillover Index Approach.”  Journal 
of Macroeconomics, 39 (2014), pp. 185-202. 
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aggregate is the commonly-used broad money supply in US economics studies 
(and it is also the money stock used in the FSR and WE articles).   The monetary 
base had particular relevance in 2008 and the years that followed when the 
Federal Reserve started to employ “balance-sheet policies” (Borio and Disyatat, 
2010), alternatively termed quantitative easing, in response to the financial and 
economic crisis of that time.    
It is noted at the outset of the JMACRO article, that consistent with Brainard and 
Tobin (1968), quantitative easing works through a “portfolio balance effect”, with 
changes in the relative supply of assets held by the private sector leading to 
changes in their relative yields.   Thus, the relationship between the monetary 
base and financial asset prices during a period of quantitative easing is worthy of 
investigation.   The literature review also recognises the link between bond 
markets and the monetary base as a standard feature of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism.   In relation to the broad money supply (as represented 
by M2), it acknowledges, following Friedman (1988), that there are two 
conflicting influences on the nature of its relationship with equities: a wealth 
effect (the first three factors mentioned in the WE article) and a substitution effect 
(his fourth factor).   The JMACRO article also notes the findings of the WE article 
(2012) on the money-equities relationship.  Following Friedman (1988), portfolio 
adjustment in other financial assets besides equities can occur as a result of 
monetary policy.   Asset price volatility can also affect money aggregate 
behaviour, with Slovin and Sushka (1983) showing that greater interest rate 
variability increases money demand and Tatom (1984) positing that bi-directional 
causality between money growth and interest rate variability arises.   The purpose 
of the JMACRO article then is to examine the interaction between financial asset 
prices (and the volatility of asset prices) and money aggregates over time to shed 
light on the relationships between them, including in ‘normal’ times (such as 
arose prior to 2008) and in ‘crisis’ periods (e.g. during 2008-9).    
As well as employing two money aggregates, representative indices for three 
asset classes are used in the econometric analysis in the JMACRO article: stocks 
(represented, again, by the S&P 500 index), commodities (the DJ-UBS 
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commodity index), and a currency index (the ICE US dollar index futures 
contract).  A fourth asset class, government bonds, is represented by yield data 
(US Generic Government 10-year bonds).   The data are weekly in frequency and 
cover a period from 2000 to 2012.   In the article, the interactions between money 
aggregates and asset classes are analysed in two ways: between week-to-week 
changes in the real (inflation-adjusted) money aggregates and week-to-week 
changes in the real returns of the asset classes, and between the changes in the 
real (inflation-adjusted) money aggregates and intra-week volatility measures for 
the four asset classes.   Following Garman and Klass (1980) and Alizadeh et al. 
(2002), asset price volatility series are calculated using a formula that utilises 
weekly opening, closing, high and low values for each asset class.  
The empirical approach in the JMACRO article corresponds to that of Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2009, 2012).   Those papers show how to produce spillover measures 
between variables based on forecast error variance decompositions produced 
from VAR models using, in this case, six (two money, four asset) variables.   The 
decompositions show the proportion of the movement in a variable’s 
development over time due to its own shocks (own-variable, or own-market, 
shocks) and due to shocks in the other variables (cross-variable, or cross-market, 
shocks) in the VAR.   A spillover index, with a possible range of values between 
0 and 100, is then calculated from these decompositions to provide a measure of 
interdependence, or interaction, among the variables.  A higher index value 
implies that a larger proportion of the shocks in markets as a whole is accounted 
for by cross-market shocks.   Spillover measures can be produced for all the 
variables taken as a group, between a money variable and the four asset variables, 
and on a bilateral basis between variables, including the two money variables. 
The spillover between variables over time is assessed using rolling-sample 
estimation, thus ensuring that interaction can be studied in periods of ‘crisis’ and 
otherwise.   In the JMACRO article, 52-week rolling windows are employed with 
the first window covering the weeks from 24 May 2000 to 16 May 2001, and the 
final window observations from 7 December 2011 to 28 November 2012.   The 
resultant spillover values are then plotted.   Sharp upward spikes in index values 
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at particular junctures in the 2000-2012 period are the main feature of the charts.   
In the case where the four asset returns and changes in the two monetary 
aggregates are the variables in the VAR (dubbed the returns spillover index in the 
article), spikes arise at the time of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the 
Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, and the downgrade of US 
sovereign debt in August 2011.   In the second case (termed the volatility spillover 
index in the article), where the four asset volatility measures and two monetary 
aggregate variables are those in the VAR, the same three dates exhibit spikes in 
the spillover index, while a fourth spike coincided with a “flash crash” in the US 
government bond market, which occurred on 6 May 2010.20   
The components of the two total spillover indices are the main focus of the article, 
in particular those showing the interaction between the monetary aggregates and 
asset returns, and between the monetary aggregates and asset volatilities.   There 
are two salient features of the observed interactions between the money stocks 
and asset classes.   The first is that the spillover of shocks between money and 
financial assets, in both returns and volatility index cases, tends to be much 
stronger during periods of financial market turbulence than in calmer times.   This 
is explained by the same substitution effect emphasised in the WE article, i.e. the 
nominal-certain property of money balances matters to investors at times of 
financial and economic stress and causes greater interaction between money and 
the four asset classes at such times.   The second feature is that the interaction 
between M2 and the financial assets tends to be greater than between the 
monetary base and those assets.   The particularly high level of interaction 
between M2 and stocks is noticeable.   The effects of quantitative easing (which 
affects the monetary base directly) then seems to be less important than the 
portfolio adjustment that occurs between broad money and financial assets.    
Finally, the bilateral spillover between the two money aggregates is also 
considered in the article.   There is strong bilateral spillover between them during 
                                                 
20 A flash crash refers to a situation where there is a sudden, rapid decline in an asset price within 
a trading day, often with no obvious reason as to why it occurred. 
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the twelve months after the September 2001 terrorist attacks when monetary 
accommodation by the Federal Reserve at that time may have met an increased 
demand for broad money (and, thus, caused the greater interaction between the 
two money stocks).   There is also a large net spillover from M2 to the monetary 
base in the nine months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.   Shocks to M2 
having large effects on the financial assets arise in the VAR output at that time as 
well.   The large spillover to the monetary base from M2 may reflect the Federal 
Reserve having had to increase the monetary base, at least in part, to facilitate 
portfolio adjustment from financial assets to M2.                  
----- 
The final article in this tranche, “Money Growth, Uncertainty and 
Macroeconomic Activity: A Multivariate GARCH Analysis”, published in 
Empirica in 2011, shares with the previously-discussed three articles a focus on 
the impact of uncertainty on the money supply.21   It opens by noting that 
understanding the effects of uncertainty on money growth had become a concern 
of central banks, in particular the ECB and other euro area central banks, in the 
mid-2000s.22   The Empirica article contributes to the literature on this topic by 
using a multivariate GARCH (generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity) model, which measures uncertainty by the conditional 
variance of the data series, to investigate whether macroeconomic uncertainty and 
monetary uncertainty Granger-cause changes in real money.   
As Greiber and Lemke (2005) note, terms such as “macroeconomic uncertainty” 
are difficult to conceptualise.   They use that specific term to refer to “a fairly 
broad concept capturing the bundle of forces that have led to a shift in the 
preference in liquidity” (Greiber and Lemke, 2005, p. 2).   They cite stock market 
losses, “high experienced volatility”, and geopolitical events as influencing 
                                                 
21 “Money Growth, Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Activity - A Multivariate GARCH 
Analysis.”   With R. Kelly and B. Kennedy, Empirica, May 2011, 38, 2, pp. 155-167. 
22 As articulated and examined in, for example, European Central Bank (2005) and Greiber and 
Lemke (2005). 
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uncertainty.   The terms used in the Empirica model are more specific: 
macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary uncertainty are capturing, in turn, the 
stochastic processes of output growth and money growth.   The conditional 
second moments of both growth rate processes provide measures of uncertainty 
in the real economy and in money supply, respectively.     
In estimating conditional volatilities, the article addresses the critique of Serletis 
and Shahmoradi (2006) that studies such as Hall and Noble (1987) and Thornton 
(1995), in using moving sample standard deviations of variables as measures of 
uncertainty, are using ad-hoc measures of variability, rather than of uncertainty.   
In contrast, if specific features appear in time-series data, namely the presence of 
ARCH effects in the series, a GARCH model will produce consistent measures 
of uncertainty if the conditional variances are correctly parameterised.    
Among the propositions considered in the article is that macroeconomic 
uncertainty should have a positive influence on money growth.   This could be 
expected, inter alia, on the basis of the content of the three articles discussed 
earlier in this section and other contributions to the literature.   Two monetarist 
propositions are also tested.   First, Belongia (1984), referencing earlier 
monetarist perspectives, posits that a pickup in monetary volatility generates, or 
adds to, macroeconomic uncertainty within the economy, increasing the 
precautionary demand for real money balances.   Secondly, monetary uncertainty 
has a negative effect on output growth within the economy.         
The first-differences (changes) in the natural logs of two monthly US data series 
are employed: the real (i.e. CPI-adjusted) M2 stock and the Composite Index of 
Lagging Indicators.   The Index is a broadly-based indicator of macroeconomic 
activity in the US economy (in contrast to more narrowly-defined indicators such 
as industrial production).   The dataset covers the period from 1959M1 to 
2007M4.   A two-step modelling approach is undertaken.   In the first step, the 
conditional variances of both the M2 and Index variables are estimated.   Unit 
root tests indicate both first-difference variables to be stationary series, while 
descriptive statistics show those first-differences to have excess kurtosis and non-
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normal distributions.   The residual diagnostic tests of VAR regressions of the 
first-difference series indicate non-normality to be present in the regression 
residuals, which is prima facie evidence that ARCH arises.   A bivariate BEKK 
GARCH model is then applied to the regression residuals, generating measures 
of macroeconomic uncertainty (from the Lagging Indicators residuals) and 
monetary uncertainty (from the real money residuals).   The uncertainty measures 
show a sustained rise in monetary uncertainty and episodes of heightened 
economic uncertainty in the United States in the 2000s, backing up central banks 
and other commentators’ interest in their effects. 
The second step in the modelling approach involves undertaking Granger 
causality tests among the four variables to hand: the first-differenced real money 
and Lagging Indicator series and the two measures of uncertainty.   Tests of 
significance indicate whether causality runs in a particular direction (espoused, 
for example, by a particular hypothesis), in the opposite direction, in a 
bidirectional manner, or in no direction (i.e. causality is absent).   The tests 
indicate whether causality from one variable to another (if it arises) is positive or 
negative in nature.  
The initial finding reported in the article is that macroeconomic uncertainty has a 
positive influence on real US M2 money growth.   This contrasts with Choi and 
Oh (2003) who find macroeconomic uncertainty to have a negative effect on the 
narrower US monetary aggregate, real M1.   Those authors’ theoretical model 
helps reconcile the differing results.   They show that the influence of uncertainty 
on money holdings is ambiguous a priori and can only be determined empirically.   
In relation to the monetarist propositions, the relevant Granger-causality tests on 
the hypothesised relationships offer mixed support.   The test indicate no 
significant causality occurring from monetary uncertainty to real money, rather a 
positive causal impact from real money growth to monetary uncertainty arises.   
An explanation for this may be provided in Choi and Oh’s model where monetary 
uncertainty evolves from a stochastic process in money supply growth.   The 
causality tests indicate monetary uncertainty having a significant, negative 
influence on macroeconomic uncertainty, in contrast to that argued by Friedman 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
(1984).   A significant, negative causal effect from monetary uncertainty to 
economic growth is reported, consistent with the monetarist view.      
5. Money, Commodity Prices and Inflation Tranche 
Where the articles discussed in the previous section focussed primarily on the 
interaction between money and asset prices, the four considered in this section 
address the traditional monetary economics topic of looking at how money and 
inflation relate to one another.   Three articles examine the relationship between 
consumer prices, commodity prices and the money stock.   The article 
“Commodity Prices, Money and Inflation”, published in Journal of Economics 
and Business in 2010, is the most important of these, with the other two articles 
following on from it.23   It provides both a formal “overshooting” model of the 
relationship between the three variables and an econometric investigation of the 
propositions arising from the theory articulated in the model.   The articles, “A 
Monetary Perspective on the Relationship between Commodity and Consumer 
Prices”, published in the Central Bank of Ireland’s Quarterly Bulletin in 2008, 
and “Monetary Policy, Inflation and Commodity Prices”, published in Perrucci, 
S., and Benaben, B., Inflation Sensitive Assets: Instruments and Strategies 
(London: Riskbooks) in 2012, provide an additional application of the 
overshooting model to components of the CPI, and discuss price and money 
developments in the 2000s and early 2010s using the model’s main tenets, 
respectively.24 25   The fourth article of this second tranche, “US Inflation and 
                                                 
23 “Commodity Prices, Money and Inflation.” With F. Browne, Journal of Economics and 
Business, 2010, 62, pp. 331-345.  
 
24 “A Monetary Perspective on the Relationship between Commodity and Consumer Prices.” With 
F. Browne, Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Quarterly Bulletin, No. 1 
2008, pp. 77-90. Also published as “Una Perspectiva Monetaria de la Relación Entre los Precios 
de Productos Básicos y los Precios al Consumidor.” With F. Browne, Monetaria, XXXII, 2, pp. 
271-296, Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies, Abril-Junio 2009. 
“Monetary Policy, Inflation and Commodity Prices.” With F. Browne, in Perrucci S. and Benaben 
B. (ed.s), Inflation Sensitive Assets: Instruments and Strategies, London: Riskbooks, 2012, pp. 
255-276.      
25 The article published in the Journal of Economics and Business was initially made available as 
a Central Bank of Ireland working paper in 2006 and as an ECB working paper in 2007.   The 
Quarterly Bulletin article and Perrucci-Benaben chapter were written subsequently.    
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Output since the 1970s: A P-Star Approach”, published in Empirical 
Economics, examines the P-star model of inflation, which follows from the 
quantity theory of money, and does so by the application of the VAR-based 
spillover index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) to US data.26   As with the 
overshooting model, its focus is on the money-inflation relationship.  
----- 
The JEB article was motivated, in part, by three Financial Times articles that 
asked whether sharp commodity price increases at that time were owing to a loose 
monetary stance in major industrialised economies.27   The views of Jeffrey 
Frankel (one of the financial press contributors) were particularly interesting to 
Frank Browne and me.   He had provided an overshooting theory of commodity 
prices (Frankel 1984 and, subsequently, Frankel 2008).   It argued that because 
commodities are exchanged in financial markets, they will respond quickly to 
changes in monetary conditions.   Although consumer prices will also adjust to 
monetary stimuli, they do so more slowly.   Consequently, commodity prices will 
adjust more than proportionately (i.e. overshoot) in the short run to compensate 
for consumer goods’ price stickiness.    
Frankel’s theory had a Keynesian basis (it drew on the Dornbusch (1976) theory 
of exchange rate overshooting), with the dynamic responses of commodity  prices 
following from changes in real interest rates in the presence of sticky consumer 
prices.   His theory led us to ask how commodity prices, consumer prices and the 
money stock would interact in a monetarist setting.   In particular, how would the 
price variables respond in the short to medium term to an exogenous change in 
the money supply where long run proportional relationships between each and 
the money supply are proposed and a varying degree of price stickiness between 
                                                 
26 “US Inflation and Output since the 1970s: A P-Star Approach.” Empirical Economics, 54, 2 
(March 2018), pp.567-591.   This article was accepted for publication on 19 October 2016 and 
was published on-line on 10 February 2017.  
27 The specific articles were published in The Financial Times: “More to oil shocks than the 
Middle East” (Clover and Fifield, 29 July 2004); “Too much money to blame for rising price of 
oil, economists claim” (Fifield, 18 August 2004); and “How real interest rates cast a shadow over 
oil” (Frankel, 15 April 2005).  
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consumer goods and commodities arise.   Le Chatelier’s principle in the field of 
chemistry, which says that if any change is imposed on a system that is in 
equilibrium then the system will adjust to a new equilibrium counteracting the 
change, was a concept that we also bore in mind in writing the JEB article.   The 
principle could be applied to price theory as follows: if not all goods prices in the 
economy are free to adjust readily to a change in economic conditions then other 
goods prices must initially overshoot their new equilibrium values to compensate, 
a dynamic feature that holds until all prices are able to adjust to their new 
equilibrium values. 
These influences and ideas led us to put forward a formal two-good, two-period 
model of the money-commodity price-consumer price relationships and to 
investigate it empirically.   Two monetarist propositions are noted at the outset of 
the article to give it a theoretical basis.   The first is that an exogenous change in 
the money stock leads to an equivalent percentage change in the overall price 
level under conditions of stable money demand.   The second proposition is that 
such changes are neutral in the long run steady state implying that all individual 
prices, whether they be consumer goods or commodities, adjust in the same 
proportion as the money stock, thus leaving all relative prices unchanged in the 
new steady state relative to their pre-money stock change configuration.   The 
overall price level is defined as comprising a weighted average of a consumer 
(final goods) price index and a commodity price index.   The prices of the two 
goods are assumed to have varying speeds of adjustment to changes in the money 
stock, with the consumer good adjusting more slowly.     
The propositions that frame the model imply that, say, a doubling of the money 
stock causes the overall price level to increase two-fold immediately, and that in 
the long run its two components will also rise by that same amount.   The differing 
speeds of adjustment of commodity and consumer prices, however, affect the 
trajectory of how they move to their new long run values.   In particular, the 
stickiness of consumer prices means those prices adjust slowly upwards over time 
to their new, higher equilibrium value.   To ensure the overall price level 
immediately rises pari passu with the larger money stock, commodity prices must 
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then compensate for consumer price sluggishness by rising more than 
proportionately to the change in the money stock.   Commodity prices must 
overshoot their new equilibrium value in the short run before reverting back in 
the long run.     
The algebraic model provided in the JEB article formalises this theory of 
commodity price overshooting.   It also provides a number of hypotheses for 
empirical investigation.   They are that (i) commodity prices and consumer prices 
move in proportion to the money stock in the long run; (ii) commodity prices will 
initially overshoot a new equilibrium value following a shock to the money 
supply to compensate for the sluggish response of consumer prices to the same 
shock; (iii) the mean-correction of commodity prices to their new equilibrium 
explains subsequent consumer price inflation.    
The first hypothesis indicated the need to apply a cointegration procedure to test 
for and estimate long run relationships within the data.   When there are more 
than two unit root variables in the time series dataset, the Johansen cointegration 
procedure is efficient in comparison to the Engle-Granger approach to 
cointegration.   Besides providing more efficient estimation, Johansen also offers 
better graphical output than Engle-Granger.   In particular, its innovation 
accounting output allows one ascertain whether commodity price overshooting 
(as indicated under hypothesis (ii)) arises or not.  
These hypotheses are then tested in the JEB article through the application of the 
Johansen cointegration procedure to US data for the period 1959Q1 to 2008Q4.   
The data comprise a commodity price index, the consumer price index (CPI), the 
M2 money stock and an output variable, real GDP.   Three commodity price 
indices (the Commodity Research Bureau Spot Index, the Commodity Research 
Bureau Raw Industrials Index, the Sensitive Materials Index) are used as 
alternatives to one another in the estimations.    
Each VAR estimation comprises four integrated-of-order-one variables: a 
commodity price index, the CPI, M2 and GDP.   The various steps of the Johansen 
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procedure show that the long-run proportional relationships hypothesised 
between the money stock and consumer prices and between the money stock and 
commodity prices are upheld; and that the deviation of the commodity price index 
from its equilibrium value and the deviation of the CPI from its equilibrium value 
have explanatory power, with the correct coefficient signs, for subsequent CPI 
inflation.   The impulse responses of the three endogenous variables to a positive 
M2 shock are supportive of the hypothesis that consumer prices adjust slowly 
toward their new-money-determined equilibrium to that shock, while commodity 
prices overshoot their new equilibrium value in the short-to-medium term.    
                                                                     ----- 
Following the JEB article, I was anxious to see whether the overshooting model 
would prove robust in an application to a dataset where the price adjustment 
characteristics of the variables would seem, at least a priori, to be less extreme 
than what arises between commodities and consumer goods.   In the Quarterly 
Bulletin (QB) article, written in the months after the JEB article, the commodity 
price index and the CPI are replaced in the cointegrating VAR estimations by two 
components of the US CPI.   The motivation is that just as commodity prices are 
more sensitive than the overall CPI to monetary stimuli, it should also be the case 
that some components of the CPI will react more quickly than others to money 
supply shocks.   The article refers to evidence (Alvarez et al., 2006, and Bils and 
Klenow, 2004) that the price of some goods included in the CPI (in particular, 
energy and food products) are more flexible than those of other goods in it.    
The Johansen procedure is then applied to a new US dataset in the QB article, 
comprising, as previously, the M2 money stock and real GDP and, in place of the 
CPI and commodity index, the CPI-less-food-and-energy index and the CPI food 
index.   The econometric output finds two long-run proportional relationships 
arising, between CPI-less-food-and-energy index and M2 and between the CPI 
food index money stock and M2.   The impulse response analysis shows both 
price indices converging over time to their new equilibrium values following a 
money supply shock.   While no overshooting arises, the CPI food index responds 
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more quickly, and with sharper movements (i.e. greater volatility), than the CPI-
less-food-and-energy index to changes in the money stock.   The policy 
implications of these results are that the CPI food component is monetary-
determined and not a nuisance to be easily discarded in inflation analysis.   With 
the food component reacting more quickly to a money shock, it might also prove 
to be a leading indicator of core inflation developments  
                                                               ----- 
The central hypothesis of the overshooting model that goods prices are monetary-
determined but vary in speed in their response to monetary stimuli had been 
shown to hold for both a CPI-commodity index pairing and for two components 
of the CPI in the JEB and QB articles.   These findings proved of interest to the 
commissioning editors of a book on inflation-sensitive assets (assets whose 
values are particularly sensitive to the inflation environment, among them 
commodities).   The resultant contribution to the Perrucci-Benaben volume uses 
the overshooting model to analyse US price and money developments between 
2000Q1 and 2011Q1.   The chapter shows how prior to 2008Q3 (when a period 
of financial crisis took effect), the US M2 money stock had grown by 68 per cent 
since 2000Q1 and the CPI by 28 per cent.   With such a large growth differential 
between those two variables, it is unsurprising from the perspective of the 
overshooting theory that the Commodity Research Bureau Spot Index exhibited 
a sharper rise, of 115 per cent, over the same period, and greater volatility than 
the CPI.    
Other instances of overshooting during the 2000-2011 period are also observed 
in the data.   One example is the sizeable, positive differential between the M2 
growth rate and CPI inflation between 2001 and 2003.   The commodity index 
then starts to rise sharply in 2003 with strong rates of growth in it maintained into 
2005.   The overshooting theory explains this behaviour by noting that some delay 
in the effects of a monetary stimulus (such as occurred after the terrorist attacks 
of September 2001) to commodity prices will occur.   Its peak effect on 
commodity price inflation is shown in the JEB article to occur with about a six-
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quarter lag to the money supply shock.   Thus, the 18-to-24 month delay in the 
response of commodity prices to the monetary stimulus of 2001 should not be 
unexpected.   A second example identified in the chapter is the strong rebound in 
commodity prices in 2010 and early-2011 following the loose monetary stance of 
the post-2008Q3 period.                 
----- 
As with the last three articles discussed, the fourth article in this second tranche, 
“US Inflation and Output since the 1970s: A P-Star Approach”, published in 
Empirical Economics (EE), addresses the relationship between money and 
inflation.   It examines the P-star model of inflation, introduced by Hallman et al. 
(1991), with the Diebold-Yilmaz econometric approach that I had previously 
employed in the JMACRO article.    
Hallman et al (1991) derive a model of inflation from the quantity theory of 
money equation.   Their argument is that there is an equilibrium price level (𝑃𝑃∗, 
i.e. “P-star”) consistent with the current money stock, 𝑀𝑀, and the equilibrium 
values of the velocity of money (𝑉𝑉∗) and output (𝑄𝑄∗), as follows: 
𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉∗
𝑄𝑄∗
 
The money stock, 𝑀𝑀, also satisfies the determination of the current price level, 𝑃𝑃, 
and velocity of money (𝑉𝑉) and output (𝑄𝑄): 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉
𝑄𝑄
 
Using natural logs, it follows from these two equations that: 
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝∗ = (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑣𝑣∗) + (𝑞𝑞∗ − 𝑞𝑞) 
Under the P-star theory, the two variables on the right-hand-side of this equation, 
the velocity gap and the output gap, respectively, will cause the gap between the 
current price level and the equilibrium level to be closed over time, either through 
inflation or deflation.   Inflationary pressure will arise when 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣∗ and/or 𝑞𝑞 >
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𝑞𝑞∗, and deflationary pressure when the gaps have the opposite sign.   Inflation 
then can be modelled as a function of the two gap variables.28 29   
The EE article then estimates VARs on a rolling window basis with each VAR 
including the inflation rate, the two gap variables and a fourth variable, oil price 
inflation.   This final variable is included as a measure of cost-push/non-monetary 
pressures.   From VAR estimations, forecast error variance decompositions 
indicate the extent to which inflation shocks are accounted for by past 
innovations, or shocks, to the other variables (cross-variance shares) in the VAR 
and by shocks to inflation itself (the own-variance share).   The influence of the 
two P-star gaps variables on inflation over time, including relative to one another 
and relative to the cost-push variable, are then quantified.    
The VAR estimations use quarterly US data from 1960Q3 to 2016Q2, with the 
percentage difference between real GDP and potential GDP providing the output 
gap and changes in the West Texas Crude spot price the oil inflation variable.   
Following Hallman et al. (1991), percentage changes in the GDP implicit deflator 
(GDPD) give the measure of inflation.   Two measures of money velocity are 
used: one based on the M2 money aggregate and the other on the MZM money 
aggregate.30   Percentage deviations of the current-period aggregates from an 
estimated equilibrium value for each provide velocity gap measures.   Those 
velocity gaps are used as alternatives to one another in the four-variable VAR 
estimations, which also include the output gap, the inflation rate and the oil 
inflation rate.   M2 has been the usual choice of money stock variable in US 
monetary studies, but its previously stable relationship with nominal output broke 
down during the 1980s and 1990s (Friedman and Kuttner 1992; Estrella and 
                                                 
28 The P-star model was applied initially to US data by Hallman et al. and others such as Tatom 
(1990).   Variants of the P-star model were also developed by Trecroci and Vega (2002) and 
Gerlach and Svensson (2003), with the latter, for example, using a real money gap (that is the gap 
between the current real money stock and the long-run equilibrium money stock) and an output 
gap in a model of euro area inflation. 
29 According to Humphrey (1989), there are many precursors to Hallman et al.’s formal model, 
stretching back as far as the writings of David Hume. 
30 The MZM (Money Zero Maturity) money stock is defined as the M2 stock less small-
denomination time deposits plus institutional money funds.  
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Mishkin 1997).   Carlson et al. (2000) provide evidence that the MZM money 
demand function remained stable throughout this period.   Both velocity gaps are 
used as substitutes for one another in the VAR.   The rolling-window size chosen 
is 60 quarters, with the first window ending in 1975Q3 and the final window 
ending in 2016Q2. 
The decomposition output from the VAR estimations is considered in three parts 
in the EE article.    The first focusses on spillovers to GDPD inflation.   The results 
are supportive of a P-star/monetary explanation of inflation.   The overall finding 
is that shocks to the two gap variables explain a substantial share of US GDP 
deflator inflation shocks over time, particularly in the late 1980s-early 1990s and 
after the financial crisis of 2008.   Monetary factors (i.e. the two gap variables), 
and not oil shocks, underlie price developments in the 1970s and early 1980s.   
Even during the 1970s, the monetary variables’ share of the inflation 
decomposition is higher than that of the oil price.   After the 1970s, oil price 
shocks take a low share of the decomposition of inflation.   This feature of the 
results supports the views of Barsky and Kilian (2000, 2002) which attribute high 
and variable inflation and low or negative output growth during that period to 
monetary expansions and contractions, rather than the popular view that 
exogenous oil shocks were dominant at that time.       
The strength of the impulse from the two gap variables to inflation after 2008 is 
attributed to the effects of the three programmes of quantitative easing undertaken 
by the Federal Reserve after the crisis of that year.   The goal of quantitative 
easing was to stimulate the economy through an increased money supply.   The 
econometric evidence in the article is that shocks to M2 velocity have a strong 
influence on inflation developments during the post-crisis period.   The M2 gap’s 
share of inflation is also much lower than that of the MZM gap during the early 
1990s, providing support to the view of Carlson et al. (2000) that the MZM 
aggregate is more informative in explaining the relationship of money to nominal 
economic activity at that time. 
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The resurgent view of recent years (and espoused in the JEB, Perrucci-Benaben, 
and QB articles) that commodities are subject to monetary influences motivates 
the second portion of the econometric assessment in the EE article, that 
examining the spillover of shocks to oil price inflation.   The contention of Barsky 
and Kilian (2000, 2002) that oil price increases in the 1970s were, at least in 
significant part, the result of a high rate of monetary growth is explored through 
the forecast error variance decompositions.   The estimations indicate a strong 
monetary impulse to oil prices in the 1970s, mainly from velocity shocks, before 
it declines slowly thereafter.   Monetary shocks’ influence on oil prices has 
become noticeably stronger since the mid-2000s, supporting the greater attention 
being paid of late to the impact of the monetary environment on commodity 
markets.    
The third set of results considered in the EE article examines the spillover of 
shocks to the output gap over time.   The results indicate money mattering to 
output developments, with a strong influence of the velocity gap variable being 
particularly noticeable after the 2008 financial crisis.   The money aggregate used 
in estimating the velocity gap is again important in establishing and quantifying 
the relationship with economic activity at particular times.   As with the inflation 
decomposition, the influence of the MZM gap on output developments is 
particularly strong in the late-1980s and early-1990s.   GDPD inflation shocks 
and, to a lesser extent, oil inflation shocks dominate the cross-variance share of 
output gap shocks in the 1970s and early-1980s.   After the Volcker disinflation 
(of 1980-1982), the influence of both inflation and oil price shocks on the output 
gap wane and those of velocity gap shocks increase.    
The application of the Diebold-Yilmaz spillover index methodology to US 
macroeconomic data in the EE article then provides a number of distinct findings.   
Most importantly, shocks to monetary variables have explanatory power over 
inflation developments.   This is particularly strong during the 1970s and early 
1980s but also in recent years.   The P-star model, therefore, continues to have 
empirical relevance.   Money shocks, and not oil shocks, underlie price 
developments in the period before the Volcker disinflation.   Monetary shocks’ 
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influence on oil prices has become noticeably stronger over the past ten years or 
so, supporting the greater attention being paid of late to the impact of the 
monetary environment on commodity markets.  
6. Conclusion 
The primary purpose of the research recorded in this dissertation was to consider 
money’s relationship to economic activity (in particular, the inflation rate of 
goods and services) and to financial markets.   Its starting premise was that 
changes in the money stock affect goods and asset markets and the research 
predominantly used time series-based econometric methods, informed by 
economic theory and using US data, to investigate money’s links to both.   In this 
concluding section, I argue that this research succeeded in shedding fresh light on 
the relationship between money and goods and asset markets.   How it has been 
referenced and ties into the economics literature is reviewed.   In the second part 
of the section, I consider how the research and the processes involved in 
undertaking it, writing it up and getting it published has affected my development 
as an economist. 
6.1 How the research fits into the literature 
It can be hard for a researcher to gauge and assess where their output fits into the 
literature in the area they are working in.   That stems, in part, from a reluctance 
to overegg one’s contribution and from the breadth of the literature, even within 
what one might see as a small corner of, say, the macroeconomics literature.   A 
practical issue is that while an article can be read against the scholarly 
contributions that precede it, there is usually some delay from its publication date 
to it being referenced in other articles.   This makes it difficult to see how it fits 
into and is being used in the output of other researchers.   In this dissertation, this 
arises for the JMACRO and EE articles, which were published in 2014 and 2018, 
respectively (available on-line from October 2013 and February 2017, 
respectively).   
                                                                        ----- 
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With these caveats, I consider first the tranche of articles dealing with the money-
inflation-output relationship.   The research involved succeeded in addressing the 
empirical difficulty of establishing a monetarist relationship between money and 
economic activity in two ways, one through the JEB overshooting model and 
follow-on applications, and the other by an innovative application of the P-star 
model in the EE article. 
The JEB article provided a formal “overshooting” model of the relationship 
between money, consumer goods prices and commodity prices.   The model 
informed the empirical analysis, in particular the choice of the Johansen 
cointegration procedure as the basis for investigating whether the purported 
relationships in the theoretical model are supported by the data.   The econometric 
application was in the affirmative in its support for the model.   The first step in 
the procedure established that commodity and consumer prices are each 
cointegrated with the money stock and output.   The coefficient on the money 
variable in both cointegrating vectors was found to be statistically insignificantly 
different from one, so that long run proportionality between money and prices, a 
tenet of the Quantity Theory, cannot be rejected.   The deviations of commodity 
prices and consumer prices from their fundamental/monetary-determined values 
were shown to have predictive power for future consumer price inflation, with 
coefficient signs predicted by the overshooting model and its underlying 
monetarist theory.   The coefficient of the deviation of the actual consumer price 
index from its monetary-determined (i.e. fitted) value has a statistically 
significant negative value – the theoretically-correct coefficient value - in the 
short-run dynamic equation.   This is also the coefficient sign posited by Hallman 
et al.’s (1991) P-star model in its demonstration of the relationship between the 
consumer price index and its monetary-determined value (i.e., P-star).    
A feature of the results is that a stable inverse money demand function is provided 
in the JEB article.31   It has proved difficult since the early 1990s to establish 
                                                 
31 The inverse money demand function being referred to here is one where the final goods price 
level (in this case, the CPI) is on the left-hand-side of the equation and the money stock is on the 
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well-defined US money demand functions based on the standard specification of 
the real money stock being dependent on real GDP (or another output variable) 
and the opportunity cost of the money stock.32   The JEB article differentiates 
itself in two ways in addressing this issue.   First, the inverse money demand 
equation (the long run equation with the CPI on the left-hand side of the equation) 
is estimated as one of a pair of equations (within a cointegrating vector approach), 
where the other equation is a modelling of the determination of the commodity 
price indices used in the article.   Secondly, there is no opportunity cost variable 
in the equation, because within the overshooting model the overall price level 
(comprising a weighted average of consumer prices and commodity prices) is 
unchanging.   Thus, there is no need for the interest rate to change to equilibrate 
money demand to money supply and so it is excluded from both the consumer 
price index and commodity price index equations.   These features suggest that a 
richer econometric approach to money demand estimation may occur within a 
system of equations rather than undertaking embellishments of the standard 
single-equation money demand equation.   
Other researchers have used the JEB article as a basis and reference point for their 
published work.   Where the JEB article tests the overshooting theory using US 
data, Belke et al. (2010, 2014) apply the theory and the cointegration 
methodology in it to aggregated OECD data.   They find similar relationships to 
that in the JEB article and attribute price developments to the measure of global 
liquidity provided by the aggregated data.  Their contribution then provides a 
corroboration of the application of the overshooting model with a second dataset.   
With data comprising time series for the US, euro area, India, China, and Japan 
(what they term the G5), Ratti and Vespignani (2016) also provide results 
consistent with the JEB article, including cointegration between the money stock, 
                                                 
right-hand side.   In contrast, a standard money demand has the real money stock on the left-hand-
side (usually calculated as the natural log of the money stock less the natural log of the CPI).  
32 Duca and VanHoose (2004) provide a survey of the issues involved. 
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output and CPI and changes in the money stock causing changes in the CPI and 
commodity prices.    
Beckmann et al. (2014) cite the JEB article in explaining how rapid commodity 
price adjustments may be attributed to relative consumer price stickiness in 
response to changes in monetary policy.   They also use a VAR-based 
methodology (a Markov-switching error-correction variant) and find a significant 
long-run relationship between global liquidity and commodity prices, as well as 
commodity prices reacting more quickly to global liquidity shocks than consumer 
goods prices.   Belke et al. (2010b) refer to the stickiness of consumer prices in 
explaining rapid asset price responsiveness to monetary stimuli.   They argue that 
monetary aggregates may then have a role as leading indicators of both consumer 
price and asset price developments.   The JEB article has also been referred to in 
papers that look specifically at commodity price movements as leading indicators 
of CPI developments (see, for example, Jalil and Zea (2011) and Verhayen 
(2010)).   The overshooting model has also been highlighted in the financial press 
(e.g. Reuters, Breaking Views) and in fora discussing the conduct of monetary 
policy, such as the Shadow Open Market Committee (author: Michael Bordo).33    
The second substantive contribution in this dissertation to research on the money-
inflation relationship is contained in the EE article.   Since it has only been 
available on-line since early 2017, it is difficult to assess what influence this 
contribution might have in the years ahead.34   The Hallman et al. (1991) P-star 
article has been heavily cited since its initial publication but much less so in recent 
years.   Moreover, references to it since 2014 in Journal of Economic Literature-
listed journals have tended to be in the context of examining issues such as the 
appropriate money stock to use for inflation analysis (Anderson et al. (2017)) and 
                                                 
33 http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL2229499520070323; 
http://www.livemint.com/Money/dV2LSgl4rk6oNCPTLbHk3L/Oil-price-drop-too-little-and-
too-late.html;  
http://shadowfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Bordo_SOMC-Mar2011.pdf 
34  The EE article has been downloaded 309 times (as at 19 March 2018) from the Springer website 
since it became available online on 10 February 2017 
(https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-017-1229-2), which is quite a large number in 
comparison to other EE articles made available online around that time.    
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employing the P-star model as a starting point for an identification of monetary 
shocks in explaining inflation (see the state-space models of El-Shagi and Giesen 
(2013) and El-Shagi et al. (2015)).   The EE article is much closer to the original 
Hallman et al. approach as it uses the two gap variables identified in their model 
and shows how they can explain price developments over time.   Their 
explanatory power is particularly strong at times when inflation rates were high 
and also in recent years when quantitative easing was being undertaken by central 
banks.   The econometric output also sheds light on the debate as to whether oil 
price or monetary developments were the primary determinant of the stagflation 
of late 1970s and early 1980s.   The evidence is supportive of the views of Barsky 
and Kilian (2000, 2002) that monetary factors were the dominant influence on the 
macroeconomy at that time.    
An attraction to policymakers of the EE econometric approach, particularly in its 
rolling-window estimation format, is that it can be used to examine inflation, 
velocity gap and output gap behaviour and their interaction with one another on 
an ongoing basis.   A regular updating of the rolling windows estimation, with 
windows being added as new data observations become available, could give 
policymakers or analysts an insight into whether inflation developments were 
coming more, or less, from the money channel (velocity gap) than the real 
economy channel (output gap), and whether own (price) shocks’ influence has 
increased or decreased.35   Another research option, in the spirit of Orphanides 
(2001), would be to use the EE econometric approach to compare historical real-
time measures of the velocity gap’s and output gap’s explanatory power over 
observed inflation with that of ex-post gap data.36   Such an exercise could 
highlight any informational difficulties faced by central banks in monetary 
policymaking and how those could be addressed in their decision-making. 
                                                 
35 F.X. Diebold and K. Yilmaz, co-authors of the eponymous spillover index methodology, 
maintain a website (http://financialconnectedness.org/) that regularly updates (in some cases, on 
a daily basis) measures of financial interconnectedness as new observations become available.  
Indices are provided for global stock, sovereign bond, CDS, and foreign exchange markets.    
36 Using the Taylor rule and US data, Orphanides (2001) shows how monetary policy 
recommendations based on real-time data differ substantially from those drawn from ex-post data.    
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In summary, both the overshooting and EE articles show that an innovative 
econometric approach to the modelling of standard monetarist relationships can 
succeed in establishing a causal link from money to inflation.   This can breathe 
fresh life into longstanding gap variables (such as the output gap and the velocity 
gap) and provide new ones (such as the pairing of CPI and commodity price index 
gaps) as indicators of inflationary/deflationary pressures within the economy.   
The articles then find that what is old (the quantity theory and monetarism) can 
be new again when explored in innovative, but rigorous, ways.    
                                                                         ----- 
Of the four articles in the tranche of the dissertation considering the money-
financial markets relationship, the JMACRO article represents an endpoint to the 
themes and research set out and developed in the FSR, WE, and Empirica articles, 
each of which were published prior to it.   The JMACRO article focuses on the 
period 2000 to 2012.   That timeframe provides data for assessing spillovers 
between asset markets and money, and between money stocks, in periods of both 
economic and financial calm and turbulence in the expectation that the greater 
volatility associated with the latter kind of period will see more interaction 
arising.   It was also a period when there was strong money growth between 2000 
and 2005, as documented in the FSR article, and after the financial crisis that took 
hold in 2008.     
Beyond considering the effects a volatile economic environment has on it, the 
relationship between money and asset markets has come into focus in recent years 
owing to quantitative easing and this is given particular attention in the JMACRO 
article.   Over the past ten years, there has been a reliance by central banks on 
what Borio and Disyatat (2010) call “balance sheet policies”, whereby the central 
bank uses its balance sheet to affect asset market prices and conditions directly.   
The efficacy of these policies is posited to rely on the distinctions that arise 
between asset types, in particular their risk characteristics.   This gives central 
banks – the sole issuer of the monetary base – leverage in those asset markets 
towards achieving their policy aims.   This policy stance highlights the need for 
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the money-asset markets relationship to be examined more closely.   While the 
other articles in the money-asset markets tranche of this dissertation were 
completed before sufficient macroeconomic data relating to programmes of 
quantitative easing of the late-2000s/early-2010s were available, the JMACRO 
article pays particular attention to balance sheet policies’ effects on asset markets.   
It does so in the line of enquiry put forward initially in the FSR article: that what 
is identified there as “monetary laxity” will have an impact on asset market 
developments.     
In motivating the JMACRO article, reference is made at the outset to the WE 
hypothesis that households substitute their wealth holdings between nominal-
certain money and equities in response to changes in the economic climate, and 
that this could extend to the relationship between money and other asset classes.   
It also refers to the JEB article in espousing the relationship that might arise 
between money and commodities, another one of the four asset classes 
considered.   While the Empirica article is not referenced, its focus on how 
uncertainty affects money aggregates is reflected in the JMACRO contribution by 
considering how the monetary base and M2 money stock interact with one 
another, and with financial assets, over a timeframe that includes periods of 
recession and severe financial stress.     
The main finding in the JMACRO article is that more sizeable spillovers between 
money and asset variables occur in periods of economic and financial turbulence 
than at other times.   It argues that households re-adjusting their wealth holdings 
between money and other financial assets in response to the prevailing economic 
climate may have been the dominant force at play in generating this behaviour.   
This view is also put forward in explaining another feature of the econometric 
results: that the interaction of the monetary base with financial assets was less 
than that of the M2 money stock with them during the period when quantitative 
easing was being pursued by the Federal Reserve.   The thinking and empirical 
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illustrations of the FSR and WE articles then receive support from the more 
involved methodological approach of the JMACRO research.37     
The JMACRO article has been cited in various studies since its publication in 
2014 (according to Google Scholar, it has been cited 35 times (as of 19 March 
2018)).   These include references to its monetary policy focus, with Guidolin et 
al. (2017) referring to its use of a “modern, flexible dynamic time series model” 
in their study of the mechanisms linking monetary policy to US corporate bond 
values in both periods of conventional monetary expansion and quantitative 
easing.   How the Diebold-Yilmaz approach is used in the JMACRO article is 
referenced in motivating papers on spillovers between Asian stock markets 
(Nishimura et al. (2017)), the dynamic interactions between credit and output 
growth (Antonakis et al. (2015)) and volatility connectedness in EMU sovereign 
bond markets (Fernandez-Roudriguez et al (2016)).  
Nyborg and Ostberg (2014) provide evidence that developments in the demand 
for liquidity (base money) in the interbank money market have consequences for 
financial asset markets on a day-to-day basis, irrespective of whether financial 
stress, or “financial crisis”, prevails or not.  They conclude that “money matters 
in financial markets” (2014, p. 30).   Taken together, the articles in the money-
asset markets tranche of this dissertation could be said to reach a similar 
conclusion.   They contribute to the understanding of the financial cycle by 
highlighting asset markets’ relationship to money developments over time and in 
particular in response to changes in the economic cycle and to events such as the 
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. 
In terms of policy, the articles point to the need for central banks to consider the 
money-asset market nexus in their deliberations, including with regard to their 
price stability mandates.   Smets (2013, p.4) indicates that the medium-term 
aspect of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, which always had a money-focus, 
                                                 
37 The FSR article was the focus of a newspaper article in the German financial newspaper, Borsen 
Zeitung, soon after it was published (“Uberschussige Liquidat blaht Asset-Preise auf”, Borsen 
Zeitung, Ausgabe 223 vom 18.11.2005, Seite 7). 
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now takes “into account the medium-term implications of booming asset prices 
and credit markets for price stability.”   The import of the Empirica article, which 
considers money and uncertainty in isolation from financial market 
developments, for policymakers is similar, with its concluding section arguing 
that information gathering by central banks should include measures of monetary 
uncertainty and macroeconomic uncertainty in their holistic assessment of 
monetary data.          
An aspect common to both tranches here (the JMACRO and EE articles in 
particular) is that different definitions of the money stock can have an impact on 
research findings.   Following on that, one potential avenue of future research that 
is of interest to me relates to the components of the broad money stock and their 
connection to stock markets.   The relationship between money market funds 
(MMFs), a component of the M2 money stock, and stock markets could be 
explored further.   Two articles cited in the WE article (Dow and Elmendorf 
(1998) and Carlson and Schwartz (1999)) argue that this component of the US 
broad money stock acts as a “gateway” for households in rebalancing the portfolio 
of assets in liberalised financial markets, with shifts in stock market values seeing 
funds being channelled through MMFs.   More recently, Kacperczyk and Schnabl 
(2013) find MMFs to have been risk-taking during the financial crisis of the late 
2000s and being prone to runs as a result.   Strahan and Tanyeri (2015) note that 
investors ran on MMFs after Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008, forcing funds 
to sell their most liquid asset holdings, while Hanson et al. (2014) find MMFs 
having destabilising effects on financial markets during that crisis period.   These 
recent contributions are alluding back to the late 1990s’ “gateway” perspective 
(although neither refers to the earlier articles).   Modelling MMFs’ relationship 
to financial markets then would be of particular interest to me as a future research 
project.   My preliminary investigation of weekly data shows a strong negative 
correlation between changes in the S&P500 index and changes in the size of the 
MMF component of M2.   Further work on this would include estimating an 
econometric model of the relationship between the two variables (possibly 
drawing on a financial econometrics methodology suited to relatively high 
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frequency data), and the consideration of how variables like the VIX index affect 
it.     
6.2  Personal development as a researcher and economist 
The research recorded in this dissertation constitutes a coherent subset of my 
published work since the mid-2000s.   The eight articles are a subset of twenty 
that I had published as the sole author or co-author over the period 2005 to 2018 
(of which thirteen were peer-reviewed).   I have been doing less research in the 
area of monetary economics since 2013.38   This reflects a change in my role in 
the Central Bank that requires me to conduct research and analytical work in the 
area of sovereign bond markets and the related area of fiscal policy and the public 
finances.   The monetary research of previous years has stood me well in 
undertaking this strand of research, particularly its empirical aspects, as I would 
expect it will continue to do in any future lines of research.39    
Looking back over the monetary research and how it was conducted, I believe it 
has enhanced my skills as an economist and deepened and widened my 
knowledge of monetary economics in three ways in particular: 
• Ability to identify a topic worthy of research, formulate a number of propositions 
for empirical investigation, and choose an appropriate empirical approach and 
dataset:  In my initial ten years working as a professional economist, econometric 
estimation and assessment played a relatively small role in my analytical work.   
This has changed significantly since I began undertaking the research captured in 
this dissertation.   While the analysis involved acquiring econometric skills 
(discussed under the next bullet point), it also enhanced my ability to assess and 
keep abreast of the economics literature – and contemporaneous developments in 
the economy and financial markets – as a basis for framing the hypotheses to be 
                                                 
38 Although I still have latitude to do monetary research, as in the EE article and Cronin (2017) 
that have been undertaken, written up, and published in that period. 
 
39 My publications since 2013 in the sovereign markets-fiscal policy area include Cronin and 
Dowd (2013), Cronin (2014), Cronin and McQuinn (2014), Conefrey and Cronin (2015), Cronin 
et al. (2015), Cronin et al. (2016), and Cronin and McQuinn (2017).  
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investigated in a piece of research.   Of the articles that I have written over the 
past five years or so, the JMACRO and EE publications are good examples of 
how this works.   The former addressed a lacuna that exists in the literature 
(despite the progress made over the past fifteen years or so) of providing a 
rigorous quantitative assessment of the relationship between money and asset 
prices.   A trawl of the literature (assisted by the arrival of Google Scholar and 
other search engines which I now use routinely in my research) helped assemble 
a set of related issues for investigation.   My understanding of US money and 
financial databases and econometric skills combined to provide evidence on those 
that was sufficient to meet the standards of a high-ranking journal.   The EE article 
also utilised those capabilities.   It showed an ability to recollect and revisit a 
venerable theory and to give it new life.   In summary, the experience of the 
research contained in this dissertation honed my skills in producing scholarly 
output to a peer-reviewed standard.      
• An improvement in my time-series econometrics skills:  Prior to the undertaking 
of the research that would result in the articles herein, I had spent the previous 
ten years or so writing papers that involved little or no econometrics.   I was 
writing mainly in two areas: how fiscal policy should be conducted in EMU (in 
line with my duties as the Central Bank’s designated “fiscal expert”) and in the 
area of payments and monetary standards.40   Part of the motivation in moving to 
the monetary policy function in 2003 was a desire to improve my empirical skills.   
Time-series-based econometrics are the predominant mechanism for assessing 
the various propositions and hypotheses being set out and investigated in 
monetary research.   VAR-based econometrics (including Johansen 
cointegration) were of attraction to me, in particular the innovation accounting 
(impulse response functions and forecast-error-variance decompositions) that 
these estimation methods produce.   The academic standing of the EE, Empirica, 
JMACRO, and JEB outlets for my research would indicate that I have mastered 
the application of these techniques to a high level.   With this grounding, I have 
                                                 
40 The fiscal policy articles include Cronin and McCoy (1999, 2000) and Cronin and Scally (2000, 
2002).   Among the articles on payments and monetary reform published in this period were 
Browne and Cronin (1995, 1997) and Cronin and Dowd (2001). 
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been able in recent years to extend my econometric knowledge to include 
threshold VAR (used in Cronin and McQuinn, 2014), multivariate GARCH 
(Cronin, 2014), Markov-switching VAR (Cronin et al., 2016), and 
autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration (Cronin and McQuinn, 
2016). 
• Writing and presentational skills: any research will have an impact and meet 
professional standards only if it is presented in a coherent and reader-friendly 
manner.   The writer needs to be able to set out initially the hypotheses to be 
investigated, document the empirical results, and then marry them back to the 
economics hypotheses outlined initially.   My ability to write and organise my 
research on paper has certainly benefitted from the research documented in the 
articles herein.   Engaging with editors and referees and responding to their 
suggestions and requirements has not only sharpened how I present my findings 
but it has also made me more cognisant of their requirements before commencing 
new research.   In short, I engage better with the undertaking and recording of 
research, as an economist engaged by my employer to do so and in satisfying my 
own curiosity.             
The practical benefit of the research undertaken and documented in this 
dissertation then is that I am a better economist for it.   This is illustrated, inter 
alia, by the number, and quality, of the scholarly articles that I have had accepted 
for publication in recent years.   Alongside an enhanced research ability, my 
writing and editorial style has become more succinct as a result of contributing to 
various publication outlets, be they field journals, central bank periodicals or 
book chapters aimed at financial market professionals.   My knowledge of 
monetary economics has also increased, particularly the monetarist and, to a 
lesser degree, the Austrian perspectives in the area.   Beyond the practical benefit 
of improved skills, I also believe that I have engaged in a body of research that 
stands as a meaningful contribution to monetary economics and, in particular, to 
the understanding of the relationships  between money, inflation, and asset 
markets.   
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Looking ahead, I would hope to continue to expand my knowledge of time series 
econometric methods to include principal components, canonical correlations, 
and structural VARs, and to gain at least some understanding of Bayesian 
methods.   At something of a tangent to the material in this dissertation, I would 
hope to investigate developments in monetary economics relating to new 
technologies (for example, how and whether blockchain technology could have 
an effect on monetary arrangements in the years ahead).   These technological 
advances could also blur the differences between money and financial assets, 
something that I argue for in a recent article (Cronin, 2017).       
In concluding, the question that naturally arises is whether I am still of the view 
that “money matters” and has explanatory power over economic and financial 
market developments.   The answer is in the affirmative.   The research in this 
dissertation testifies to money’s role in determining inflation along lines that have 
been described in the economics literature over many decades, something that 
always resurfaces to counter whatever inflation theory has recently been put 
forward and is in vogue.   The relationship between money and financial markets 
is one that has not received as much attention and probably has a long way to go 
before being well understood, but on that path the research included in this 
dissertation points to money being a causative variable in financial market 
developments.            
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Recent Developments in Asset Prices and 
Liquidity in the Context of an Evolving 
Relationship* 
by 
Frank Browne, David Cronin and Edward J. O’Brien 
 
Abstract 
The prices of virtually all asset classes have seen substantial gains over the last 
two to three years, following on from the more mixed performances that occurred 
after the rapid succession of shocks in the early years of this decade.   At the same 
time, liquidity conditions over this entire period can be broadly characterised as 
exceptionally easy.   This was reflected in strong money growth and low short-
term interest rates.   This article examines the relationship between these liquidity 
conditions and asset price developments.   Our graphical and highly tentative 
results indicate considerable monetary laxity as proxied by both excess money 
growth and the gap between the short-run real interest rate and its estimated 
equilibrium value (i.e., the natural rate of interest).   The graphical evidence 
suggests that this lax liquidity situation began to impact positively on asset prices 
around the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003.   What is especially noteworthy 
is the escalation of prices across all asset classes since then.   This suggests, 
subject to more rigorous econometric testing, that abundant liquidity has 
imparted significant momentum to asset prices across the board.   This 
description seems to be broadly correct for the three economic regions examined, 
the US, the euro area and the UK.    
 
*The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of the CBFSAI or the ESCB. 
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1.  Introduction 
Rising asset prices are a common feature of the current economic climate in many 
advanced industrial economies.   They have increased substantially in nominal 
terms and relative to the prices of goods and services in recent years.   A rise in 
asset prices can be symptomatic of a well-performing economy.   There is always 
a concern, however, that the increase may exceed that warranted by economic 
fundamentals and be driven by speculative influences.   The most worrying 
scenario is that asset prices become detached from their economically-justifiable 
values and that inevitably a correction takes place with a rapid decline in asset 
prices bringing a general economic malaise, including instability in the financial 
system, in its wake.    
Among the factors usually considered to determine asset prices, liquidity 
conditions are typically given secondary importance in the general economic 
literature.    Upside deviations of asset prices from fundamental values are, 
instead, more often than not attributed solely to “irrational” expectations, which 
drive asset prices higher and accordingly tend to become self-fulfilling.   This 
article starts from the premise that liquidity conditions matter to the determination 
of asset prices.   We look at recent liquidity and asset price developments and 
draw from the analysis some assessment, albeit quite tentative, of the current 
relationship between these variables.    
In the past number of years, there has been a tendency for many asset prices (and 
here we include commodity prices in the definition of asset prices) to increase at 
the same time or in close temporal succession.   A very high degree of overlap in 
the pace and timing of asset price acceleration seems to be in evidence.   
Alongside this, recent liquidity conditions can be broadly characterised as 
comprising exceptionally strong monetary growth and low short-term interest 
rates occurring in a period of general price stability and a varying degree of 
economic uncertainty.   Liquidity has been growing at unaccountably fast rates, 
when reckoned in terms of the usual real economy determinants of the demand 
for liquidity or money.   Almost by any measure, money stock growth has been 
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excessive.   Despite these rapid growth rates, there is little discernible evidence 
of any serious rekindling of goods and services inflation.   The prices of virtually 
all asset classes, however, have seen substantial gains over the last two-to-three 
years from the more mixed performances that followed the rapid succession of 
shocks in the early years of the new century.   This suggests some relationship 
between excess money and low short-term interest rates on the one hand and asset 
prices on the other.  
The nature of this relationship, however, is far from straightforward.   The 
apparent co-movement between monetary and credit aggregates on the one hand 
and asset prices on the other is amenable to a number of interpretations.   One 
possibility is that asset prices are being driven by developments in the real 
economy and that credit and money are merely responding passively to 
accommodate the funding and payment requirements arising from these 
developments.   Another is that autonomous movements in money and credit 
aggregates are driving asset prices.   A third possibility is that both monetary 
aggregates and asset prices are both being driven by a common third influence, 
such as monetary policy or cyclical shocks.   Similar model uncertainty surrounds 
the relationship between asset prices and our complementary measure of liquidity 
conditions, the real interest rate gap.   It is not the purpose of this article to engage 
in rigorous econometric testing of these alternative hypotheses.   It is much less 
ambitious.   Rather, the aim is to conduct a graphical examination of the data with 
a view to seeing if there is some validity behind the idea that liquidity conditions 
impact on asset price behaviour.   If there is, then it is possible that it will show 
up in the timing of events as revealed by the data.   This may allow some tentative 
inferences about the likely consequences of any such relationship for prospects 
for financial stability.               
In our view, the nature of the relationship between liquidity and financial assets 
is influenced heavily by the fact that liquidity, or more precisely money, provides 
two, separate functions to the public.   First of all, money is a transactions medium 
and is used routinely to purchase goods, services and assets.   At the same time, 
liquid balances do not need to be used immediately for this purpose; they can just 
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as easily be held to buy goods or assets in the future.   This gives money a second 
quality of providing a store of value over time, making it an asset for its holder 
and one whose fixed nominal value and saleable qualities make it an attractive 
and safe haven for holding one’s wealth in times of uncertainty.   Money then, 
uniquely, acts both as a medium of exchange (giving rise to a transactions 
demand) and as a store of value (giving rise to an asset demand for money).    
The division of the money balance between these two functions depends in large 
part on the degree of uncertainty among the public concerning current and future 
economic/political conditions.   Periods of heightened uncertainty, following, for 
example, a major shock to the economy, tend to see an increase in the asset 
demand for money, while in periods of declining uncertainty that source of 
demand for money tends to wane.   This cycle in money demand (accumulation 
followed by de-accumulation) has, in the past, tended to impact on overall 
inflation.   Since the liberalisation of financial systems, however, these cycles are, 
in the first instance, more likely to spill over into asset price gyrations.   In this 
article, we provide only tentative graphical evidence in support of this and, 
therefore, our conclusions have likewise to be seen as tentative at this stage.    
It is evident from a perusal of the data that liquidity conditions over the past five 
years or so could be appropriately described as “ample” in nature and that during 
the same timeframe asset price growth has also gathered momentum after 
uncertainties began to wane.   This was especially the case after the start of 2003 
when the prices for all asset classes began moving in the same upward direction 
at the same time.   On the basis of our graphical examination of the data, we 
conclude tentatively that excess money and real short-term interest rates below 
equilibrium values have been important drivers of asset price developments in the 
last few years.   It must be stressed, however, that this analysis is mainly 
suggestive and descriptive in nature and that a more thorough, quantitative 
examination of this area is being undertaken that might provide more definitive 
answers. 
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The link between asset price and monetary developments has been explored in 
recent years, most notably in papers emanating from the BIS.41   These focus on 
financial liberalisation having strengthened the role of financial factors in the 
economic cycle and on excess demand showing up first in asset prices rather than 
consumer prices in the new price stability environment.    
The rest of the article is structured as follows.   Sections 2 and 3 show recent 
developments in liquidity and asset prices in the US, the euro area and the UK.   
Diagrammatic analysis suggests that there has been ample liquidity and 
historically low interest rates in these three areas over the past five years or so.   
We go on to analyse the uses to which this liquidity has been put in recent years.   
We take from this review the following observations.   Firstly, general inflation 
has been quite low, both by historical standards and relative to the growth of 
money.   Secondly, there is some evidence from developments in the velocity of 
money that there was significant hoarding of money in the early years of the 
current decade but that further hoarding has not since occurred.   Thirdly, over 
the same five-year timeframe, asset prices initially behaved in a heterogeneous 
manner with some asset categories experiencing a decline and others rising.   
Since late 2002/early 2003, however, at about the same time that additional 
hoarding seems to have ceased, a more general rise in asset prices started to take 
place and has been maintained since.   We suggest that this changed behaviour in 
asset prices over the past five years when assessed alongside contemporaneous 
developments in liquidity conditions is owing to a change in public confidence 
regarding economic and political risks and illustrates our basic contentions with 
regard to the asset price-liquidity relationship.   In Section 4, we take stock of this 
analysis and consider its implications for financial stability.   Section 5 concludes.       
 
 
                                                 
41 This includes BIS papers written by Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004), Borio, English and Filardo 
(2003), Borio and White (2004), Filardo (2004) and speeches by Crockett (2000, 2003).   It also 
includes contributions from non-BIS authors such as Clerc and Pfister (2003).  
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2.  Recent Liquidity and Interest Rate Developments   
2.1 Money Developments 
The real growth rate of broadly-defined money stocks for the US, the euro area 
and the UK over at least the last twenty years are plotted in the first three panels 
of Chart 1.42, 43   The full range of quarter-on-quarter growth rates is damped 
somewhat by the use of a backward-looking eight-quarter moving-average 
representation of the current and previous growth rates.44   We see that each 
money stock has experienced a wide range of growth rates over their respective 
sample periods and that while not quite at the top of the historical range, real 
money growth rates have picked up gradually over the past ten years or so and 
have recently been close to historical highs. 
Headline money growth rates are not particularly illuminating on their own, 
however.   One of the more important roles of money is as a transactions medium.   
To explore whether there is an excess supply of transaction balances, it makes 
sense, therefore, to relate money’s growth rate to that of some measure of 
economic activity.   Accordingly, Chart 2 links the nominal money growth rate 
to the growth rate of nominal GDP.   The representation in Chart 2 involves 
subtracting the GDP growth rate from the money stock growth rate so that a 
positive value in the graphs (as scaled on the vertical axis) indicates that the 
backward-looking eight-quarter money growth rate exceeded that of GDP, and 
vice versa.45   With regard to recent developments, Chart 2 adds to Chart 1 in 
saying that money growth has picked up strongly over the last ten years or so, in 
                                                 
42 All data used in constructing the Charts are described in the accompanying appendix. 
43 Each nominal money stock is deflated by the consumer price index in calculating the real money 
growth rates.   The growth rates shown for monetary and asset price data in Chart 1 and subsequent 
Charts are annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates. 
44 They are “backward-looking” in the sense that the value reported for, say, the first quarter of 
1990 is calculated as the unweighted average of the sum of that quarter’s growth rate value and 
the previous seven quarters.   This means that each growth rate is a function of current and 
historical data.   The benefit of using a moving-average representation, as opposed to just a simple 
per-quarter value, is that it gives a better impression of medium-term growth rates.  
45 Negative values reflect, among other things, inflation following money growth with a lag.    
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this case relative to economic activity, and that there may now be an excess of 
money balances outstanding. 
Chart 1: Real Money Growth (Eight Quarter Lagged Moving Average, 
Percentages) 
 
a) United States (1963Q1-2005Q1) 
 
b) Euro Area (1983Q1-2005Q1) 
 
c) United Kingdom (1985Q1-2005Q1) 
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Chart 2: Annualised Change in Money less Annualised Change in Nominal 
GDP (Eight Quarter Lagged Moving Average, Percentages) 
 
a) United States (1963Q1-2005Q1) 
 
b) Euro Area (1983Q1-2005Q1) 
 
c) United Kingdom (1985Q1-2005Q1) 
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2.2 Interest Rate Developments 
Besides money-based measures, the other key variable used for assessing 
liquidity conditions is the short-term interest rate, which tends to be highly 
sensitive to the liquidity situation.   In Chart 3, we see that the short-term nominal 
interest rate has dipped steeply in the US since about 2000 and has fallen more 
moderately in the euro area and the UK over the same timeframe.   This follows 
a more sustained reduction since the early 1980s in the US, since about 1993 in 
the euro area and from the early 1990s in the UK.   Indeed, short-term interest 
rates are now close to historically low values. 
Lower inflation rates may explain in part this fall in nominal interest rates.   To 
show that they do not account for the full amount of the decline, it is necessary to 
exclude the inflation rate component of the nominal interest rate giving a measure 
of the real interest rate.   This inflation-adjusted rate is graphed in Chart 4.46   We 
can see that real interest rates have, like their nominal counterpart, fallen from 
1980s/early1990s levels and are also now close to historical lows.   What does 
this signify?   Real short-term interest rates are determined by the demand and 
supply of short-term loanable funds, where the supply of those funds can be 
inflated by excess liquidity.   Low rates would, therefore, tend to indicate a large 
supply of funds relative to demand.   According to this reasoning, these graphs 
would point to the economies in question being amply supplied with funds.    
We can take this analysis of interest rates one step further and see how actual 
short-term real interest rates compare to their equilibrium values, which are 
determined by the sustainable rate of return in the economy.   In the first column 
of Chart 5, we plot the actual real rate of return (as per Chart 4) and the estimated 
contemporaneous equilibrium values, while in the second column we plot the 
difference between them, which is termed the real interest rate gap.47   The graphs 
                                                 
46 This interest rate is an ex post rate calculated as the actual nominal rate less realised inflation, 
which is a reasonable rate to use when examining trends over a long span of time.  
47 The actual and equilibrium real interest rate series for the euro area are taken from the article 
by Browne and Everett in this Report.   We are grateful to Mary Everett for estimating and 
providing us with the interest rate series for the US and the UK.   
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in the first column can be broadly characterised as comprising an actual real 
interest rate (the solid line) moving around a less undulating equilibrium value.   
This reflects the excess supply or demand for funds varying more substantially 
than the rate of sustainable returns from productive activity.   The difference 
between these two interest rates - the real interest rate gap – is plotted in the 
second column of Chart 5.   It shows this gap to be now in negative territory in 
the US, the euro area and the UK, signifying an excess of funds being available 
relative to that justified by long-term returns.    
3.  Possible Causes and Consequences of Current Liquidity Conditions    
We conclude tentatively from our survey of indicators of liquidity conditions in 
the last section that there is an excess of liquid balances in all three economies 
being examined.   There would also, therefore, appear to be an excess of liquidity 
at a global level.   What are the reasons for and consequences of these current 
liquidity conditions?   We seek to answer this in the subsequent subsections. 
3.1 Changing Liquidity Preferences  
Besides being held for the purpose of purchasing goods and services, liquid 
balances are often simply held or hoarded.   It is possible, therefore, that liquid 
balances have been built up in recent times as agents wish to hold money balances 
not for immediate transaction purposes but rather to use at some future date.   This 
may seem a viable explanation for the features of the data in section 2 relating to 
the last five years or so.   Rapid money growth may be symptomatic of a desire 
among the public to hoard larger holdings of money.    
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Chart 3: Short Term Nominal Interest Rates (Eight Quarter Lagged 
Moving Average, Percentages) 
 
a) United States (1963Q1-2005Q2) 
 
b) Euro Area (1983Q1-2005Q2) 
 
c) United Kingdom (1985Q1-2005Q2) 
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Chart 4: Real Interest Rates (Eight Quarter Lagged Moving Average, 
Percentages) 
 
a) United States (1963Q1-2005Q2) 
 
b) Euro Area (1983Q1-2005Q2) 
 
c) United Kingdom (1985Q1-2005Q2) 
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Chart 5: Real and Equilibrium Interest Rates and the Interest Rate Gap 
(Eight Quarter Lagged Moving Average, Percentages) 
a) United States (1963Q1-2005 Q1) United States (1963Q1-2005 Q1) 
 
 
b) Euro Area (1983Q1-2005 Q2) Euro Area (1983Q1-2005Q1) 
  
c) United Kingdom (1985Q1-2005 Q2) United Kingdom (1985 Q1 - 2004 Q4) 
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This may explain the sharp dips in the velocity of money for the US, the euro area 
and the UK in recent years, as shown in the left-hand column of Chart 6, where 
the velocity of money is defined as the nominal value of GDP divided by the 
money stock.48   A sudden fall away in the velocity of money suggests a decision 
by consumers and firms to hoard money by holding more liquid balances than are 
needed for trade in goods and services.   
Why hold more money?   It is well recognised that cyclical movements in the 
velocity of money tend to be sensitive to the opportunity cost of holding money.   
When the opportunity cost is low, money is obviously less costly to hold and so 
money balances can be expected to increase relative to transactions demand.   As 
can be seen in Chart 6, however, the recent declines in velocity for the euro area 
and the UK have occurred at a time when the opportunity cost of holding money 
(shown in the right-hand side column) has actually increased.   For the US, the 
decline in velocity since about 1997 preceded the decline in the opportunity cost 
of holding money that started in 2001.   An interest elasticity effect, therefore, 
does not seem to explain the rise in liquidity.    
In suggesting that there is more than an interest rate effect impacting on the 
velocity of money in recent years, the next step is to examine some of the other 
non-transactions-based reasons why the public may want to hold more money.   
The principal factor in this regard will be the desire of the public to hold money 
for both precautionary and speculative reasons in a period of uncertainty.   Money 
balances provide a safe haven for holding one’s wealth at any time.   Generally, 
they have fixed nominal value and can be easily mobilised and used in the future 
for acquiring other assets and goods.   The early years of the current decade were 
evidently a time when there was much macroeconomic uncertainty following 
declines in stock markets and dips in economic performance and large-scale 
terrorist acts.   We highlight 2001q3, to indicate the timing of the September 11 
terrorist attacks, in Chart 6 through the use of a vertical line at that juncture.   As 
                                                 
48 We shorten the length of this Chart to start in 1995 to compare better the co-movement between 
the velocity of money and the opportunity costs of holding money in recent years.  
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we can see, the rate of decline in the velocity of money accelerated or was 
maintained subsequent to that time in all three areas, suggesting an increased 
hoarding of money.   It is worth noting again from Chart 6, however, that the 
accentuated decline in the velocity of money preceded these events and was 
sustained after their effect may have been considered to be greatest.   An increased 
desire to hoard money may, therefore, explain only part of the increase in liquidity 
in the economies being discussed.  
3.2 A Rise in Demand for Goods and Services       
If more money is not being held entirely for hoarding purposes, the only 
alternative is that it is being used for transactions purposes.   The normal 
expectation then would be that the recent build-up of liquid balances should 
coincide with a pick-up in the purchasing of goods and services in the economy 
and, should the supply of goods and services be inelastic relative to nominal 
expenditure, a rise in their prices should occur, albeit with some lag.   The general 
inflation rate should then climb to higher levels.   In Chart 7, we plot annualised 
growth rates for (nominal) broad money and the consumer price index (CPI), a 
suitable index of general goods and services prices, over the entire available 
sample periods.   We can see that over time CPI inflation broadly tracks the rate 
of money growth, albeit usually at a lower rate and with some lag.49   In other 
words, when the rate of money growth goes up so does the inflation rate, and vice 
versa.   It is obvious, however, that while money growth has picked up 
substantially since the mid-to-late 1990s in all three countries/monetary zones, 
the rate of general inflation has either declined or effectively flattened out.    
It could be suggested that perhaps real growth in goods and services bridges the 
gap between money and inflation growth rates.   Referring back to Chart 2, 
                                                 
49 The pick-up in the rate of inflation may not exactly match that of money growth because the 
supply of goods and services will also be changing over time.   Most usually that supply is 
increasing resulting in some of the money growth being required to facilitate the extra amount of 
goods being transacted in the economy.   Thus, part of money growth will not have an inflationary 
impact and the rate of money growth will then tend to exceed that of inflation. 
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Chart 6: Velocity and Opportunity Cost of Money (Eight Quarter Lagged 
Moving Average) 
a) United States (1995Q1-2005Q1) United States (1995Q1-2005Q2) 
  
b) Euro Area (1995Q1-2005Q1) Euro Area (1995Q1-2005Q1) 
  
c) United Kingdom (1995 Q1 - 2005 Q1) United Kingdom (1995 Q1 - 2005 Q2) 
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however, we can see that the growth rate for nominal GDP, which accounts for 
both the changes in real activity and general prices, has been in almost all quarters 
less than that of money growth rates (as reflected in the positive gap values) 
during the current decade.   It seems then that money growth is not currently 
having the expected effect on general inflation. 
 3.3 A Rise in Demand for Financial Assets                                  
  -  Asset price developments in recent years 
Having tentatively established a prima facie case for excess liquidity in all three 
economic areas, the next step is to examine graphically the relationship between 
these liquidity measures and a range of asset prices.   We categorise across six 
asset types: government bonds, corporate bonds (across a range of default risk 
classes from AAA to Caa), equities, property, commodities, and emerging market 
(bond and/or equity) indices.50   With the exception of commodities, which are 
represented by the price of oil, all other series are indices to capture broad market 
movements in the particular asset type.   We undertake our analysis for asset 
prices for the shorter period of 2000 to the present.   One reason for this is that 
asset prices tend to be particularly volatile and, therefore, patterns in the data are 
examined and digested better in a short-term context.51   A second reason is that 
we expect the relationship between asset price and liquidity developments to be 
much stronger following the increased household participation in financial 
markets in the 1990s and subsequently.   We focus on nominal rather than real 
asset price developments as general inflation has been so low in recent years that 
it is not unreasonable to study just one form of prices alone.    
                                                 
50 The Caa category of corporate bonds is Moody’s nomenclature for bonds that would be 
classified as CCC by other rating services such as Standard and Poor’s.   The asset price data 
utilised in Charts 8 to 13 for the three economic areas is, like all other data, described in the 
accompanying appendix.  
51 Given the shorter, five-year timeframe and a desire to capture the speed at which asset prices 
can change direction, all asset price entries in Chart 8 and subsequent Charts use a shorter, four-
quarter backward-looking moving average representation of the underlying data while the eight-
quarter moving average representation of the monetary and interest rate variables is maintained.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
In the upper panels of Chart 8, 9 and 10, we plot the nominal levels of the 
aforementioned asset types over the past five years for, in turn, each of the three 
economic areas under consideration.52   These and subsequent graphs include 
three vertical lines at a number of appropriate dates: 2001q1 (the start of the last 
recession in the US, as identified by the NBER), 2001q3 (the time of the terrorist 
attacks in the US) and end-2002 (which we will argue was a turning point in the 
perceived level of market uncertainty and risk aversion and, consequently, in 
asset price developments).   This panelling allows the data to be read in a 
macroeconomic-political economy context. 
For the US, Chart 8a reflects a pattern of asset performance that is mirrored in the 
data for the euro area and the UK in Charts 9a and 10a.   The sub-period from 
2000q1 to 2002q4 was marked by diverse US asset price behaviour.   Five of the 
asset types (the government bond index, the AAA and BBB bond indices, the 
property index, and the emerging markets bond index) experienced a trend 
increase in value; two more (the equity index and the emerging markets equity 
index) experienced broad declines; the Caa bond index’s value declined sharply 
and steadily to end-2001 and maintained a firm rate of increase thereafter; and, 
finally, the price of oil oscillated around a range of values during the period.   
From end-2002 onwards, however, this directional diversity has disappeared with 
a trend rate of increase across all nine asset-types having been experienced. 
In Chart 8b (and the lower panels of Charts 9 and 10), we provide an unweighted 
average of the indices available over the entire sample range of 2000q1 to 2005q2 
to represent aggregate market behaviour.53   The diversity of US asset 
performance to end-2002 is shown in an oscillating aggregate index measure.    
                                                 
52 For convenience, all are indexed to 100 at the start of the period. 
53 For the US, this includes eight of the nine asset types.  The exception is the property index, 
which is only available up to 2004q3.  
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Chart 7: Monetary Aggregates and CPI Percentage Changes (Eight 
Quarter Lagged Moving Average, Percentages) 
 
a) United States (1963Q1-2005Q1) 
 
b) Euro Area (1983Q1-2005Q1) 
 
c) United Kingdom (1985Q1-2005Q1) 
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aftermath of September 11.   A moderate pick-up, however, started around early-
to-mid 2002 which has followed by a more accentuated rate of increase from late-
2002 onwards, reflecting all asset types experiencing positive and, in some cases, 
dramatic growth.   It must be observed too that over the entire sample period, this 
aggregate index rose by some 50 percent, four-fifths of which occurred in the 
period after end-2002. 
These patterns of asset price behaviour in the US are reflected in the euro area 
and UK data in Charts 9 and 10, albeit across somewhat different ranges and with 
some differences in timing.   For the euro area, Chart 9a shows that the equity 
index declined to early 2003 but has mounted a partial recovery since then, while 
all three bond indices have increased steadily, if unspectacularly, over the sample 
period and oil’s value experienced both periods of rise and decline (but increased, 
on balance, by over 60 percent for the entire period).   In Chart 10a, we can see 
that UK government bonds, both types of corporate bonds and property have 
experienced little or only moderate rates of growth from 2000 to 2005 and so 
differ from the more robust US and euro area growth experience for these 
particular asset types.   The UK equity and emerging market equity indices, 
however, shared the same decline-followed-by-a-rise experience of US and euro 
area equities while oil prices’ behaviour was close to those of the other two areas 
for obvious reasons. 
Looking at the aggregate indices in the lower panels of Charts 9 and 10, we can 
see a varying asset performance over the 2000 to 2005 period in the euro area and 
the UK that is broadly comparable to the US case.   There was an initial rise in 
the aggregate indices through to early 2001 followed by a flattening out in both 
indices during 2001 and then a decline in their value to the start of 2003 before a 
sharp pick-up thereafter.   Although the cumulative rates of increase for the 
aggregate indices in Charts 9b and 10b over the entire period are close to 30 
percent for the euro area and just over 20 percent for the UK and are, like their 
US counterpart, well above the rate of increase in the prices of goods and services, 
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it is the diverse performance of asset prices within the period that we find more 
interesting and which we analyse in the next subsection.54      
- Asset prices and monetary variables 
Asset prices in the US, the euro area and the UK in 2005 are now, in aggregate, 
substantially above their values in 2000.   More interestingly, asset price 
behaviour over the past five years can be differentiated across two sub-periods.   
In the first sub-period, there were diverse performances across asset types up to 
end-2002 with some assets declining in value, others rising moderately and still 
more oscillating in value.   This is exactly what we would expect in the 
environment of uncertainty that prevailed at the time in the wake of a succession 
of substantial shocks.   In the second sub-period since end-2002, however, all 
asset prices have increased strongly and, indeed, most of the large overall 
increases in asset prices since 2000 occurred in this second sub-period.   The 
entire 2000 to 2005 period has been characterised by a low short-term interest 
rate and strong money growth rate environment, as outlined in section 2, and low 
inflation, as discussed in a previous subsection.   It remains then to try to tie 
together these developments into a coherent story and, in doing so, to provide an 
explanation of the asset price-liquidity relationship in recent years.   We simplify 
the analysis by using the simple unweighted average of all asset-class index series 
which are plotted in the lower panels of Charts 8 to 10.   These measures allow 
us to compare general asset price developments with general liquidity and interest 
rate conditions, all of which are plotted for the respective economic areas in 
Charts 11 to 13.    
 
                                                 
54 The differing cumulative rates of increase in asset prices across the three economic areas reflect, 
in part, the differing composition of asset-types in the aggregate asset price indices for each area.  
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Chart 8: US Asset Price Nominal Levels 2000Q1-2005Q2 (Four Quarter 
Lagged Moving Average) 
 
a) Asset Price Nominal Levels 
 
b) Aggregate Asset Price Nominal Levels 
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Chart 9: Euro Area Asset Price Nominal Levels 2000Q1-2005Q2 (Four 
Quarter Lagged Moving Average) 
 
a) Asset Price Nominal Levels 
 
b) Aggregate Asset Price Nominal Levels 
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Chart 10: UK Asset Price Nominal Levels 2000Q1-2005Q2 (Four Quarter 
Lagged Moving Average) 
 
a) Asset Price Nominal Levels 
 
b) Aggregate Asset Price Nominal Levels 
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Looking in the first instance at the monetary conditions, the middle panels of 
Charts 11 to 13 point to a build-up of excess liquidity from 2000 through until 
early 2004 as the moving average values of money growth exceeded those of 
nominal GDP growth by one-half of one percent to about 4½ percent in all three 
areas.   This excess money growth has been maintained in the euro area and the 
UK into 2005.   For the US and the euro area, the excess growth rates reached 
maximum values in 2002 and 2003 while the UK’s growth rate has been strongest 
in the most recent quarters.   The interest rate gap has either declined steadily into 
negative values during the five-year period (in the case of the US and the UK) or 
has remained in negative territory throughout (as for the euro area), also reflecting 
the ample liquidity conditions.    
As for asset prices, our aggregate measures in the upper panels of Charts 11 to 13 
show that their behaviour could be broadly characterised in the following manner: 
they experienced some growth in 2000; this was reversed during 2001 and 2002; 
and since then, they have grown very strongly in the years 2003 to 2005.   Why 
did asset prices not grow steadily throughout this period when money growth was 
high and interest rates were low?   It may be that the initial growth in money 
occurred to satisfy a demand for money to hold at a time of political and economic 
uncertainty but that when that source of demand began to wane, the resulting 
excess money supply began to spill over into a demand for financial assets rather 
than a demand for goods and services, as reflected in the divergent patterns of 
consumer price inflation (which remained subdued) and asset price inflation 
(which took off for all main asset classes at about that time) already noted.     
These charts then seem to provide a strong prima facie case for monetary 
conditions influencing asset price developments over the past five years or so.   
The entire period can be characterised as a time of low interest rates and ample 
liquidity.   Initially, there was some diversity in performance across asset classes 
but there has been a more unified upward surge in asset prices since about the 
start of 2003.   That this broadly-based rise in asset prices did not occur earlier at 
a time when monetary growth was already strong is likely owing to a more 
unstable macroeconomic environment and an aversion to equities and other more 
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risky investments at that time.   These two factors may, in fact, have contributed, 
through stronger money demand, to the pick-up in money growth.   Once those 
uncertainties declined, as it is reasonable to argue has been the case for the past 
two years or so, that increased money stock would seem to have been used more 
as a transactions medium than as a store of value, with the transactions in question 
being in financial assets rather than in goods and services.   The outcome was 
higher asset prices.    
4.  The Evolving Relationship between Liquidity and Asset Prices and Its 
Implications for Financial Stability   
4.1 The Relationship between Liquidity and Asset Prices 
The purpose of this article has been to look at recent experience in asset price 
developments alongside those in liquidity conditions in order to highlight features 
of the relationship between both sets of variables.   For assets, the most salient of 
the stylised facts to emerge has been the tendency for prices in all asset classes to 
increase at the same time or in close temporal succession since, roughly, the end 
of 2002.   This phenomenon is common to all three economic areas examined, 
the US, the euro area and the UK.   This co-movement is no doubt reflective, in 
part at least, of the growing influence of the globalisation of financial markets.   
A prolonged period of ample liquidity has also been a feature of recent years.   So 
far, this has failed to show up in consumer prices.   This is quite puzzling when 
compared with similar circumstances in the past.   It may be attributable, however, 
not to an absence of such inflationary pressures, but rather to the fact that it is 
now taking a longer period of time for easy liquidity conditions to show up in 
expenditure on final goods and services and, depending on the conjunctural state 
of the economy, in consumer prices.    
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Chart 11: Asset Prices and Liquidity Indicators for the US 2000Q1-2005Q2 
 
a) Nominal Asset Price Index 
 
b) Money - GDP 
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Chart 12: Asset Prices and Liquidity Indicators for the Euro Area 2000Q1- 
2005Q2 
 
a) Nominal Asset Price Index 
 
b) Money - GDP 
 
c) Interest Rate Gap 
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Chart 13: Asset Prices and Liquidity Indicators for the UK 2000Q1-
2005Q2 
 
a) Nominal Asset Price Index 
 
b) Money - GDP 
 
c) Interest Rate Gap 
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Arguably, the reason for this may be that the transmission from ample liquidity 
to inflation is taking longer because it is following a more circuitous route to final 
expenditure and overall inflation than in the past and that that route is increasingly 
via financial markets.    
Such a longer lag to inflation is not implausible if the transmission from ample 
liquidity and low short-term nominal interest rates is now occurring 
systematically via asset prices.   In the relatively repressed financial market 
environment of the 1970s and some of the 1980s, much of the household and non-
financial corporate sectors did not have the same easy and cheap access to 
financial markets that they enjoy today.   This meant that monetary disequilibrium 
tended to be resolved relatively quickly in the market for goods and services.   An 
element of the hypothesis being propounded here is that monetary disequilibrium 
is now being increasingly felt in asset price movements in the first instance owing 
to the improved access to financial markets available to the public.   It will then 
tend to affect overall expenditure on goods and services and final consumer price 
inflation only much later and this will tend to happen predominantly through 
wealth effects arising from capital gains or losses on a range of marked-to-market 
assets but also via corporate investment spurred by cheap funding.  
The graphical analysis in section 3 lends tentative support to this idea.   The data, 
however, also show another key aspect to the money-asset price relationship, 
namely, that while money growth impacts on asset prices the two are not 
necessarily positively correlated at all times.   This is because in periods of 
uncertainty excess money growth may actually reflect a change in the 
composition of wealth away from financial assets and so accelerating money 
growth can occur alongside static or even declining asset prices.    
These two key features of the money-asset price relationship – firstly, excess 
money growth increasingly impacting on asset prices and, secondly, the exact 
timing and nature of the effect being dictated by the degree of uncertainty 
prevailing in the economy – allow us to interpret the patterns of asset and money 
market behaviour in recent years.   The first year of the new millennium was 
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marked by investor confidence, which saw financial markets continue to do well.   
A fall in the overall asset price index (the simple unweighted average of all 
available asset class price indices) started during 2001 and lasted until about the 
end of 2002 in all three areas.   In 2001, each area also experienced a sharp pickup 
in the growth rate of the money stock as investors sought safety in the certain 
nominal value of money against the turmoil in financial markets (see middle 
panels of Charts 11 to 13).   Another common feature around this time is the 
emergence of negative real interest rate gaps (see bottom panels of the same 
Charts) as short-term real interest rates fell relative to their corresponding 
equilibrium values.   This is an additional indicator of the very liberal liquidity 
conditions that began to prevail at this time.   
Also common to all three areas has been the positive response of the overall asset 
price index to these liquidity conditions as uncertainty began to fade towards the 
end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003.   Not only did the overall asset price index 
start to escalate but so too did each of the individual asset price indices (which 
together comprise the overall index) covered in Charts 8 to 10.   This may well 
be a unique event and is very likely to have been the result of the more-than-
ample liquidity conditions prevailing in the global economy at this time as agents 
began to spend money balances hoarded during the period of uncertainty.                        
The rush to the safety of money in the 2001 to 2002 period following the 
heightened uncertainty generated by the collapsing dot-com bubble (and the 
many other substantial shocks which impacted the global economy during this 
period) was driven by both precautionary and speculative motives.   The former 
was needed as a hedge against the prevailing financial market uncertainty and the 
latter by a desire to hold money in idle balance form until such time as confidence 
returned to the markets when those funds could then be released and used to take 
speculative positions on future asset price movements.   It is likely that this began 
to happen in early 2003.   Although uncertainty and heightened risk aversion 
seems to have lasted longer than might have been anticipated, much of the 
precautionary money holdings were no longer attractive in the light of the much 
reduced uncertainty moving into 2003.   Both this and the speculative demand for 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
holding money would have faded, thereby freeing up money holdings and starting 
a search for yield.   This search for yield seems to have affected most, if not all, 
financial markets more or less simultaneously rather than sequentially, as has 
been suggested elsewhere.55     
This description of asset price and liquidity developments in recent years shows 
the nature of the relationship between the two.   It indicates that money growth 
will not necessarily coincide immediately with asset price rises if that money is 
hoarded – the timing of the increase is unknown and is dictated by the preferences 
of its holder, in particular his attitude towards risk.   Once uncertainty abates and 
the demand for money as an asset wanes, however, much of the precautionary 
balances are likely to become transactions balances while balances held for 
speculative purposes begin to be used for that purpose.   This is likely to increase 
the demand for financial assets and, with limited short-run asset supply, result in 
asset prices increasing rapidly.   The temporal relationship between excess money 
holdings (relative to underlying transactions demand for goods and services) and 
asset prices then, being a function of uncertainty, is itself likely to be uncertain.   
Furthermore, as the actual behaviour of asset prices and excess money in recent 
years illustrates, these interactions between liquidity and assets have been made 
much easier by financial liberalisation and innovation.  
4.2 Implications for Financial Stability 
It is difficult to say what the dangers posed for financial stability from this 
relationship between liquidity and asset prices are.   This is in part because, as 
argued, there may be some elements to this interaction that have always existed 
but are now coming more to the fore as financial liberalisation and innovation 
make it easier for the public to adjust their holdings of money and other assets.   
They, therefore, need deeper consideration.   The most basic concern for financial 
                                                 
55  The search for yield has received a good deal of attention especially in financial stability reports 
(see the ECB’s Financial Stability Review and the Global Financial Stability Report of the IMF).  
The view in those publications, however, appears to be that there is a search for yield in particular 
asset classes with this search manifesting itself sequentially as funds move from one asset class 
to another.           
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stability, nevertheless, follows from the recognition that the money-asset 
relationship can alter and can do so relatively quickly, meaning that asset prices 
can experience rapid change.   Sharp changes in asset prices are undesirable from 
a financial stability perspective.   A rapid pick-up in asset prices may encourage 
speculation of further price increases driving asset prices into territory 
unwarranted by underlying economic conditions while a subsequent sudden fall 
in asset prices could weaken financial institutions’ balance sheets substantially.     
The danger is that excess liquidity will cause asset prices to become misaligned 
from their fundamental, real economy-based determinants.   This, in itself, 
distorts the allocation of resources and may lead to subsequent economic 
weakness and financial fragility as projects signalled as being viable by financial 
markets prove not to be in the event.   Another, more obvious risk arises from 
distorted asset prices collapsing, which, if accompanied by loan defaults on 
leveraged positions, could quickly erode the prudential buffers available to the 
banking system and threaten systemic collapse.     
Monetary and asset price developments, therefore, seem to be interlinked.   The 
changing relationship between money and asset prices provides authorities whose 
task it is to monitor financial stability risks with a number of practical difficulties.   
It seems possible also that this interlinkage may be becoming stronger and with 
the scope to be more variable over time as financial innovation and liberalisation 
enables the public to adjust its holdings of money and other assets more easily 
and cheaply and, therefore, also more rapidly.   This is a feature of behaviour 
which we feel is tentatively confirmed by the recent developments in asset and 
money markets outlined in previous sections. 
The financial stability implications of the relationship between liquidity and asset 
prices have received greater attention in recent years.   The Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) has been to the forefront of this area of research and has 
published a number of key papers on the subject.56   Much of the BIS research 
                                                 
56  Much of the literature emanating from the BIS has already been referenced in footnote 41.    
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seems to stress that while a stable monetary environment may not be sufficient to 
eliminate excess tendencies in financial markets, it does contribute to reducing 
those financial risks.   As Borio and Lowe (2002) argue, however, it is the 
simultaneous build-up of imbalances in monetary variables, such as credit, and in 
asset prices that should be of most concern.   Another thread running through BIS 
research is that greater financial liberalisation inherently encourages greater 
procyclicality in markets.   The changes in financial markets that have occurred 
in recent decades may have potentially increased the scope for financial 
imbalances to occur and raised the vulnerability of the system to boom and bust 
cycles in asset prices. 
5.  Conclusions 
Recent history has provided much evidence that asset price collapses from levels 
that were not consistent with their fundamental determinants has probably been 
the single most destructive influence on financial stability in a number of 
countries.   Although liquidity is a nebulous variable and difficult to measure, the 
limited empirical evidence available would suggest that in the newly liberalised 
financial market environment, excess liquidity tends increasingly to be deflected 
into financial asset markets and inflates asset prices.   Despite the measurement 
difficulties, liquidity is an issue to which those charged with financial stability 
should devote close and warranted attention.     
If the recent and current excess liquidity does not show up in general inflation but 
instead distorts asset prices, this can be as damaging as higher general inflation 
(if not more so) to the overall performance of the real economy and hence to the 
systemic health of its financial sector as higher general inflation.   Misaligned 
asset prices not only distort the allocation of resources, they also tend to collapse 
resulting in sharp increases in non-performing loans and insolvencies possibly 
leading to financial system weakness.  
This article has focused on the connection between monetary variables and asset 
prices since 2000.   The laxity of the liquidity situation was proxied by two 
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measures, namely excess money and the gap between the short-run actual and 
(estimated) equilibrium real interest rates.   A coherent story can be told about the 
relationship between the evolution of these two variables on the one hand and 
developments in asset prices on the other over approximately the last five years.   
It suggests that ample liquidity may be an important driver of the overall asset 
price increases that have taken place in recent years.   A generalised search for 
yield across all asset classes that was prompted by the decline in financial market 
uncertainty and the consequent release of liquidity from its safe haven has indeed 
affected asset prices across the board.   Furthermore, this process may not yet 
have run its course.   The bottom line is that the recent and current ample global 
liquidity should be a source of concern for financial stability.  
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Appendix.   Data Description  
Chart  Description 
   1a  United States, Broad money and components, M2 Monetary aggregate 
  United States, Consumer Price Index, All items 
   1b  Euro Area, Monetary aggregate M3, All currencies combined 
  Euro Area, Consumer Prices, All Items, Total (linked and re-based), Index 
   1c  United Kingdom, Broad money and components, M2 Monetary aggregate 
  United Kingdom, Consumer Price Index, All items 
   2a  United States, Broad money and components, M2 Monetary aggregate 
  United States, GDP by Expenditure, Gross domestic product, Current Prices 
   2b  Euro Area, Monetary aggregate M3, All currencies combined 
  Euro Area, Gross Domestic Product, Current Prices 
   2c  United Kingdom, Broad money and components, M2 Monetary aggregate 
  United Kingdom, GDP by Expenditure, Gross domestic product, Current Prices 
   3a  United States, Treasury Bills, 3 Month Yield Average 
   3b  Euro Area, Euribor 3 Month Average 
   3c  United Kingdom, Treasury Bills, 3 Month Average 
   6a  United States, GDP by Expenditure, Gross domestic product, Current Prices 
  United States, Broad money and components, M2 Monetary aggregate 
  United States, Treasury Bills, 3 Month Yield Average 
  United States, Monetary Aggregate M2 Own Rate 
   6b  Euro Area, Gross Domestic Product, Current Prices 
  Euro Area, Monetary aggregate M3, All currencies combined 
  Euro Area, 5-year Euro area Government Benchmark Bond Yield 
  Euro Area, Euribor 3 Month Average 
   6c  United Kingdom, GDP by Expenditure, Current Prices 
  United Kingdom, Broad money and components, M2 Monetary aggregate 
  United Kingdom, Government Benchmarks, 5 year Average Yield 
  United Kingdom, 3 Month Deposit Rates 
   7a  United States, Broad money and components, M2 Monetary aggregate 
  United States, Consumer Price Index, All items 
   7b  Euro Area, Monetary aggregate M3, All currencies combined 
  Euro Area, Consumer Prices, All Items, Total (linked and re-based), Index 
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7c  United Kingdom, Broad money and components, M2 Monetary aggregate 
  United Kingdom, Consumer Price Index, All items 
   8a 
 
United States, J.P. Morgan, Government Bond Index, All Maturities, Total Return, 
Close 
   United States, CGBI USBIG Corp. AAA/AA 1-10Y - Tot Return Index 
  United States, CGBI USBIG Corp. BBB 1-10Y - Tot Return Index 
  United States, Lehman High Yield, Caa 
  United States, Dow Jones Wilshire, Broad, 5000 Index (Full Cap), Price Return, Close 
  United States, NCREIF, National Index, Total Return 
  United States, Spot Oil Price, West Texas Intermediate 
 
 
United States (World), J.P. Morgan, Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+), 
Total Return 
  United States, Emerging Markets, MSCI, Index, Close 
   9a  Euro Area (Germany), J.P. Morgan, Government Bond Index, Average 
  Euro Area, J.P. Morgan, Maggie Euro Credit, AAA Index, Total Return 
  Euro Area, J.P. Morgan, Maggie Euro Credit, BBB Index, Total Return 
  Euro Area, Standard & Poors, Euro Index, Price Return, Close 
  Euro Area (World), Europe Brent Oil Spot Price, Close 
   10a  United Kingdom, J.P. Morgan, Government Bond Index, Average 
  United Kingdom, IBOXX £ Coll. All Mats. AAA - Price Index 
  United Kingdom, IBOXX £ Corp. All Mats. BBB - Price Index 
  United Kingdom, FTSE 100, Index, Price Return, Close 
  United Kingdom, IPD All Property Index, Capital Growth 
  United Kingdom (World), Crude oil price, FOB spot Brent 
  United Kingdom, UK-DS IT FTA Group Emerging Markets. - Price Index 
 
Sources: Datastream, ECB, EcoWin, IFS, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
Note: Data for Charts 4, 5, 11, 12 and 13 are derived from the above series. See article for 
details.
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The New Dynamic between US Stock Prices and 
Money Holdings 
 
Frank Browne and David Cronin 
 
Abstract 
The financial crisis has had the effect of focusing attention on the role of liquidity, 
but more specifically excess liquidity, in driving asset prices to unsustainable 
bubble levels.  We think this focus is fully warranted.  However, we consider that, 
in this critical relationship between money and other financial assets, it is only 
half the story.  Little attention has been devoted to date to examining whether this 
same money-financial asset interaction might also be responsible for the excess 
liquidity having been generated in the first place.  We argue that it is.  A new 
dynamic is at play in which newly liberalised and democratised financial markets, 
a hugely expanded role for (Keynesian) liquidity preference (driven by an asset 
demand for money), and a monetary policy constrained to respond to threats to 
financial stability play key roles.  We present evidence, using the asset pairing, 
money and equities, which is supportive of our argument.  These results have 
important implications for both monetary policy and financial stability.  
 
Keywords:  money hoarding and dishoarding; liberalised and democratised 
financial markets; asset price cycles; monetary policy; financial stability                
 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Central Bank of Ireland or the European System of Central 
Banks. 
 
Introduction 
  
104 
 
Financial markets in advanced industrial countries have been subject to a 
systematic evolution over recent decades that has left them radically altered 
relative to, say, the early 1970s.   Ongoing financial market deregulation and 
innovation has enabled grass roots investors (such as households and small firms) 
to gain much easier and cheaper access to financial markets, both in their own 
home countries and abroad.   It would not be inaccurate to say that, during this 
period, financial markets have been subject to a process of democratisation and 
that these markets are now, to all intents and purposes, fully democratised in that 
access to them is available to all.   This description is particularly apt when 
applied to US financial markets, which is why we focus on that country in this 
paper.   
The argument that we make here is that this new, democratised financial market 
setting has critical implications for patterns of substitution between money and 
financial assets.   We illustrate this point by examining just one asset pairing, 
money and equities.   The effect of the liberalised and democratised financial 
market environment has been to generate new and robust substitution patterns 
between these two assets over time according to the level of uncertainty in the 
economy.   We think that these patterns pose tricky problems for monetary policy 
and a substantial danger to financial stability.   These difficulties would be 
compounded if replicated between money and other risky asset classes, which we 
do not examine here.  
The motives for holding money balances are well known - i.e. as a transactions 
and settlement medium on the one hand and as an asset which serves as a store of 
value on the other.   In its relationship with equities, money can be used to buy 
and sell stock and as an alternative store of value to company shares.   Friedman 
(1988, p. 221) notes a “close inverse relation between the level of the Dow Jones 
stock market index and the velocity of the monetary aggregate now designated 
M2 by the Federal Reserve System” over the period 1961 to 1986, where the 
velocity of money is nominal GDP divided by the money stock.   He identifies 
four factors impacting on the nature of the relationship.   The first three are the 
dominant factors for the period he was examining, as their effect was, individually 
and collectively, to determine the inverse relationship he observed.   The first 
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factor relies on a wealth effect and, although not stated explicitly, the idea that 
money is a luxury good (a view espoused by Friedman in other publications).   A 
rise in stock prices increases the wealth to income ratio, which, because money 
is a luxury good, results in a higher money to income ratio (i.e., a fall in income 
velocity).   The second factor also rationalises an inverse relationship by arguing 
that a rise in stock prices implies an increase in the dollar volume of financial 
transactions, which leads to a greater demand for money to facilitate these 
transactions.   The third effect suggested by Friedman is that, as their prices 
increase, stocks are assumed to become riskier and, with an unchanged level of 
investor risk aversion, investors want to acquire additional holdings of safer 
assets of which money will probably be the most attractive.   This type of 
behaviour also serves to reduce income velocity.    
The fourth and final factor identified by Friedman is a substitution effect.   It 
operates on the interaction between the variables in the opposite direction to the 
other three factors just noted.   An expected rise in the return on equities (proxied 
by the share price index) leads to substitution out of money resulting in an 
increase in the velocity of circulation.    
We contend that the relative strength of the motives for holding money balances 
has been transformed radically by the democratisation of financial markets and 
that Friedman’s fourth factor in the money-stocks relationship, the substitution 
effect, is now much stronger as a result.   So whereas Friedman is of the view that 
there is a “close inverse relation” between stock prices and the velocity of money, 
we believe that there is now a “close positive relation” between them.   In our 
view, in the pre-liberalised-pre-democratisation period, the relationship between 
money and the stock market was dominated by the demand for money as a 
transactions and settlement medium for completed share trades.   In the post-
liberalised-post-democratised period, this transactions demand has been 
displaced by an asset/store of value demand as the dominant motive for holding 
money balances with a view to participation in the stock market.   This heightened 
asset demand for money derives from stronger precautionary and speculative 
motives for holding it in a situation in which retail investors are now much more 
exposed to the vicissitudes of the stock market.    
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Observers such as Congdon (2005) argue that general movements in asset prices 
are strongly influenced by the money supply and that ignoring monetary 
aggregates could have destabilising effects on the economy.   Economists at the 
Bank for International Settlements (e.g., Borio and Lowe (2002) and Borio and 
White (2004)) have been persistent in flagging the role of “ample liquidity” in 
instigating the search-for-yield episode of the mid-2000s.   This, ultimately, may 
have sent asset prices shooting upwards during those years and may have 
contributed to the 2007/8 financial crisis.   There has been little attention, 
however, devoted to examining the possibility that this “ample liquidity” itself 
might have been the product of the interaction between money and financial 
markets, along the lines we are suggesting here, i.e. that strong substitution effects 
are now at work in the money-financial asset relationship.   We would agree with 
the view that an excessively loose monetary policy pursued by central banks 
during the 2000s facilitated and drove the search-for-yield phenomenon.   Yet, 
was that loose stance itself forced on central banks by the dynamics of the 
interaction between money and financial markets?   We would say yes and will 
explain why later.          
The empirical focus in this paper is on the relationship between the real Standard 
and Poors 500 (S&P 500) price index and US M2 money holdings and how it has 
evolved over time.57   We demonstrate how the behaviour of the income velocity 
of money (nominal GDP divided by the M2 money stock) in response to 
uncertainty appears to have changed in the transition between two periods that 
correspond to periods of pre- and post-democratisation of financial markets, 
respectively.   We also show how the correlation between S&P 500 price changes 
and changes in the velocity of money has become strongly positive in recent 
times, having previously been negative.  We argue that these developments are 
attributable to the improved ability of the public to manage its wealth holdings, 
and in its enhanced ability to shift wealth between money and other assets in 
response to the level of uncertainty in the economy. 
                                                 
57 The S&P 500 Price Index data used in this paper are inflation-adjusted, i.e. the Index has been 
deflated using the Consumer Price Index.   Description and sources of all data used are included 
in the appendix.   
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New correlation patterns in the data – a case to be addressed?        
Financial market democratisation is a fairly amorphous process which makes it 
difficult to pinpoint a starting date and a completion date.   There is, likewise, no 
easily identifiable chronological demarcation line dividing pre- and post-
democratisation periods.   The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates, the creation of money market mutual funds, the removal of 
Regulation Q interest rate ceilings, and, in the specific case of US stock trading, 
the ending of NYSE fixed commissions, were among the key events that 
liberalised US financial markets and enhanced household participation in those 
markets.   Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2001) report that the share of US 
households holding risky assets (either directly held or indirectly held though 
mutual funds and other accounts) rose from 31.9 percent in 1989 to 49.2 percent 
in 1998, a substantial rise in a short period.   One could reasonably expect this 
share to have increased further since 1998. 
The interplay between money variables and the stock market in the United States 
has received some, if not adequate, attention in the literature.   Dow and 
Elmendorf (1998) and Carlson and Schwartz (1999) find US M2 and its 
components acting as a “gateway” for redirecting and rebalancing funds in 
household portfolios.   The gateway effect will be triggered by both rises and falls 
in stock prices, and it would appear to have become more important between the 
1980s and the mid-1990s as households gained easier and cheaper access to 
financial markets with practical recourse to these markets being provided by 
mutual funds in particular.       
We would think that the early 1990s constituted the time when US financial 
markets were substantially democratised and when the new dynamic between 
stock markets and money came into noticeable effect.   The data examined here 
cover the period 1967Q2 to 2010Q2.   To assist the analysis below, we will 
exclude the interim hybrid period between the mid-1980s and the early-1990s 
from our empirical analysis so as to be able to draw a stronger contrast in 
behaviour between a period of financial market repression (before the mid-1980s) 
and a period of virtually full liberalisation and democratisation (after the early-
to-mid 1990s).                
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The periodicity of the data used is quarterly.   Our preferred velocity variable is 
US nominal GDP divided by the US M2 money stock.   A decrease in the velocity 
measure indicates a rise in money holdings relative to economy-wide transactions 
needs, all other things being equal, and vice versa.   The starting date (1967Q2) 
is determined by the earliest available data on the Consumer Confidence Index 
(CCI).   It is a consumer sentiment indicator calculated from survey data by The 
Conference Board.  The inverse of this is used here as a measure of uncertainty.   
The CCI-based measure of uncertainty and the velocity of the US M2 money 
stock are graphed in Figure 1 below.   The interim hybrid period observations are 
plotted against a shaded background, covering the period 1985Q1 to 1992Q4.   In 
the era of financial repression, before 1985Q1, the simple contemporaneous 
correlation between the uncertainty variable and M2 velocity was positive at 0.36 
- the velocity of money and the level of uncertainty tended, broadly speaking, to 
rise and fall together.   The reason why this positive correlation arises for that 
period can be explained as follows.   An increase in uncertainty (a deterioration 
in consumer sentiment) would probably have likely led to a reduced need for 
money as a transaction medium, not only in the overall economy, but also because 
a fall in share values associated with greater uncertainty would have caused a 
decline in the volume of financial transactions requiring less money as a 
transactions and settlement medium (a fall in M2 demand and an increase in 
velocity).        
For the later, financially liberalised and democratised period (1993Q1-2010Q2), 
the contemporaneous correlation value between the two series changes sign to -
0.81.   This is a dramatic change in value, with Figure 1 testifying to the changed 
correlation between the two series.   Our view is that this is due to the changing 
role of money for stock market participants between the pre- and post-
democratised periods.   Nowadays, an increase in uncertainty is associated with a 
decrease in velocity as investors substitute out of equities and into the safe haven 
of money, and vice versa.   An increase in liquidity preference (i.e., increase in 
the demand for money to hold) has to be accommodated by the central bank – 
otherwise interest rates will rise, at an inappropriate juncture in the economic 
cycle.   The actual money stock, therefore, also increases in response to this 
  
109 
 
demand.   The greater precautionary demand for money as an asset dominates the 
overall demand for money even as the transactions demand probably falls off as 
the economy slows under the sway of deteriorating consumer sentiment and 
declining stock prices. 
This type of conjuncture could also see an increase in the asset demand for money 
driven by speculative considerations.   Speculators will want to be in a position 
to purchase assets when they believe profitable investment opportunities arise 
from asset values having fallen to bargain basement levels.   The only way they 
can be sure that they will be in such a favourable position is to hold (hoard) 
liquidity.   These two sources of asset demand for money come to the fore in 
periods of heightened uncertainty when the equity market is increasingly 
populated by grass roots investors as it has become in the post-democratised 
period.     
Figure 1: The velocity of money and uncertainty, 1967Q2-2010Q2      
 
Note:  Shaded area represents period from 1985Q1 to 1992Q4. 
We would expect the contemporaneous correlation between M2 velocity and the 
S&P 500 price index to be consistent with this broad narrative.   It is, as we can 
see from Figure 2.   The period of financial market repression (1967Q2-1984Q4) 
was characterised by a negative correlation (-0.70 over the period) between 
money velocity and share prices.   This switched to a positive, if low, correlation 
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for the democratisation period (0.16).   When the initial phase of this later period 
(i.e., 1993Q1 to 1999Q4) is dropped from this correlation calculation (because it 
is clear from Figure 1 that equity prices were lagging velocity and the correlation, 
although remaining strong, is not contemporaneous) then the contemporaneous 
correlation goes to 0.85 – a dramatic change from the 1967Q2-1984Q4 period 
and mirroring the change in the contemporaneous correlation value between 
uncertainty and velocity already noted. 
Figure 3 follows on from Figure 2 by showing that there has been an increasing 
correlation between S&P 500 price changes and changes in M2 velocity over 
time.   In that chart, the correlation values are calculated on a rolling 70-quarter 
basis so that the first correlation value plotted is for the period 1967Q3-1984Q4, 
in the pre-democratisation period, and the last value for 1993Q1-2010Q2, in the 
post-democratisation period.   The correlation between the two variables rises 
from an initial value of -0.26 to a final value of 0.41.    
Figure 2: The velocity of money and the S&P 500 price index, 1967Q2-
2010Q2 
 
 Note:  Shaded area represents period from 1985Q1 to 1992Q4. 
 
Figure 3: Rolling correlation values of S&P 500 price changes and changes 
in the velocity of money, 1984Q4-2010Q2 
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Note:  Shaded areas represent correlation values that are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. 
A rationale for the new dynamic  
Our perspective in this area stems from the greater scope for rapid and substantial 
substitution between equities and money in modern, democratised financial 
markets, affording investors great latitude in managing their portfolios.   This 
brings money’s dual role as both a transactions and settlement medium on the one 
hand and as a store of value on the other to the fore.   Money is an extremely good 
store of value and this feature generates both precautionary and speculative 
motives for holding it.   A short-term increase in the money stock relative to trade 
needs (as reflected in a decline in money velocity) should mainly reflect 
precautionary and speculative behaviour at work.58   In effect, this reflects the 
public’s desire to hoard money as a store of value but with the knowledge that it 
is available to purchase assets (or goods) in the future if so required. 
In the new world of democratised finance, asset prices are increasingly affected 
by substitution out of money and into financial assets in periods of growing 
                                                 
58 It is also possible that some of the quarter-to-quarter change in the income velocity of money 
represents a response to changes in the net opportunity cost of money and/or an ongoing 
technological shift in the amount of real money balances required to fulfil transaction needs.   The 
latter effect is likely to be a negligible influence in the short or medium term.    
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confidence (or even irrational exuberance), and out of financial assets and into 
money in periods of waning confidence or market uncertainty.   We believe that 
in financial markets with substantial grass roots participation, Keynesian liquidity 
preference is now a much more powerful force than it was in the time of Keynes, 
which was long before financial markets were democratised according to our 
characterisation.   
The relative motives for holding money have been transformed by the 
democratisation process.   In the pre-democratisation period, the need to transact 
and settle equity market transactions was the dominant motive for stock market 
participants to hold money.   With the greater involvement of retail investors in 
the stock market in the post-democratisation era, the demand for money as an 
asset has come to play a much greater role than it did previously.   More 
democratised financial markets give households greater latitude in reconfiguring 
the composition of their wealth holdings in response to extraneous events.    
Among the key influences on asset management is likely to be the level of 
uncertainty in the economy.   The broader participation in financial markets that 
is implied by democratisation also means greater exposure of households to 
economic and financial market uncertainty.   A rise in uncertainty can be expected 
to see households attempt to change the composition of their wealth holdings 
away from risky asset categories, such as stocks, in favour of money.   Likewise, 
they will be inclined to invest (or re-invest) in riskier assets in a search for yield 
when uncertainty fades.    
This behavioural change is necessary to explain the new dynamic between money 
and equities but so also is the role of money, created to excess, in driving up asset 
prices, and into bubble territory in extreme cases.   We argue that the role of the 
interaction between money and financial markets goes much further than excess 
money creation and its repercussions for asset prices – it also contributes to the 
excess liquidity in the first place.   This is because an asset price bust raises the 
demand for money as an asset (safe haven), especially in the new democratised 
environment.  This increased demand must be accommodated by the central bank 
to avoid interest rates rising in circumstances where financial markets and the real 
economy are under strain.   
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As a result, there is a large increase in the money stock as the central bank is 
forced to accommodate the shift of investments out of the stock market.   The 
central bank is not likely to meet with much success in attempting to sterilise this 
injection of money at a later stage.   When confidence returns to financial markets, 
there will be a substantial monetary overhang.   The improvement in investor 
sentiment combined with ready purchasing power is then likely to kick off a new 
asset price cycle and may even ratchet up its amplitude in comparison with earlier 
cycles.  
Figures 4 and 5 show how both the S&P 500 price change and the change-in-
velocity respond to a positive innovation or shock in the other variable for the 
1967Q2-1984Q4 and 1993Q1-2010Q2 periods, respectively.59   The responses in 
the earlier period (Figures 4a and 4b) see a significant negative effect for each 
variable being registered in the same quarter that the innovation in the other 
variable takes place, but no significant effect occurs in subsequent quarters.   The 
interpretation of the S&P 500 price change shock’s effect on the velocity variable 
in this period is that it was dominated by a rise in equity prices, generating same-
period increases in the transactions demand for money from stock market 
participants.   Likewise, a positive shock to M2 velocity at that time led to a 
contemporaneous fall in S&P 500 prices as a lower transactions demand for 
money by stock market participants was associated with fewer stock trades and a 
decline in stock prices.  
In contrast, in the later, post-democratisation period, there are significant and 
prolonged positive responses to shocks from either variable (stock price or 
velocity) to the other variable (Figures 5a and 5b).   So, in this period, a positive 
velocity shock causes a relatively long-lasting, though still transient, rise in equity 
prices.   This reaction is consistent with the view that a dishoarding (hoarding) of 
money balances is associated with an increase (decrease) in the price of a risky 
asset, such as equities.   Similarly, a positive shock to equity prices causes a 
                                                 
59 The plots in Figures 4 and 5 are based on generalised impulse responses based on a vector 
autoregression (VAR methodology).   The S&P price change, change-in velocity, and CCI series 
(measured in log-natural first-difference form) used heretofore are included in the VAR 
estimations.   The VAR lag length chosen is one, based on an examination of various test statistics 
across both sample periods, and a constant term is included in all VAR equations.   
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positive change in the velocity of money.   We interpret this evidence as saying 
that good returns in equity markets prompts investors to dishoard their idle money 
holdings and substitute in favour of stocks.   These results back up our view that 
the role of money in its interaction with stock markets has shifted from being 
predominantly one of a transactions medium to being mainly one of an asset or 
store of value between the pre- and post-democratisation periods. 
In other research on this general topic conducted at the Central Bank of Ireland, 
Browne and Kelly (2009) undertake an econometric assessment of US money 
demand and, specifically, the influence of uncertainty on it.   Employing also a 
pre-democratisation/democratisation split in the time series, they find that an 
increase in uncertainty (also measured using the inverse of the CCI) in the pre-
democratisation era would have resulted in a decline in the transactions demand 
for money owing to pessimism regarding income and employment prospects.   In 
the post-democratised era, they find the precautionary/store-of-value function of 
money dominating the transactions demand such that a rise in uncertainty results 
in a net increase in the demand for money. 
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Figure 4a: Impulse response of the S&P 500 price change to a change-in-
velocity shock, 1967Q2-1984Q4 
 
Figure 4b: Impulse response of the change-in-velocity to a S&P 500 price 
change shock, 1967Q2-1984Q4 
 
Note:  The solid lines indicate the impulse response and the jagged lines the related bootstrapped 
error bounds at the 95 percent confidence level. 
 
 
Figure 5a: Impulse response of the S&P 500 price change to a change-in-
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Figure 5b: Impulse response of the change-in-velocity to a S&P 500 price 
change shock, 1993Q1-2010q2 
 
Note:  The solid lines indicate the impulse response and the jagged lines the related bootstrapped 
error bounds at the 95 percent confidence level. 
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If we restrict attention to the part of the post-democratisation period beginning at 
the start of the new millennium then the close co-movement between the income 
velocity of money and stock market prices is particularly evident.   The 
performance of the S&P 500 price index from 2000Q1 to 2010Q2 is plotted in 
Figure 6, alongside the velocity of M2 money stock for the same period.   It can 
be seen that the two series track each other closely during those years – the 
contemporaneous correlation between them for the period is 0.85. 
Figure 6: The velocity of money and the S&P 500 price index, 2000Q1-
2010Q2.   
 
Note:  Shaded areas represent periods of recession, as identified by the NBER.    
The narrative for the 2000s can be told as a sequence of phases of the economic 
cycle.   In terms of exposition, this is helped by the inclusion of shaded areas 
representing the 2001Q1-2001Q4 and 2007Q4-2009Q2 US recessions, as 
identified by the NBER, in Figure 6.   Another feature of the decade was the loose 
stance of monetary policy at critical parts of the economic cycle.   The short-term 
real interest rate was extremely low in particular in the 2000s relative to its level 
at similar points in previous business cycles.   We illustrate this through Figure 
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average of the five cyclical peaks prior to those two.60   The real interest rate was 
rising prior and subsequent to the cyclical peak, on average, in the pre-2000s, 
while it dipped and was at a relatively low level after the 2001 and 2007 peaks.    
It can also be seen in Figure 7b that real money growth at the 2001 and 2007 
cyclical peaks was much higher than through the previous peaks’ average.   
Moreover, real money growth increased subsequent to the peaks of the 2000s 
whereas it declined, on average, in earlier post-peak periods.   These data then 
point to a much looser monetary policy stance in the two most recent US 
economic cycles than occurred in those phases in earlier decades.   Such a stance 
would have helped feed the search-for-yield behaviour of financial market 
participants in the 2000s by providing them with cheap access to funding 
balances, as well as accommodating their desire for money holdings when 
financial market performance started to deteriorate.    
Figure 6 shows that the early 2000s saw a decline in both M2 velocity and the 
S&P 500 index.   As well as the defined 2001 recession, uncertainty was at 
elevated levels at that time relative to late 1990s values (see Figure 1).   It is 
unsurprising then, given our previous discussion, that the S&P price index 
declined during this time.   There would, as a result, have been a greater demand 
to hold wealth in the form of money balances.   The extremely loose stance of 
monetary policy in the early 2000s (the tinted lines in Figures 7a and 7b have 
already illustrated this) would have accommodated such hoarding behaviour.    
When confidence returned (around mid-2003), the excess liquidity arising from 
the monetary policy stance of that era would be expected to have driven a search 
for yield, thereby raising equity returns.   This is what can be seen to have 
transpired (Figure 6).   The S&P 500 price index increased, in real terms, by 62 
percent between 2003Q2 and 2007Q3.   Over the same period, the velocity of the 
M2 money stock rose also.      
 
                                                 
60 The five earlier peaks occurred in 1969Q4, 1973Q4, 1980Q1, 1981Q3 and 1990Q3.   The 
plotted series in both Figures 7a and 7b are each eight-quarter moving averages, with the variable 
plotted at the last quarter of those eight. 
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Figure 7a: Real interest rate through the cyclical peak, 1967Q1-2010Q2 
 
 
Figure 7b: Real money growth rate through the cyclical peak, 1967Q1-
2010Q2 
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stocks as the financial crisis of 2007/8 took hold.   This behaviour is illustrated in 
Figure 6 where the S&P 500 index can be seen to fall by almost one-half, in real 
terms, between 2007Q3 and 2009Q2.   Over the same period, the velocity of the 
M2 money stock also declined, reflecting both a preference among the public for 
holding money as liquid balances and an unavoidably loose monetary policy 
stance (as shown by the solid lines in Figures 7a and 7b).      
Finally, from early 2009 onwards, both money velocity and the S&P 500 index 
have started to rise.   As can be seen in Figure 1, this was a time when uncertainty 
started to recede after a particularly turbulent year, 2008.   It is unsurprising, then, 
that both the velocity and equity price variables have started to increase in 
tandem.    
Implications for policy 
The new financial market environment ushered in by the prolonged process of 
liberalisation and democratisation of financial markets would be expected to 
evoke behavioural changes in these markets especially in the wake of large 
shocks.   The greater involvement of retail investors in stock markets means that 
the natural ebb and flow of uncertainty in the economic environment now throws 
up quite different patterns of interaction between stock prices and money than 
occurred in the past.   These are not just an academic curiosity: they have 
implications for both monetary policy and financial stability.     
Monetary policy, in particular, would seem to be in something of a bind when it 
comes to addressing the effects of democratisation, in particular in having to 
facilitate a safe-haven demand for money in a downturn while realising that 
money creation at that time is not easily sterilised later.   The central bank is not 
likely to be able “to sit on its hands” in such a situation.   The liquidity preference 
theory of the rate of interest says that a failure to meet an increasing demand for 
money arising from the efforts of investors to substitute out of financial assets 
and into money will drive up the market rate of interest according to the standard 
Keynesian theory of liquidity  preference.   The extent of the increase will be 
directly proportional to the strength of the public’s preference for liquidity.   It is 
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likely to be intense in the kind of situation investors found themselves in during 
2007 and, in particular, 2008. 
In these circumstances, a sharp increase in the interest rate would be harmful to 
the real economy.   It would have already been hit by a steep decline in most asset 
prices, which, in itself, impacts negatively on banks’ loan losses and causes 
primary issuance on securities markets to dry up.   The resulting credit crunch 
would be expected to have a powerful deflationary effect.   The central bank has 
little option in such conditions but to accommodate the much greater preference 
for liquidity among the public.   Banks and investors need money created by the 
central bank as a safe haven against the turmoil in financial markets.   Inflated 
money stock holdings are then held by them as idle balances as insurance during 
the period of uncertainty.  
When confidence returns, excess money balances can drive a search-for-yield and 
rising asset prices in excess of those warranted by fundamentals.   While a central 
bank is likely to be aware of the difficulties that a loosening of monetary policy 
can create in subsequent years, its broad mandates of maintaining price stability 
and contributing to financial stability mean that it is effectively constrained to 
respond to a systemic threat by adopting such a loose policy stance when a 
generalised asset price collapse occurs.   If the central bank does not react in that 
way, it might face the prospect of an even steeper meltdown in asset prices, which 
could leave widespread corporate and household bankruptcies in its wake.   Initial 
financial weakness could easily become systemic in such circumstances.   An 
accumulation of bad debts could result in a credit crunch and drive the economy 
into an overall deflation, with the emergence of a debt deflation then making the 
situation progressively worse, with the central bank in danger of missing both its 
price stability and financial stability objectives at the same time.   Experience 
suggests (most recently in the case of Japan) that it is extremely difficult to 
extricate the economy from a debt deflation.   Equally, it would probably be 
particularly difficult to do so for the US economy now in light of the way in which 
debt ratios have trended upwards there over time as indeed they have in other 
advanced industrial countries. 
 
  
122 
 
Conclusion 
We have sought to shed new light on the relationship between money and 
equities.   The results point to a substitution effect, governed by the level of 
uncertainty in the economy, now being the dominant force in that relationship.   
This state of affairs is, in our view, owing to the transformation of financial 
markets in recent decades.    
The democratisation of financial markets is likely irreversible.   In itself, this is 
to be welcomed as it provides the public with greater control and influence over 
its financial affairs.   It does, however, bring with it particular macroeconomic 
dangers that we have sought to relate here.   Monetary policy would seem to be 
in something of a bind when it comes to addressing these issues, in particular in 
having to facilitate a safe-haven demand for money in a downturn while realising 
that money creation at that time can drive a search-for-yield and an asset price 
spiral subsequently.   It can threaten financial stability later when those prices 
collapse.   It remains to be seen whether and how central banks will address such 
issues.  
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Data Appendix 
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Seasonally Adjusted. 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
M2 Money Stock, Seasonally Adjusted.  
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Abstract 
We employ Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2009, 2012) spillover approach to study the 
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1. Introduction 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the ensuing 
turbulence experienced in financial markets, the Federal Reserve and other central banks 
chose to pursue what Borio and Disyatat (2010) refer to as “balance sheet policies” 
alongside standard monetary policy, which focuses on the setting of short-term interest 
rates.   These unconventional policies essentially involve central banks using their 
balance sheets to influence market prices and conditions directly rather than through the 
indirect interest rate channel.   Such actions affect the composition of private sector 
balance sheets as well as those of the central banks.   This approach appears to be in 
keeping with Brainard and Tobin’s (1968) view that monetary policy works through a 
“portfolio balance effect” which sees changes in the relative supply of assets held by the 
private sector leading to changes in their relative yields.       
The Federal Reserve initially chose to undertake sizeable purchases of financial assets in 
late 2008.   This involved it acquiring, inter alia, government bonds from banks in 
exchange for reserve balances at the Reserve.   The monetary base has expanded 
considerably since then following various rounds of so-called quantitative easing.   The 
immediate price effect of the policies on government securities was to alter the yield on 
them but its effect was expected, and intended, to work beyond that asset market alone 
and may have had the desired effect.   The reduction in the yield on government securities 
could, for example, have forced fund managers to invest in commodities in a search for 
yield (Koo, 2011) and to have altered prices in that market.   A similar effect might be 
expected to be at play in stock and currency markets. 
As well as the interaction between the monetary base and financial assets, the financial 
and economic turbulence of recent years may also have affected the dynamic between 
broad money, specifically M2, and assets.   The economics literature in this area has 
mainly focussed on the broad money-equities relationship.   Friedman (1988) argues that 
there are two conflicting influences on the nature of that relationship.   The first is a 
wealth effect - that is a rise in stock prices increases demand for money both as a 
transaction medium and as a store of value.61   The other factor is a substitution effect 
and works in the opposite direction to the wealth effect with an expected rise in the return 
                                                 
61 In a cross-country assessment, Caruso (2001) finds that wealth effects in stock markets do impact the 
demand for money. 
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in equities leading to a substitution out of money and into stocks.    Friedman 
acknowledges that which factor dominates the other is an empirical issue.   His own 
assessment is that the wealth effect dictates the money-stocks relationship.   More 
recently, Dow and Elmendorf (1998) and Carlson and Schwarz (1999) have found 
evidence of a link between stocks and money (specifically, M2) in the United States in 
households’ management of their wealth portfolios over time.   M2 acts as a gateway for 
redirecting and rebalancing funds in household portfolios.   The gateway will tend to be 
utilised when there are both rises and falls in stock prices.   Browne and Cronin (2012) 
argue that financial innovation over the last twenty years or so has led to the substitution 
effect now dominating the wealth effect among the two broad factors identified by 
Friedman as dictating the relationship between stocks and money.   Households will re-
orientate their wealth holdings from stocks to money when uncertainty in the economy 
rises and will reverse this flow when the economic climate is perceived to have improved.   
If modern financial markets allow agents to switch their wealth holdings more easily 
between nominal-certain money and risky financial assets in response to the level of 
uncertainty in the economy then the period since 2008 seems likely to have been one 
when such substitution would have been quite substantial. 
While the literature may have focussed primarily on the money-stock price relationship, 
linkages between money and other asset classes also arise.   Friedman acknowledges that 
the public will undertake general portfolio adjustment, affecting money, stock and other 
asset holdings.   The link between money growth and commodity prices has received 
renewed attention in recent years.   Commodity prices have been shown to overshoot new 
equilibrium values in response to money shocks as a result of sluggishness in consumer 
prices (Frankel (2008), Browne and Cronin (2010)).   Variability in money growth rates 
then may effect considerable volatility in commodity markets due to the overshooting 
dynamic. 
A link between bond markets and monetary base is a standard feature of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism.   It has been brought back into the spotlight of late by 
central banks pursuing policies that alter the composition of government debt held by the 
private sector.   These can alter the yield on government securities and can also have 
effects on returns in other asset classes.   A feature of monetary policy in recent years 
(from 2008) has been the practice of the Federal Reserve announcing details of its 
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programs of quantitative easing, outlining specific asset purchase targets.   
Announcements on money supply targets in the past (following the 1979 decision by the 
Federal Reserve to target money growth) had effect on both foreign exchange futures and 
spot prices.   Mussa (1979) indicates that the efficient markets hypothesis would lead one 
to expect exchange rate movements in response to any such announcements or “news”.   
Sheehan and Wohar (1995) find that expected money growth leads to a depreciation of 
the US dollar, but that unexpected changes in money supply have insignificant effect.   
Neely and Dey (2010) conclude from a survey of the literature that macroeconomic 
announcements in general have effect on exchange rate returns.             
This paper then uses an econometric method owing to Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) 
to examine, in the first instance, the interaction between money (both monetary base and 
M2) and the returns on four classes of financial asset (stocks, commodities, currency 
index, and government bonds) since 2000.   This approach allows the user to quantify the 
extent to which shocks in different variables spill over to one another.   It may then shed 
some light on whether the particular monetary policy of recent years has a noticeable 
impact on financial asset return behaviour.   A successful balance sheet policy would be 
expected to see greater spillover between the monetary base and asset returns.   Likewise, 
if the gateway/substitution effect is active then one should see greater spillover between 
broad money (M2) and financial asset returns occurring during periods of financial and 
economic uncertainty.62 
The relationship between money and asset market volatility is addressed in a second set 
of econometric estimations herein where the changes in the two money aggregates used 
in the first set of estimations are combined with measures of the volatility in stock, 
commodity, currency and government bond markets.  This is a natural extension of the 
study as money growth on asset returns could also affect the variability of the asset price, 
as already alluded to above.   Bailey (1988) finds that unanticipated changes in money 
supply affects the volatility of asset prices, including the four asset classes being 
considered in this study.   Roley (1983) notes the increased responsiveness of asset prices 
to money surprises after the Federal Reserve’s policy of targeting monetary aggregates, 
                                                 
62 The focus in this paper is on the relationship between the financial and money variables, and between 
the money aggregates themselves.   We do, however, pass brief comment on the bilateral spillover 
relationships between the four asset classes. 
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adopted in October 1979.   In particular, it explains a large fraction of the increase in the 
average volatility of interest rates following that policy change.   It remains to be seen 
whether the adoption of unconventional monetary policies in recent years may also have 
resulted in money having greater effect on asset volatility through increased spillover.       
Asset price volatility can also affect money aggregates.   Slovin and Sushka (1983), for 
instance, show that greater interest rate variability increases money demand.   Tatom 
(1984) notes the two-way causal effects between money growth and interest rate 
variability.   Among the possible effects that might be observed in recent times, and with 
the particular policies being utilised by the Federal Reserve, is that when there is a 
volatility shock in a financial market, a substantial change in the monetary base, but not 
in M2, will be observed.   This would occur because the Federal Reserve has responded 
to such a financial event by altering the monetary base, with little impact on M2.63   This 
effect, if correct, could be expected to manifest itself in a noticeable rise in the spillover 
between financial markets and the monetary base. 
Finally, the Diebold-Yilmaz approach can also provide information on how the monetary 
base and broad money, M2, have themselves interacted with one another.   The increase 
in the size of the monetary base following the balance-sheet programs of recent years 
would normally be expected to raise the size of the M2 money stock via a money 
multiplier effect, although it might also not be unexpected in an uncertain economic 
environment if the monetary base was hoarded by the banking sector and not used to 
pursue a larger retail deposit stock.   Lothian (2009) points out that in spite of the 
monetary base more than doubling from August 2008 to April 2009, its growth did not 
spill over in any major way to M2.   An absence of spillover from the monetary base to 
M2 may then transpire in the econometric results.    
2. Methodology 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) provide a spillover measure based on vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models in the tradition of Engle et al. (1990).   Construction of the index relies 
on forecast error variance decompositions, which show the proportion of the movement 
in a variable’s development over time due to its own shocks and that due to shocks in 
                                                 
63 This hypothesis was suggested by a referee. 
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other variables in the vector autoregression by quantifying how much of the total variance 
forecast is attributed to each.   The spillover index provides a measure of interdependence 
among variables with a higher index value implying that a larger proportion of the shocks 
in markets as a whole can be accounted for by cross-variable shocks rather than own-
variable shocks.64 
Whereas their earlier paper utilised orthogonalised variance decompositions, Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2012) uses the generalised VAR framework of Koop, Pesaran and Potter 
(1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998).   The advantage of this form of VAR is that variance 
decompositions are invariant to the ordering of the variables in it.   Net spillover values 
between variables can also be calculated, if desired.   Given these features, we utilise this 
VAR approach rather than that in the earlier Diebold-Yilmaz paper.   In the remainder of 
this section, we outline in summary form the VAR framework and construction of the 
spillover index, while referring the interested reader to the greater detail found in section 
2 of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). 
The 𝑁𝑁-variable VAR (𝑝𝑝) specification is given by  
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡=1 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡   (1) 
 
Where 𝜀𝜀~(0,𝛴𝛴) is a vector of independently and identically distributed disturbances. 
Assuming covariance stationarity, this specification can be rewritten in moving average 
form as:   
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖∞𝑡𝑡=1 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖    (2) 
 
Where the 𝑁𝑁 × 𝑁𝑁 coefficient matrices 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  observe the recursion 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛷𝛷1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖−1 +
𝛷𝛷2𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖−2 +  … + 𝛷𝛷𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖−𝑝𝑝, with 𝐴𝐴0 an 𝑁𝑁 × 𝑁𝑁 identity matrix and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖𝑖 < 0.   
Variance decompositions allow the fraction of the 𝐻𝐻–step-ahead error variance in 
forecasting 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 owing to shocks to 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗, ∀ 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖 , for each 𝑖𝑖 to be measured. 
                                                 
64 Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, p. 170) point out that spillover measures “have the appealing virtue of 
conveying important and useful information while nevertheless sidestepping the contentious issue of 
definition and existence of episodes of “contagion” so vigorously debated in recent literature such as 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002)”.  
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Cross-variance spillovers are the fractions of the 𝐻𝐻–step-ahead error variance in 
forecasting 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 owing to shocks to 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗, for 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2,...,N, such that 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗, while own 
variance spillovers are the fractions of the 𝐻𝐻–step-ahead error variance in forecasting 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
owing to shocks to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, for 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2,...,N.   With the 𝐻𝐻–step-ahead forecast error variance 
decompositions denoted as 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻) for 𝐻𝐻 = 1, 2, …, we get 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻) = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 ∑ (𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗′𝐴𝐴ℎ𝛴𝛴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)2𝐻𝐻−1ℎ=0
∑ (𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗′𝐴𝐴ℎ𝛴𝛴𝐴𝐴ℎ′ 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗)𝐻𝐻−1ℎ=0   (3) 
Where Σ is the variance matrix for the error vector 𝜀𝜀, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the standard deviation of the 
error term for the 𝑖𝑖th equation and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is the selection vector with one as the 𝑖𝑖th element 
and zeros otherwise.    
Each entry of the variance decomposition matrix is then normalised by the sum of the 
elements of each row of the variance decomposition table as: 
𝜃𝜃� (𝐻𝐻)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔 = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)𝛴𝛴𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)  (4) 
By construction, ∑ 𝜃𝜃� (𝐻𝐻)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔 = 1 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗−1 and ∑ 𝜃𝜃� (𝐻𝐻)𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔 = 𝑁𝑁.𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗−1  
The total spillover index, which measures the contribution of spillovers of shocks across 
the variables to the total forecast error variance, is then defined as: 
𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻) = ∑ 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗=1𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗=1 . 100   (5) 
The directional spillover imparted by all other variables 𝑗𝑗 to variable 𝑖𝑖 is measured as: 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖.𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻) = ∑ 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖∑ 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 . 100  (6) 
In a similar vein, the directional spillover from market 𝑖𝑖 to all other markets 𝑗𝑗 is calculated 
as: 
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𝑆𝑆.𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻) = ∑ 𝜃𝜃�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖∑ 𝜃𝜃�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 . 100   (7) 
Given these directional spillovers, net volatility spillovers from market 𝑖𝑖 to all markets 
𝑗𝑗 can be calculated as the difference between gross volatility shocks transmitted to and 
gross volatility shocks received from all other markets: 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻) = 𝑆𝑆.𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖.𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻)  (8) 
3. Data and Full-Sample Results 
3.1  Data 
We use weekly financial market data from four US asset classes: stocks (represented by 
the S&P 500 index), commodities (DJ-UBS commodity index), currency index (the ICE 
US dollar index futures contract) and government bonds (US Generic Government 10-
year bonds).65   The basic data for the stocks, commodities and US dollar contract are 
index levels and that for the government bonds are nominal yields.   The sample size 
covers the period 24 May 2000 to 28 November 2012. 
Two money supply variables are used: the US M2 money stock and US monetary base.   
Weekly data for these aggregates are reported on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s 
FRED database on a Monday reporting date for M2 and on a Wednesday for the monetary 
base.   In constructing first-difference datasets for the money aggregates, we are then 
required to use the Wednesday-to-Wednesday changes for the monetary base and to 
match them to the preceding Monday-to-Monday changes in the M2 stock.   There are 
then two business days between the reporting days for the monetary base and for M2.   
Real rates of weekly change in these money variables are included in the two datasets 
that we utilise in the VAR estimations that follow.   The first dataset is completed by 
including real return series for each of the four asset series.   Those rates of return series 
use Wednesday closing values for the assets.   The second dataset includes volatility 
measures for the four financial assets and, again, the two money aggregate first-
differences series.   The asset return/volatility series then are contemporaneously matched 
                                                 
65 All data series used are detailed in Appendix A. 
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to the monetary base series, while the M2 series is separated from them by two business 
days.   This is an unavoidable consequence of the differing reporting dates for the money 
aggregates but, particularly in the context of the sample sizes in the regression analysis 
that follows, this seems to be a sensible and low cost means of dealing with the issue.      
The nominal rates of change in the stock, commodity and currency indices, the 
government bond yield, and in the money aggregates are adjusted for inflation using the 
following formula: 1 + 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 
Where 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the nominal rate of change in money aggregate/asset value over the week 
and the measure of 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 is estimated as follows: the rate of change in the CPI between start- 
and end-month is divided by four or five depending on the number of Wednesdays in the 
month.66    
The first dataset utilised in the regression analysis then comprises the real rate of changes 
in the four asset variables and in the two money aggregates.   The latter two are also used 
in the second dataset which is completed by the inclusion of volatility measures for the 
four asset classes.   Following Garman and Klass (1980) and Alizadeh, Brandt and 
Diebold (2002), volatility for each asset class is calculated as follows: 
𝜎𝜎�2 = 0.511(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)2 − 0.19[(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 − 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡)(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 2𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡) − 2(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 − 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡)(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡)] −0.383(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 − 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡)2     
Where 𝐻𝐻 is the high index/yield value in the Thursday-opening to Wednesday-close 
week, 𝐿𝐿 is the Thursday-Wednesday low value, 𝑂𝑂 is the Thursday opening value and 𝐶𝐶 
is the closing Wednesday value (all in natural logarithms with the exception of the 
government bond).67    
                                                 
66 If all weekly data were deflated by a quarter of the monthly inflation rate, the rate of deflation of asset 
returns and nominal money growth over time would exceed that warranted by the actual path of the CPI.   
Deflating the nominal data according to the method outlined then provides a more accurate measure of real 
returns or rates of change.      
67 Our choice of the Garman-Klass estimate of volatility follows that of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) and its 
standing as an efficient measure of volatility (Shu and Zhang (2006)).   Alternative measures of volatility 
could also be used.   Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasicity (GARCH) and stochastic 
volatility models are two means of estimating and modelling time-varying conditional financial market 
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The data are graphed in Fig.s 1 and 2.   In Fig. 1, the four asset return series are relatively 
volatile during the period extending from September 2008 to mid-2009.   Their range of 
values was also high in the early 2000s, with the exception of commodities.   There is a 
pickup in the variation of weekly returns for stocks and, more noticeably, for the 
government bond series in the second half of 2011.   The M2 money stock experiences 
large, positive changes in the weeks ending 19 September 2001, 24 September 2008 and 
3 August 2011.   The positive spike in 19 September 2001 was followed by a large 
negative change in the week ending 26 September 2001.   A similar pair of changes 
occurred for the monetary base at that time.   Large weekly changes in the monetary base, 
mainly of a positive value, occur between the period 24 September 2008 and 24 June 
2009.    
The four intra-week asset volatility series in Fig. 2 reveal a number of periods and 
particular weeks when there was high volatility.   For stocks, there was a sharp, temporary 
pickup in volatility in July 2002.   Volatility also rose in the weeks after 17 September 
2008 and relatively high values were maintained into early 2009.   Intra-week volatility 
values in commodities rose in the second half of 2008 and persisted at higher values into 
the spring of 2009, while earlier in the decade there was a noticeable spike in volatility 
in September 2001.   The volatility series for government bonds sees large values being 
recorded in three sub-periods: from December 2001 to August 2003, from September 
2008 to June 2009, and in the second half of 2011.   Finally, unlike the other three assets, 
the currency index exhibited relatively high volatility only in the late 2000s and not 
earlier in the decade.   The largest volatility value was recorded in the week ending 23 
April 2008, while volatility values were usually high from September 2008 to early-2009.   
More recently, high volatility values were recorded in November 2010 and November 
2011.  
  
                                                 
volatility.   Both, however, have been criticised as being inaccurate and inefficient as they use closing 
prices and fail to take account of price information within the period (in this case, a week) (Alizadeh, 
Brandt and Diebold (2002), Brandt and Diebold (2006)).   The Garman-Klass estimator uses price range 
information to improve volatility estimation.   Both it and the Parkinson (1980) estimator of volatility (used 
below in assessing the sensitivity of the spillover index to volatility choice) are also robust to market 
microstructure noise (Alizadeh, Brandt and Diebold, 2002).        
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Fig. 1.  Weekly return series for four asset classes and weekly changes in M2 and 
Monetary Base 
i. Stocks      ii.      Commodities 
  
iii. 10-year Government Bond  iv. US Dollar Index   
  
v. M2 money stock    vi.  Monetary Base 
  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Weekly volatility series for four asset classes 
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i. Stocks                         ii.      Commodities 
  
iii. 10-year Government Bond  iv. US Dollar Index   
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3.2  Full-sample analysis 
The initial vector autoregression (VAR) undertaken involves a full-sample estimation of 
the total spillover index and its constituent parts.   As well as giving an indication of 
spillover behaviour over the entire May 2000 to November 2012 sample period, it may 
also help the reader in following the graphical representations in the rolling-sample 
analysis that follows.   All decompositions are based on ten-week ahead forecast errors 
and the aforementioned generalised forecast error variance method.68   The lag order of 
the VAR is three and a constant term is included in the regression equations.    
Table 1 then shows the decompositions where the financial asset variables are the weekly 
returns, illustrated in Fig. 1.   In Table 2, the financial variables are the volatility measures 
in Fig. 2.   The two money variables outlined above make up the six variables in each 
VAR.   For convenience, we refer hereafter to the decompositions involving the return 
series as the return spillovers and those containing the volatility series as the volatility 
spillovers.  
A measure of the estimated contribution to the forecast error variance of market 𝑖𝑖 coming 
from innovations to market 𝑗𝑗 is given by the off-diagonal elements in the main body of 
each table.   The sum of off-diagonal column entries (contributions/directional to others) 
and the sum of the off-diagonal rows (contributions/directional from others) then give, 
respectively, the “to” and “from” directional entries for each variable in the “Directional 
to others” row and “Directional from others” column of Tables 1 and 2.   The total 
spillover index is calculated by dividing either the sum of the “to” or “from” measures 
(they will each add up to the same numerical value) by the sum of the six columns (in 
this case, 600).   The difference between the “Directional to others” and “Directional 
from others” values for each variable gives its net spillover to/from other variables. 
The value of the total return spillover index in Table 1 is 21.4 percent.   For the two 
money variables, M2 can be seen to impart greater spillover to (14.9 percent) and from 
(20.3 percent) the other five variables relative to the corresponding values for the 
monetary base (12.6 percent and 16.4 percent, respectively).   When one looks at the 
bidirectional spillovers between each money variable and the four financial asset return 
                                                 
68 The insensitivity of the total spillover indices to the forecast horizon is shown in Appendix B using the 
52-week rolling windows employed in section 4.    
  
138 
 
series, the individual values reported in Table 1 are low, having values of less than five 
percent.   With regard to the spillover between the money variables, the spillover from 
M2 to the monetary base is 10.6 percent and that from the monetary base to M2 is 8.2 
percent.   Bidirectional spillovers amongst the asset classes are relatively strong between 
stocks and commodities, stocks and government bonds, and commodities and the 
currency index. 
Turing to Table 2, it can be seen that the total volatility spillover index value is higher, 
at 34.4 percent, than that reported in Table 1.   The directional-from and directional-to 
values for the money variables are also higher in this table.   M2 imparts 35.6 percent 
spillover to the other five variables and receives 21.1 percent from them.   It, therefore, 
has a net spillover flow to the other variables of 14.4 percent.   In contrast, monetary base 
is a net spillover recipient from the other variables, albeit of only 0.5 percent.   Its 
spillover from the other five variables is 29.4 percent while its spillover to them is 28.9 
percent.    
With regard to the bidirectional spillover values, it is noteworthy that M2’s spillover 
value to stocks is 11.1 percent, higher than that imparted to stocks by two of the other 
three financial asset variables.   The spillover M2 receives from stocks is 7.3 percent, and 
from the monetary base is 8.1 percent.  The spillover from the other three asset classes is 
low.   For the monetary base, there is a spillover from it to stocks of 9.6 percent and a 
spillover of 13.2 percent in the opposite direction.   The interaction between the money 
aggregates and stocks then exceeds that between the other financial assets and the money 
aggregates.   The spillovers between M2 and the monetary base reported in Table 2 are 
not too different from those reported in Table 1.   Stock market volatility imparts 
relatively strong shocks to the other three asset markets (see first column of Table 2).   
Other relatively large spillover values are from government bonds to stocks (11.7 
percent) and from government bonds to the dollar index (10.5 percent). 
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Table 1.   Returns spillover index and components: full sample estimation 
 Stocks Commodities 
Govt. 
Bond 
 
 
Dollar 
Index 
 
 
M2 
 
 
Monetary 
Base 
Directio-
nal 
from 
others  Net spillover 
    
   
 
(+: to;  
  -: from) 
Stocks 73 9.2 10.2 
 
3.9 
 
1.2 
 
2.5 27 2.3 
Commodities 8.5 72.8 2.6 
 
13.5 
 
1.3 
 
1.3 27.2 6.5 
Govt. Bond  11.3 3 83.7 
 
0.7 
 
0.9 
 
0.4 16.3 0.2 
Dollar Index 4.2 15.1 0.7 
 
79 
 
0.9 
 
0.2 21 0.3 
M2 4.1 4.4 1 2.6 
 
79.7 8.2 20.3 -5.4 
Mty. Base 1.2 2 2 
 
0.6 
 
10.6 
 
83.6 16.4 -3.8 
         
Directional  
to others 29.3 33.7 16.5 
 
21.3 
 
14.9 
 
12.6 128.3  
     
 
  
Total 
Spillover 
Index: 
Directional  
incl. own 102.3 106.5 100.2 
 
100.3 
 
94.6 
 
96.2  21.4 
 
Table 2.   Volatility spillover index and components: full sample estimation  
 Stocks Commodities 
Govt.  
Bond 
 
 
Dollar 
Index 
 
 
 
M2 
 
 
Monetary 
Base 
Direction
-al from 
others  Net spillover 
    
   
 
(+: to;  
  -: from) 
Stocks 56.2 6.6 11.7 
 
4.8 
 
11.1 
 
9.6 43.8 19 
Commodities 13.6 62.5 5.5 
 
7.9 
 
5.5 
 
5.1 37.5 -15.8 
Govt. Bond  13.7 2.6 69.5 
 
9.2 
 
4.1 
 
1 30.5 1.5 
Dollar Index 15 8.2 10.5 
 
55.8 
 
5.4 
 
5.1 44.2 -18.6 
M2 7.3 1.5 2.8 1.4 
 
78.9 8.1 21.1 14.4 
Mty. Base 13.2 2.8 1.5 
 
2.3 
 
9.5 
 
70.6 29.4 -0.5 
         
Directional 
 to others 62.8 21.7 32 
 
25.6 
 
35.6 
 
28.9 206.6  
     
 
  
Total 
Spillover 
Index: 
Directional  
incl. own 119 84.2 101.5 
 
81.4 
 
114.5 
 
99.5  34.4 
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4. Rolling Sample Analysis 
4.1  Total Spillover Indices         
Examining how spillover relationships have evolved over time should prove more 
informative than the full-sample assessments garnered from Tables 1 and 2.   It allows 
us observe, for example, whether spillover patterns changed markedly during periods of 
acute financial market turbulence or policy intervention.   Estimating and plotting 
components of each of the two spillover indices, as well as the total spillover index values 
themselves, on a rolling-sample basis allows such an analysis to be undertaken.   We 
estimated the VAR on a 52-week (approximately one year) rolling sample basis, 
beginning with a sample from 24 May 2000 to 16 May 2001 and concluding with a 
sample from 7 December 2011 to 28 November 2012.   In what follows, we plot the 
series of total spillover index values generated from these rolling sample estimations, 
along with charts of components of that index.   The dates on the horizontal axis of each 
chart correspond to the end-week of each rolling regression.69 
In Fig.s 3 and 4, two rolling total spillover indices are plotted.   The first represents the 
VAR containing the two money variables and the four asset return series (the returns 
spillover index), while the second comprises the same two money variables and the four 
asset volatility series (the volatility spillover index).   The returns spillover index (Fig. 3) 
attains values of 60 percent and above in sample periods ending on 26 September 2001 
and on 3 October 2001 and in samples ending between 29 October 2008 and 17 
December 2008.70    
While the evolution of the returns spillover index remains relatively steady and 
uneventful after 2008, there is noticeable variation in the volatility index in later years 
(Fig. 4).   It experiences sharp pickups in value in the rolling window ending 10 October 
                                                 
69 No value of the total spillover index is reported for a rolling window when one, or more, of the individual 
data series exhibits an explosive root within that window.   The incidence of no value being reported is low 
with only 10 occurrences among the 603 rolling window estimates for the returns spillover index and 24 
instances among the 603 estimates for the volatility spillover index. 
70 The plotted values in Fig.s 3 and 4 correspond to the total spillover index values in the bottom right-
hand corner of Tables 1 and 2.   In other words, they are rolling samples measures of average spillover 
across all six variables included in each VAR.   The reader will notice that total spillover values in the two 
figures are well in excess of those in the tables (where values of 21.4 percent and 34.4 percent are recorded, 
respectively).   This likely reflects the differing sizes of the rolling samples (52 weeks) versus that of the 
sample size of the tables (654 weeks).  
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2001, and after the sample period ending 10 September 2008.   Interaction remains high 
for some time after those dates.  Spillover values are also elevated from early August 
2011 through until early 2012.71 72 
The index values indicate a number of periods common to both spillover indices when 
there was a visible rise in general interaction.   The first was around September 2001.   
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 caused considerable disruption to the 
operation of financial markets at that time.   The Federal Reserve responded by providing 
large quantities of liquidity to financial markets and the target federal fund rate was 
lowered over a number of months. 
A second period when there was a marked rise in spillover was during late 2008 with 
spillover declining only gradually in the ensuing months.   This period was one when 
there was a sharp deterioration in financial market conditions, most notably associated 
with Lehman Brothers filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 15 September 
2008.   This event not only instigated considerable disruption in financial markets but 
elicited a series of policy responses from both the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury 
over the following weeks and months.   The policy initiatives were expansionary in nature 
and included programs of quantitative easing.   
The third period of note (although involving milder rises in spillover than the two former 
periods) occurs from late-summer 2011 to the end of that year, with the returns spillover 
index rising sharply in the week ending 10 August 2011 and the volatility spillover index 
rising steadily in the following months.   There was renewed turbulence in US financial 
markets at that time with international factors such as the European sovereign debt crisis 
at play.   Standard and Poor’s chose to downgrade the rating of US Treasury bonds on 5 
                                                 
71 The spike in volatility spillover in the week ending 12 May 2010 appears to be attributable to a “flash 
crash” of the stock market on 6 May resulting in a particularly large difference between the high and low 
values for the week ending 12 May and thus generating a large stock volatility value for that week.  
72 We tested the sensitivity of the volatility spillover index to the choice of volatility measure by estimating 
the volatility of all four asset categories using the measure proposed by Parkinson (1980), which, like the 
Garman-Klass measure, is recognised as an efficient measure of volatility.   Volatility in this case is 
measured as 𝜎𝜎�2 = 0.361[𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡]2 where 𝐻𝐻 is the high index/yield value and 𝐿𝐿 is the weekly low value 
(both measured in natural logs with the exception of the government bond).    Fig. A.3 in Appendix B 
indicates that the volatility spillover index is not notably sensitive to the choice of volatility measure.   
There is a spike in the Parkinson-based index in the sample ending 24 August 2011, a period when no 
value was returned for the Garman-Klass-based index.  
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August 2011.   The Federal Reserve responded to these developments, as it had to events 
earlier in the crisis, by providing additional policy 
Fig. 3.   Total returns spillover index (percent) 
 
 
Fig. 4.   Total volatility spillover index (percent) 
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accommodation.   The higher spillover values around September 2001, September-
October 2008 and late 2011 then point to spillover, or interaction, rising between money 
and financial markets and within financial markets at times of increased uncertainty and 
pronounced monetary intervention.     
Beyond these brief summaries of these particular periods, we choose to go into greater 
detail on them and other periods when analysing the components of the spillover indices 
in the next four subsections.   This allows us identify, where possible, particular events 
with the information contained in charts and to highlight how money and financial asset 
variables, in particular, interacted at those times. 
4.2  Interaction between monetary aggregates and asset returns     
Fig.s 5 and 6 are organised in a way whereby the bidirectional spillovers between M2 
and individual/total financial assets are plotted in the left-hand side column and that 
between the monetary base (marked “MB” in those graphs) and individual/total financial 
assets in the right-hand side column.   In each panel, the spillover from the money 
variable to-and-from the financial asset(s) are graphed.   Panels (i) and (ii) of the figures 
show the cumulative spillover totals from each money variable to the four individual 
assets’ returns, and in the opposite direction.    
The largest spillovers from the two money aggregates to asset returns (Fig.s 5 (i) and (ii)) 
occur on the sample periods ending 26 September 2001 and 3 October 2001 in the wake 
of the 11 September terrorist attacks (the spillover indices fail to converge on the week 
ending 19 September 2001).   This effect is noticeable for all four asset classes (panels 
(iii) to (x)).   Not only was there monetary accommodation by the Federal Reserve at that 
time but the M2 money stock was volatile in the second half of September 2001.   At the 
same time, returns on all asset classes experienced sharp weekly changes.   One would 
expect that portfolio adjustment away from risky assets to the “safe” haven of money 
was at play and, consequently, one would not be surprised to see increased interaction 
taking place at that time. 
Throughout the mid-2000s bilateral spillovers between the money aggregates and asset 
returns were of similar magnitudes.   Spillovers in both directions, however, picked up 
suddenly in late 2008 before falling slowly afterwards.   One could surmise that these 
heightened gross spillover values reflected a substitution from risky financial assets to 
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the “safe haven” of money balances during this period of considerable economic and 
financial uncertainty.   Bordo (2012) notes that M2 did not collapse during the 2007-2009 
recession, as occurred in the 1930s.   There were no runs on commercial banks as deposit 
insurance protected money balances.   M2’s attraction as a store of value then would have 
been strong and would have acted as a spur to households adjusting their portfolio wealth 
in favour of money.   This adjustment might be expected to be particularly strong between 
stocks and M2 because of the emphasis that wealth movements between them has 
received.   Panels (iii), (v), (vii) and (ix) of Fig. 5 indicate that bidirectional spillovers 
between stocks and M2 were usually at higher values among the four asset classes during 
late 2008 and up to end-2009.   A similar phenomenon occurred in the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks.   Indeed, substantial spillover from M2 to all four asset 
returns is evident in Fig. 5 at that time.    
Aspects of this interaction are repeated between the monetary base and the asset returns 
(panel (ii) of Fig. 5).   Spillover from the monetary base to all four asset returns is quite 
high at the time of the September 11 terrorist attacks, although less than from M2 to those 
assets.   During the financial market turmoil of mid-2008 to end-2009, spillover from 
asset returns to the monetary base is well above that in the opposite direction.   In contrast 
to M2 (where spillover from stocks is strongest), government bonds tend to explain the 
largest proportion of the other-variable shocks to the monetary base during the post-
Lehman Brothers period (panel viii).   Given the importance of the bond market to 
monetary policy operations generally and the undertaking of programs of quantitative 
easing from September 2008 onwards specifically, this feature of Fig. 5 should not be 
unexpected.             
Turning towards the later rolling sample estimates, panel (i) of Fig. 5 shows a sizeable 
rise in spillover from M2 to asset returns in early August 2011, which is maintained 
through that month.   This is not replicated between the asset returns and the other money 
aggregate, the monetary base.   Retail investor sentiment appears to have taken a turn for 
the worse around this time.   As noted by the Board of Governors (2012), US equity 
markets fell sharply in response to concerns about the European sovereign debt crisis, 
the US debt ceiling debate and a possible slowdown in global growth.   The Board also 
notes that US M2 increased at an annualised 12 percent rate in the second half of 2011, 
which it indicates “appears to be the result of the increased demand for safe and liquid 
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assets” (2012, p. 28).   This flight-to-safety effect then may have been occurring in a 
similar way to that which arose in late 2008 and thus shows up in the spillover values in 
Fig. 5.   The largest spillover from M2 during the second half of 2011 was to stocks, 
although it was closely followed by its spillover to government bonds.   The latter may 
reflect the downgrading of the US long-term sovereign credit rating by S&P on 5 August 
2011 and an associated investor preference for holding money rather than bonds. 
Spillover from government bond markets to the monetary base (panel (viii)) started to 
decline from mid-2010 onwards at a time when the second phase of quantitative easing 
was specifically focussing on purchases of US Treasury securities.   Fratzscher et al. 
(2012) find a fundamental difference between the first and second phases of US 
quantitative easing with the first phase (QE1) being highly effective in lowering long 
term bond yields and in supporting US equity phases but the second phase (QE2, 
commencing mid-2010) not having this outcome.   They claim that QE2 policies induced 
a portfolio rebalancing out of US equities and bonds and into foreign equities.   This may 
contribute to the diminished bidirectional spillovers after 2010 in panels (iv) and (viii) of 
Fig. 5.   What QE2 succeeded in doing, Fratzscher et al. indicate, was to bring about a 
marked depreciation in the US dollar.   This may explain the increased spillover from the 
monetary base to the dollar index in the later part of the sample (panel (x) of Fig. 5).    
For commodities, besides September 2001, spillovers between it and the two money 
stocks are generally at relatively low values through most of the rolling sample 
estimations.   The year 2007 is an exception with spillovers from the monetary base to 
commodities of close to 20 percent being recorded at that time.   Commodity prices rose 
by over 11 percent in that calendar year.   The surprise is that given the aforementioned 
overshooting theories on the relationship between broad money and commodity prices, 
and strong M2 growth during 2007, that spillover effects arise from the monetary base 
and not from M2 during that period.            
 
 
4.3  Interaction between monetary aggregates and asset volatility     
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The spillover from M2 to asset price volatilities in Fig. 6 (panel (i)) is particularly 
pronounced through late-2008 and 2009 and between mid-2010 and mid-2011.   The 
view that there was a flight-to-safety at work in asset markets at these times may be 
appropriate here.   The greater volatility in markets evident during these periods (Fig. 2) 
was matched by strong M2 growth (see Fig. 1).   It may then be that portfolio allocation 
away from assets to M2 brought with it higher volatility in asset values and, thus, by way 
of econometric effect, a large spillover from M2 to those volatility values is evident.   
Among the spillovers to individual assets, that from M2 to stocks exceeds that to the 
other three financial assets in 2008-2009, while sizeable M2 spillover to both stocks and 
the currency index is apparent in the mid-2010 to mid-2011 phase.   
Turning to the right-hand-side panels of Fig. 6, large spillover effects from the monetary 
base to asset price volatilities are evident in September-October 2001, in late 2008, and 
in the sample periods ending 16 and 23 February 2011.   In the other direction, volatility 
in asset markets has substantial net directional-to effects on the monetary base in 2004-
5, 2008-9 and also in 2012.   The latter occurrences may reflect the Federal Reserve 
responding to asset price volatility by increasing the monetary base.   Nevertheless, in 
general, the influence of the monetary base on volatility in the four asset markets is less 
than that arising from M2 and is substantially less than the broad money stock after the 
onset of the financial crisis.         
Stock market volatility has only sporadically sharp influence on the monetary base (panel 
(iv)).   The spillovers between the monetary base and government bond volatility are 
relatively low throughout (panel (viii)) and are noticeably so during later years when a 
link between quantitative easing and bond market volatility might have been expected.   
In general, the level of bidirectional interaction between the monetary base and asset 
market volatility in the era of unconventional monetary policies has not been notably 
different from what passed before. 
  
Fig. 5. Return spillovers: bidirectional and multidirectional (percent) 
i.      ii.      
  
iii.      iv. 
  
v.      vi. 
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vii.     viii.      
  
 
ix.      x.      
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Fig. 6. Volatility spillovers: bidirectional and multidirectional (percent) 
i.      ii.      
  
iii.      iv. 
  
v.      vi. 
  
 
 
 
vii.     viii.        
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ix.      x.        
  
     
  
4.4  Spillover between the money aggregates     
The two charts in Fig. 7 show the bidirectional spillovers between the two money 
aggregates from the return spillover estimates (panel (i)) and volatility spillover estimates 
(panel (ii)).   Qualitatively, the patterns of interaction are not substantially different 
between both sets of VAR estimations, particularly after the mid-2000s. 
Both panels show strong bidirectional spillovers during the twelve months after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks.   Monetary accommodation by the Federal Reserve at that 
time (including through reductions in official interest rates) may have facilitated a 
demand for broad money, increasing interaction between the two money stocks.   Asset 
prices started to recover in late 2002-early 2003 and the relative strength of the dynamic 
between the money aggregates declined substantially.     
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Fig. 7.  Bidirectional spillovers between M2 money stock and monetary base  
(percent)  
i.  Returns spillover estimation 
 
ii. Volatility spillover estimation 
  
     
 
The largest net spillover between the two variables occurs during the period after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers up to mid-2009 when spillover from M2 to the monetary 
base was at values over 25 percent and that from the monetary base to M2 was usually 
in single percentage point values.   As discussed in the previous two subsections, shocks 
in M2 had large effects on financial asset markets as well around this time and Fig. 7 
points to them having marked influence on the monetary base as well.   We would again 
suggest that this may follow from a process of portfolio adjustment during this period.   
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Not only was spillover from M2 to financial markets occurring but the Federal Reserve 
may have chosen to increase the monetary base, at least in part, in response to this 
development.   Thus, while the monetary base would have expanded substantially more 
than M2, driving down the money multiplier, it would seem that this was in response to 
both broad money and asset market developments.    
4.5  Spillover between asset classes     
Fig.s 8 and 9 show the bidirectional spillovers between asset returns and asset 
volatilities, respectively.   We comment only briefly on them.   Fig. 8 shows the 
spillover flows to be broadly matched in value for each pair of assets.   Those between 
commodities and stocks (panel (i)), stocks and the dollar index (panel (iii)), and 
commodities and the dollar index (panel (v)) have tended to rise over time.   Gorton 
and Rouwenhorst (2006) highlighted the diversification benefits of adding 
commodities to a portfolio of financial assets.   Perhaps as a result of this finding, 
greater interaction between returns in commodities and those in the other two asset 
classes might not be a surprise.   Spillovers between commodity and bond returns are 
relatively low and unchanged throughout the 2000s (panel (iv)).   The interaction 
between stock returns and government bond returns (panel (ii)) tends to fluctuate over 
time but tends to be strong at times of marked uncertainty, such as subsequent to the 
September 2011 terrorist attacks and after the sub-prime crisis started to manifest itself 
in 2007.   Substitution between these two asset classes with differing risk 
characteristics could be expected at times of uncertainty and, consequently, large 
spillover values occur. 
Volatility spillovers across the four asset classes used in this paper are also those 
studied in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), in that case using daily volatility values.   They 
note “particularly important” spillovers from the stock market to the other markets 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.   This is notable in Fig. 9 between stock and 
bond market volatilities only (panel (ii)).     
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Fig. 8. Return spillovers: between asset classes (percent) 
i.      ii.      
  
iii.     iv. 
  
v.      vi. 
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Fig. 9. Volatility spillovers: between asset classes (percent) 
i.       ii.      
  
iii.      iv. 
  
v.      vi. 
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5. Conclusion 
We have used an econometric method devised by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) to 
examine the relationship between money and financial assets since 2000, where 
alternative asset market measures (returns and volatilities) have been used to capture 
behaviour in stock, commodity, government bond, and currency markets.   Two money 
aggregates were considered: M2, representing broad money, and the monetary base.   
Given the reporting and discussion of the econometric results in the previous sections, 
we draw the following conclusions: 
(i) It is evident that the interaction between money and financial assets, in both returns 
and volatility measures, tend to be much stronger during periods of financial market 
turbulence than in calmer times.   Spillover effects were robust after the September 
11 terrorist attacks, during the early stages of the financial crisis (2008-9), and in 
the second half of 2011.   We would expect that the nominal-certain property of 
money balances versus the lack of such a quality in financial assets to be an 
important contributor to such a dynamic in periods of financial and economic stress. 
(ii) The interaction between M2 and financial assets tends to be greater than between 
the monetary base and those assets.  The relatively high amount of spillover that 
arises at times between M2 and stocks is particularly notable.   The effects of 
quantitative easing may then be less important than portfolio adjustment between 
broad money and financial assets by households in explaining the nexus between 
money and financial markets, although it is possible that quantitative easing 
facilitates portfolio adjustment.   A flight-to-M2 by households engaged in portfolio 
adjustment may have been at play during the two aforementioned crises, as well as 
in the second half of 2011, a period when there was diminished investor confidence 
and particular concerns about sovereign bond markets.   There was less spillover 
from the monetary base to government bond markets, and in the opposite direction, 
in recent years than might have been expected a priori given the programs of 
quantitative easing pursued during this time. 
(iii) In the relationship between the two money aggregates, M2 also had strong influence 
over the monetary base during the post-Lehman Brothers bankruptcy period 
between September 2008 and August 2009.   While the monetary base was not 
having its expected influence on M2 via the money multiplier, it seems that M2 had 
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explanatory power for developments in the monetary base.   We would posit that 
this was owing to the key role M2 was playing in portfolio adjustment and the 
decision by the Federal Reserve to respond to financial market developments in an 
accommodating manner.    
With regard to the implications for policy arising from our analysis, the at-times quite 
high spillovers between broad money (M2) and financial variables observed in the 
econometric results serve as a reminder of the importance of that money aggregate to 
financial market developments, something which, like the role of money in economic 
performance more generally, has been neglected of late.   Borio (2006) indicates that 
changes taking place in the economic, monetary and financial environment in recent 
years require vigilant central banks to heed the shifting dynamics between policy and 
economic performance.   Our results back up these perspectives and stress the need for 
central banks not to view financial markets in isolation from monetary developments and, 
in particular, to heed the interplay between financial assets and money held by the public.   
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Appendix A. Data description 
 
Standard and Poor’s 500 - Price Index. 
Source: Standard and Poor’s 
Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index 
Source: Standard and Poor’s 
US Generic Government 10 year Yield 
Source: Bloomberg 
ICE US Dollar Futures Index 
Source: Bloomberg 
US M2 Money Stock (seasonally-adjusted) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database 
St. Louis Source Base (seasonally-adjusted) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (seasonally-adjusted) 
Source: US Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Appendix B. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Fig. A.1  Sensitivity of the returns spillover index to forecast horizon 
 (Six-week to fourteen-week horizons)  
 
Note: median value – solid line; minimum and maximum values – dashed lines  
 
 
Fig. A.2  Sensitivity of the volatility spillover index to forecast horizon 
 (Six-week to fourteen-week horizons)  
 
Note: median value – solid line; minimum and maximum values – dashed lines 
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Fig. A.3  Sensitivity of the volatility spillover index to choice of volatility measure 
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Abstract 
 
The impact uncertainty has on money growth has received much attention in recent 
years and is an issue of critical importance to central banks, particularly for those, 
such as the European Central Bank (ECB), which place a strong emphasis on 
monetary analysis in monetary policy formulation.   Some recent papers examining 
this issue, however, use ad hoc estimates and measure variability rather than 
uncertainty.   We employ a multivariate GARCH model, which measures 
uncertainty by the conditional variance of the data series, to investigate whether 
macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary uncertainty Granger-cause changes in 
real money.   The estimated model also allows us to investigate how monetary 
uncertainty impacts economic activity.   We find that macroeconomic uncertainty 
impacts positively on US real M2 growth over a two-year horizon but that monetary 
uncertainty does not cause changes in real M2.   Instead, our results indicate that 
real money growth causes monetary uncertainty.   Monetary uncertainty is found to 
have a negative effect on real economic activity and on macroeconomic uncertainty.   
We conclude by discussing the implications of these results and the methodological 
approach used for institutions such as the ECB that give monetary analysis a 
prominent role in their monetary policy strategy. 
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Money Growth, Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Activity – A Multivariate 
GARCH Analysis   
 
1. Introduction 
The impact uncertainty has on money growth has received much attention in policy 
analysis in recent years.   The European Central Bank (ECB), in particular, has 
identified “portfolio shifts” as a critical factor in the development of the euro area 
M3 aggregate between 2000 and 2003, attributing those shifts to global shocks 
which “have had a profound impact … on the dynamics of monetary aggregates” 
(ECB, 2005, p.57).   According to the ECB, heightened geopolitical, economic and 
financial uncertainties led to increased money holdings in the euro area during the 
early years of this decade.   The impact uncertainty has on monetary developments, 
therefore, is of critical importance to central banks such as the ECB which give 
money a prominent role in their monetary policy strategy.  
In the economics literature, discussions of uncertainty and money growth have 
often been broadened out to encompass their interaction with economic activity as 
well.   Two sources of uncertainty have been highlighted: that associated with 
economic activity (macroeconomic uncertainty) and that associated with money 
growth (monetary uncertainty).  Bornoff (1983), Friedman (1983, 1984) and 
Mascaro and Meltzer (1983) consider how these various variables should interact.   
Belongia (1984), referencing those papers, outlines a set of causal links between 
the variables.   It is rooted in an initial change in monetary behaviour.   A pickup in 
monetary volatility generates, or adds to, perceived uncertainty within the economy 
and, thereof, will increase the demand for, and lower the velocity of, money.   In 
other words, more volatile money growth will induce agents to increase their real 
money holdings.  Those real balances will be held for precautionary, as opposed to 
spending, purposes, which means that greater monetary uncertainty has the effect 
of lowering output growth within the economy.    
This committed view on how these variables should impact on each other contrasts 
with a recent contribution by Choi and Oh (2003), which has a narrower focus on 
the effect of uncertainty on money holdings.   They employ a general equilibrium 
framework where output and money growth are determined by independent 
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stochastic processes and a monetary policy parameter, with the representative 
agent’s preferences being captured by a money-in-the-utility function.   They derive 
both output uncertainty and monetary uncertainty coefficients and incorporate them 
in a money demand function.   They point out that those coefficients’ influence on 
money holdings is a priori ambiguous as they depend on the curvature of the utility 
function and the policy rule parameter.   An increase in either form of uncertainty 
generates both substitution and precautionary effects that have opposing 
consequences for money holdings.73   Monetary volatility is assumed in Choi and 
Oh’s model to occur from the money supply side.   The implication of their model 
is that with the influence of uncertainty on money holdings seemingly ambiguous 
on theoretical grounds, the relationship between the two can only be determined 
empirically.    
Against this background, the challenge for econometricians is to quantify the 
interaction between the four variables identified in the discussion above: the two 
forms of uncertainty, money growth and changes in economic activity.   In section 
2, we initially undertake a brief review of empirical analyses in this area.   Many 
papers, including some recent contributions, address this topic using ad hoc 
estimates and employ measures of variability rather than uncertainty.   In contrast, 
a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model 
measures uncertainty as the conditional variance of shocks to the data series and is 
more appropriate for analyzing the impact of uncertainty on other variables.   A 
multivariate GARCH model can be employed to investigate more rigorously the 
relationship between the variables concerned.    
In section 3, using US data, we successfully estimate a bivariate GARCH model 
and use it to answer questions arising from the introductory discussion, namely do 
macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary uncertainty Granger-cause changes in 
real money and does monetary uncertainty impact economic activity and 
macroeconomic uncertainty.74 
                                                 
73 ECB (2005, p.65) also makes the point that the impact of another form of uncertainty - asset price 
uncertainty - on money demand is ambiguous on conceptual grounds and, therefore, can only be 
resolved empirically.  
74 Euro area M3 and related data were also examined.   Features of the euro area data, however, did 
not allow us apply the GARCH method to that data.   Nevertheless, we would hope that the paper’s 
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With regard to the effect that uncertainty has on money growth, our findings, in 
summary form, are that macroeconomic uncertainty impacts positively on US real 
M2 growth but that monetary uncertainty does not cause changes in real M2.   
Instead, our results indicate that it is real money growth that causes monetary 
uncertainty.   These results are interesting from a policy perspective.   First of all, 
they back up the findings of other recent contributions (Choi and Oh, 2003, Atta-
Mensah, 2004, Greiber and Lemke, 2005) that general macroeconomic uncertainty 
has a significant effect on money growth and provides support for the view, 
expressed in some of those papers, that an uncertainty variable, or variables, may 
need to be brought into money demand specifications.   We also find that increased 
monetary uncertainty has a negative effect on economic growth.    
Section 4 concludes by discussing some of the implications of the findings for 
monetary analysis, with specific reference to ECB monetary analysis.         
2. Methodological Approach  
2.1 The Serletis and Shahmoradi Critique  
A number of papers over the years (e.g., Hall and Noble, 1987, and Thornton, 1995) 
have empirically tested the impact monetary uncertainty has on the demand for 
money by using moving sample standard deviations of money growth rates as their 
measure of monetary uncertainty.   Serletis and Shahmoradi (2006) are critical of 
the use of such variability measures, which they point out are ad hoc estimates.   
Furthermore, moving standard deviation or variance series measure variability, not 
uncertainty.75 
The Serletis and Shahmoradi critique also would appear to be appropriate to more 
recent papers that examine the effect uncertainty has on money holdings.   Choi and 
Oh (2003), for instance, use a rolling regression VAR model to provide time-
varying volatility series that are used as measures of uncertainty.   Carstensen’s 
                                                 
findings and observations can contribute to the discussion of these issues in the euro area and more 
generally.   
75 This critique of using moving standard deviations (or the cross-sectional dispersion of individual 
forecasts from surveys) as a measure of uncertainty was also put forward in an earlier paper by Grier 
and Perry (1998, p.674) in the context of measuring inflation uncertainty and gauging its impact on 
inflation rates. 
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(2006) stock market volatility variable is constructed as the two-year average of the 
conditional variance estimated from a leveraged GARCH model applied to daily 
data.   In Atta-Mensah (2004), individual uncertainties are estimated using GARCH 
models and are then added together to provide a broadly-based measure of 
uncertainty.   Greiber and Lemke (2005) construct a single measure of uncertainty 
from several observable indicators for the euro area.   Through their use of 
constructed series or variability measures, these papers do not seem to meet the 
Serletis and Shahmoradi critique.    
2.2 Our Empirical Approach 
The question of whether uncertainty, specifically macroeconomic uncertainty and 
monetary uncertainty, impacts money holdings and economic activity can be 
investigated more rigorously by using a GARCH model that utilises features of the 
data, namely, the presence of ARCH effects in the series, to produce measures of 
macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary uncertainty.76   The main benefit of this 
approach over moving-average standard-deviation type approaches is that whereas 
the estimated variances from the latter can produce inconsistent measures of the 
true level of uncertainty the GARCH model will not do so if the conditional 
variances are correctly parameterized. 
The caveat is that the conditional variances from the GARCH model are themselves 
generated estimators and, thus, may be potentially inefficient.   This means that 
individual t-statistics are not applicable.   The Granger causality tests (in Table 4 
below) that use the estimated conditional variances, however, do not involve 
inference on individual t-statistics but rather use joint tests of significance which, 
according to Beaudry et al. (2001), remain applicable.    
Like Serletis and Shahmoradi (2006), we initially investigate the univariate 
properties of the money and output series.   The features of the data allow us to 
pursue a multivariate – in effect, a bivariate - GARCH modelling of the 
macroeconomic and real money growth series.   Whereas Serletis and Shahmoradi 
use an “in-mean” version of the multivariate GARCH model to examine Granger 
                                                 
76 This is also the technique used by Grier and Perry (1998) to overcome the critique of variability 
measures already mentioned. 
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causality in the data, we use a two-step method, similar to that used by Fountas, 
Karanasos and Kim (2006).   This method involves first estimating the conditional 
variances of both macroeconomic and real money growth within a bivariate BEKK 
GARCH model and then using those estimates to undertake Granger causality tests.    
The benefits of the two-step approach over the “in-mean” approach are, first of all, 
that it allows us to examine causality on a bidirectional basis between various 
pairings of macroeconomic growth, money growth and the conditional volatility of 
both series, and at various lag lengths.   Secondly, our reading of the 1980s literature 
discussing and testing, in the main, the hypothesis that money growth is a causal 
factor in changes in the velocity of money (e.g., Belongia 1984, Hall and Noble 
1987, Brocato and Smith 1989, and Mehra 1989) is that uncertainty can be expected 
to have a delayed impact on real money holdings.   We need to be able, therefore, 
to examine causal influences over various lag lengths, which the two-step method 
easily allows.77   Thirdly, we note that this approach also minimizes the number of 
parameters to be estimated (Fountas and Karanasos, 2007, p. 236).     
3.    Empirical Modelling and Testing 
3.1 Data 
Two monthly US data series are used in our study.   They are the real M2 stock 
(denoted cpim2 ) (calculated as the natural log of nominal M2 less the natural log of 
the CPI), and the natural log of the Composite Index of Lagging Indicators ( lai ), a 
series published by the Conference Board.    
We choose the Lagging Indicator index because it represents a broadly-based 
monthly indicator of macroeconomic activity, in comparison with more narrowly-
defined indicators such as industrial production.   It is a composite of several 
economic variables: the average duration of unemployment, the inventories-to-
sales ratio, the change in the labour cost per unit of output, the average bank prime 
rate, the amount of commercial and industrial loans outstanding, the ratio of 
consumer instalment credit to personal income, and the CPI.   A benefit of this 
                                                 
77 We would acknowledge, however, that a VARMA BEEK GARCH-M model, such as used by 
Bredin and Fountas (2005) in a different context, could have a role in future research in this area, 
for example in modeling uncertainty within a money demand equation. 
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composite indicator is that it captures macroeconomic activity in a single variable 
whose volatility can then be examined.78             
First-differences of these two data series, cpim2∆ and lai∆  (i.e., their month-to-
month changes), are the variables used in the model.    The sample period is 1959m1 
to 2007m4.   
3.2 Analysis of the Individual Series 
It is necessary initially to examine the stationarity properties of both cpim2∆  and 
lai∆ .   We used three variants of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (with a 
constant and a trend term included; with just a constant term included; and with 
neither a constant nor a trend term included) where the optimal lag lengths are 
selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC).   These ADF tests point to both series being integrated of order 
zero.   This result is confirmed by two supplementary unit root tests, the Dickey-
Fuller Generalized Least Squares test and the non-parametric Phillips-Perron test.   
Besides these unit root properties, descriptive statistics for both series are shown in 
Table 1.   Excess kurtosis seems to be a feature of the series and the Jarque-Bera 
test does not support the hypothesis that the series each have a normal distribution.         
3.3 Testing for the Presence of ARCH Effects 
Given these univariate properties, we estimate VAR regressions using cpim2∆ and 
lai∆ .   The general form of the bivariate VAR to be estimated is:  
tit
i
it ZAAZ ε++= −
=
∑
12
1
0   (1)    
Where tZ  is a vector containing both variables, cpim2∆  and lai∆ , 0A  is a vector 
containing two intercept terms, iA  is a matrix of coefficient estimates, and itZ −  is 
                                                 
78 The Conference Board publishes indices of Leading and Coincident Indicators, alongside that of 
the Lagging Indicators Index.   We choose the latter for this study as it is intended to confirm how 
economic activity is behaving.   By acting to verify what has happened, it appears to provide as close 
to an “ex-post” evaluation of economic circumstances as any of these three indicators allows and 
for that reason it is the index chosen here.  
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a matrix containing lagged values of both variables.   Finally, tε  is a vector 
containing the two residual terms from the VAR equations.     
The chosen VAR order is four.   For space considerations, we do not show the 
coefficient values from the regressions but can report that the equation coefficients 
seem well-behaved in general.   The residual diagnostic tests associated with the 
two regressions are reported in Table 2.   Non-normality and ARCH appear to be 
present in the regression residuals.   This is prima facie evidence that ARCH is 
present in both series. 
3.4 A Bivariate BEKK GARCH Model 
Multivariate GARCH models account for the time-varying nature of variances and 
covariances.   VECH, diagonal VECH and BEKK are the most common 
formulations for multivariate GARCH.   Neither the VECH nor the diagonal VECH 
ensure a positive definite variance-covariance matrix.   Equation (1) is, therefore, 
estimated using the BEKK approach (Engle & Kroner, 1995).   The variance-
covariance matrix is then described as,    
                               B''BAH'A'CCH
1t1t1tt −−−
εε++=          (2) 
Where Ht is the variance-covariance matrix, C is the intercept matrix and is 
decomposed into 'CC , where C is a lower triangle matrix.   Without further 
assumption, 'CC  is positive semi-definite. 
Table 1   Descriptive Statistics 
 lai∆  cpim2∆  
Skewness   -0.74  [0.00]   0.17 [0.09] 
Kurtosis (excess)    2.80  [0.00]   1.26 [0.00] 
Jarque-Bera 242.03 [0.00] 41.21 [0.00] 
Note:  P-values in brackets. 
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Table 2   Residual Diagnostics from VAR Equations   
 
lai∆  cpim2∆  
ARCH test ( 2χ , 1)   14.82 [0.00]    7.10 [0.00] 
ARCH test ( 2χ , 12)   37.35 [0.00]  18.68 [0.097] 
Bera-Jarque normality test  ( 2χ , 
2) 
110.79 [0.00] 173.29 [0.00] 
Note:  P-values in brackets. 
 
Table 3   Bivariate BEKK GARCH (1, 1) Model 


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Note:  Absolute t-statistics are given in brackets. 
 
The estimated parameters of the conditional variance equations are shown in Table 
3.   These are well-behaved according to the usual conditions required of GARCH 
models.   The diagonal elements of C are significant at the one percent confidence 
level.   The diagonal elements of A and B, however, are also significant at that level, 
suggesting large deviations in short run variance from long run levels.  
We plot the conditional volatility series in Figures 1a and 1b.   The conditional 
volatility of the lai∆ series (Figure 1a) picked up considerably at times during the 
1970s and early-1980s and there were also some short-lived rises in recent years.   
  
172 
 
The conditional volatility of cpim2∆  (Figure 1b) was high in the mid-1970s and 
early-1980s and was also relatively high at times in the 2000s.  
3.5 Granger Causality Test Results    
With a satisfactory bivariate GARCH model, we can proceed to testing, in the first 
instance, whether laih∆ and cpimh 2∆  - measures of macroeconomic and monetary 
uncertainty, respectively – each Granger-cause changes in real M2, cpim2∆ , and 
whether their influence is positive or negative.   We are also able to test whether 
causality runs in the opposite direction or in a bidirectional manner.    
Four variables ( cpim2∆ , lai∆ , laih∆ and cpimh 2∆ ), along with a constant term, are 
included in the equations on which the Granger-causality tests are undertaken.   The 
equations are estimated with different lag structures, ranging from including only 
the first four lags (i.e., months) of each of the four variables up to including the first 
24 lags of each.   The choice of lag lengths is consistent with previous literature 
(Hall and Noble 1987; and Mehra 1989) and Friedman’s indication that there are 
long and variable lags in the impact of money on other economic variables (see, for 
example, Friedman, 1961).   The F-statistics arising from the variable deletion tests 
required to test for the presence of Granger causality are reported in Table 4.   The 
statistical significance of the F-statistics is indicated and the sign of the sum of the 
lagged coefficients of the “causal” variable under consideration are shown in 
brackets.  
The variable deletion tests in panel (a) of Table 4 indicate that the null hypothesis 
that the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty, laih∆ , does not Granger-cause 
changes in real M2, cpim2∆ , can be rejected at lag 24 with this conditional 
volatility variable having a significant, positive cumulative effect on cpim2∆ .   In 
contrast, the change in real M2, cpim2∆ , has no effect on the conditional volatility 
of the Lagged Indicator series, laih∆ , across the various lag lengths examined.    
 
Figure 1a   Conditional Volatility of the Change in the Lagged Indicator  
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Figure 1b   Conditional Volatility of the Change in Real M2 
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Table 4   Granger Causality Tests 
                                 (a)  
 
M t
M
j
jtlai cpimhH 2:
1
0 ∆→∑
=
−∆  tlai
M
j
jto hcpimH ∆
=
− →∆∑
1
2:  
4 1.08       (+) 1.85    (-) 
8 1.24       (+) 1.40    (-) 
12 1.42       (+) 0.77    (-) 
16 1.45       (+) 0.76    (-) 
20 1.01       (+) 0.80    (-) 
24 1.60**   (+) 0.67    (-) 
                                 (b)  
 
M t
M
j
jtcpim
cpimhH 2:
1
20 ∆→∑
=
−∆
 
tcpim
M
j
jt hcpimH 2
1
0 2: ∆
=
− →∆∑  
 4 0.47    (+) 0.89       (+) 
 8 1.14    (+) 3.61*** (+) 
12 1.19    (+) 3.21*** (+) 
16 1.15    (+) 2.48*** (+) 
20 1.30    (+) 2.14*** (+) 
24 1.22    (+) 1.98*** (+) 
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Table 4   Granger Causality Tests (contd.) 
                                 (c)  
 
M tlai
M
j
jtcpim
hhH ∆
=
−∆
→∑
1
20 :  tcpim
M
j
jtlaio hhH 2
1
: ∆
=
−∆ →∑  
4 0.20       (-) 2.75**  (+) 
8 0.59       (-) 1.97**  (+) 
12 1.14       (-) 1.51      (+) 
16 1.05       (-) 1.24      (+) 
20 1.16       (-) 1.37      (+) 
24 1.77**   (-) 1.29      (+) 
                                 (d)  
 
M t
M
j
jtcpim
laihH ∆→∑
=
−∆
1
20 :  tcpim
M
j
jt hlaiH 2
1
0 : ∆
=
− →∆∑  
 4 1.28      (-) 1.48       (+) 
 8 1.44      (-) 1.04       (-) 
12 1.54      (+) 0.77       (-) 
16 1.40      (-) 0.97       (+) 
20 1.64** (-) 1.35       (+) 
24 1.45*   (-) 1.48*     (-) 
Note: Numerical entries in panels (a)-(d) are F-statistics.  A + (-) indicates that the sum of the 
causing variable is positive (negative).  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively.  The first column gives the number of lags used in the causality 
tests. 
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The finding that macroeconomic uncertainty has a positive influence on real US 
M2 growth contrasts with that of Choi and Oh (2003) who, in their empirics, find 
macroeconomic uncertainty to have a negative effect on the narrower US monetary 
aggregate, real M1.   Using Canadian data, Atta-Mensah obtains a positive 
association between macroeconomic volatility and narrower monetary aggregates 
and a negative relationship between the volatility variable and the broadest 
monetary aggregate used by him. 
These contrasting findings can be most readily explained by Choi and Oh’s model 
showing the influence of uncertainty on money holdings to be theoretically 
ambiguous and needing to be determined empirically.   Nevertheless, our results 
require economic interpretation and the most appropriate is that in times of greater 
economic uncertainty, economic agents are inclined to raise their money holdings 
for precautionary purposes so that the increased holdings of real money provide a 
buffer against an uncertain economic future. 
The view that monetary uncertainty impacts money growth, through an increase in 
the precautionary demand for money, is most closely associated with Milton 
Friedman and other monetarist economists.   In panel (b) of Table 4, we find no 
significant causality arising from the measure of monetary uncertainty, cpimh 2∆ , to 
cpim2∆  at all lag lengths examined.   Instead, causation seems to run in the opposite 
direction and in a positive manner.   This seems a plausible result if one believes 
monetary uncertainty must have its origin in money growth.   We note too that 
monetary uncertainty is assumed in Choi and Oh’s model to evolve from a 
stochastic process in money supply growth.        
Two further aspects of the monetarist hypothesis can be investigated using the 
growth rate series and uncertainty measures available.   Friedman (1984, p. 399) 
argues that a rise in monetary uncertainty can generate or add to general uncertainty 
within the economy.   He is not specific about whether the “adding to” is a 
contemporaneous or lagged effect.   The Granger causality methodology employed 
here allows one to test for a lagged effect of monetary uncertainty on 
macroeconomic uncertainty.   The results in panel (c) indicate monetary uncertainty 
having a significant, negative influence on subsequent macroeconomic uncertainty 
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at the longest lag length of one to 24 months.   There is also evidence of causality 
running in the opposite direction at shorter lag lengths.         
Given the number of intermediate relationships through which Friedman and other 
authors (e.g., Belongia, 1984) indicate greater monetary uncertainty impacts, in a 
negative manner, on economic growth, it is to be expected that a long lag will occur 
in any causal effect from monetary uncertainty to economic growth.   Panel (d) of 
Table 4 confirms that a significant causal effect, with the expected negative sign, 
indeed arises at lags one to 20 and one to 24.   Changes in economic activity cause 
monetary uncertainty at lags one to 24, albeit at the 10 percent significance level 
only.    
To conclude our empirical analysis we conducted a robustness test of the results in 
panels (a) to (d) of Table 4 by undertaking the Granger causality tests for the shorter 
sample period of 1959m6 to 2004m4.   The qualitative results are in line with those 
for the full sample. 
4.    Conclusion  
A multivariate GARCH model was utilized in this article to examine the 
interrelationship between real money growth and measures of macroeconomic and 
monetary uncertainty, as well as to assess the impact of monetary uncertainty on 
economic activity.   We find macroeconomic uncertainty to have a positive and 
significant impact on US real M2 growth at a one to 24 month lag length so that a 
rise in macroeconomic uncertainty will cause an increase in real money growth over 
a two year horizon.   In contrast, monetary uncertainty has no discernible causal 
effect on real money growth at all lag lengths examined.   Our results also indicate 
that changes in real money have a significant, positive effect on monetary 
uncertainty and that greater monetary uncertainty impacts negatively on economic 
activity and on macroeconomic uncertainty.    
These results and the methodology used are relevant for central banks such as the 
European Central Bank which attach a prominent role to monetary developments 
in their monetary policy strategy.   The first point we would make is that using a 
GARCH methodology, such as that used in this paper, to measure and analyse 
uncertainty’s impact on other variables, including money, is a priori a better 
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approach than some of the more ad-hoc approaches that have been used in recent 
years in this area.    
Our results also underline how the interaction between uncertainty and monetary 
developments may be particularly relevant at this time.  The ECB (2005) has 
already shown how greater economic and financial uncertainty in recent years has 
impacted and interacted with euro area M3 growth.   Our econometric results show 
similar interactions at play in US data over an extended time period.   They also 
indicate a sustained rise in monetary uncertainty and episodes of heightened 
economic uncertainty in the United States of late.   These recent developments have 
been occurring alongside strong monetary growth and, as has now transpired, have 
been followed by lower economic growth.    The results also support the emphasis 
placed by the ECB on the medium-to-longer term value of monetary analysis, with 
macroeconomic uncertainty, for example, impacting money growth with a twenty-
four month lag and monetary uncertainty having a negative impact on economic 
activity over a similar timeframe.          
Borio (2006) points out that changes in the financial, monetary and real economic 
environment in recent years are altering economies’ dynamics and pose new policy 
challenges.   The implication, in his view, is that money, credit and financial 
developments should be given renewed consideration in monetary policy and in 
assessing financial stability.   The key point that can be taken from our study in this 
respect is that central banks must give uncertainty, in its various forms, careful 
consideration in their monetary analysis.    
The ECB has identified general economic and financial uncertainty as capable of 
effecting “portfolio shifts” in euro area monetary aggregates and has shown itself 
to be adept in developing a diverse range of tools with which to undertake monetary 
analysis in response to such developments (Fischer et al. 2008).   In this regard, 
measures of monetary uncertainty and macroeconomic uncertainty should be given 
due consideration in the holistic assessment of monetary data (to use Fischer et al.’s 
phrase, p. 105) favoured by central banks such as the ECB.             
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Abstract   We argue that long run and dynamic relationships should exist between 
commodity prices, consumer prices and money.   Using a cointegrating VAR 
framework and US data, our empirical analysis shows equilibrium relationships 
existing between money, commodity prices and consumer prices, with both 
commodity and consumer prices proportional to the money supply in the long run.   
Persistence profiles reveal commodity prices initially overshooting their new 
equilibrium values in response to a money supply shock.   We conclude that money 
has to be brought into analyses of the relationship between commodity prices and 
consumer prices.    
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1.   Introduction 
Commodity prices have recently re-surfaced in discussions of the inflationary 
outlook for western economies.   The popular view seems to be that changes in 
commodity prices are a consequence of developments occurring solely in the 
relevant commodity market.   Prompted perhaps by the recognition that recent 
experiences of steep commodity price increases have occurred alongside, or in the 
wake of, a relatively “easy” stance of monetary policy in advanced industrial 
economies, there has, however, been a resurgent interest in the argument that 
monetary conditions account for changes in commodity prices.79   The implication 
for empirical work is that commodity prices’ influence on consumer prices may not 
be captured adequately by mechanical pass-through effects and a richer, monetary-
based characterisation and modelling of their relationship is required.    
From a theoretical perspective, our view is that the influence of commodity prices 
on consumer prices occurs through a money-driven overshooting of commodity 
prices being corrected over time.   In this paper, we investigate empirically whether 
the behaviour of both consumer goods prices and commodity prices are consistent 
with this perspective by using a cointegrating VAR framework.   On the basis of an 
initial discussion and a simple, illustrative model, we formulate the qualitative 
relationships that we would expect to emerge in the econometric analysis.   Our 
empirical findings are congruent with the long run and dynamic relationships that 
we posit exist between commodity prices, consumer prices, money and output.  
Frankel (1986) has already provided an overshooting theory of commodity prices, 
drawing on Dornbusch’s (1976) theory of exchange rate overshooting.   
Commodities are exchanged on fast-moving auction markets and, accordingly, are 
able to respond instantaneously to any pressure impacting on these markets.   
Following a change in monetary policy, their price reacts more than proportionately 
                                                 
79  The relevance of monetary conditions to commodity price changes has been highlighted in the 
financial press; for example, in three Financial Times articles: “More to oil shocks than Middle 
East” (C. Clover and A. Fifield, 29 July 2004), “Too much money to blame for rising price of oil, 
economists claim” (A. Fifield, 18 August 2004), and “How real interest rates cast a shadow over 
oil” (15 April 2005 and written by Jeffrey Frankel, a leading academic contributor in the area).        
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(i.e., they overshoot their new long-run equilibrium) because the prices of other 
goods are sticky.    
Surrey (1989), Boughton and Branson (1991), and Fuhrer and Moore (1992) are 
three other papers that have acknowledged the potential importance of monetary 
conditions to the relationship between commodity prices and consumer goods 
prices.   Other, US studies on the commodity price-consumer price relationship 
include Webb (1988), Garner (1989), Marquis and Cunningham (1990), Sephton 
(1991), Cody and Mills (1991), Pecchenino (1992), Blomberg and Harris (1995), 
and Furlong and Ingenito (1996).          
Our paper differs from those contributions in the form of model and econometric 
methodology used.   In our view, we add to the literature in three ways.   First, many 
of the aforementioned papers focus on the signalling or predictive power of 
commodity prices for consumer price inflation.   Our contribution examines the 
intertemporal relationship between commodity and consumer prices and the role 
money plays in it.   This still allows us, as will be seen, to use deviations in 
commodity prices from equilibrium values to predict subsequent CPI inflation.    
Second, where formal modelling of the relationship between commodity prices, 
consumer prices and monetary policy in Frankel (1986), Boughton and Branson 
(1991) and other papers uses a Keynesian overshooting model, we examine the 
relationship in a pure exchange economy framework.   Our reading of those papers 
also suggests that their emphasis is mainly on how monetary policy affects 
commodity prices.   We want to examine whether an exogenous change in money 
supply causes price disequilibrium in both commodity and consumer goods markets 
and how measures of both of these disequilibria can explain future changes in CPI 
inflation.   
Third, in terms of econometric examination of the relationship, we use a modelling 
approach (the Johansen cointegration procedure) that was not used in earlier studies 
in this area and which is superior and more versatile in a multivariate setting to the 
Engle-Granger approach to cointegration employed in some of the aforementioned 
papers.   The Johansen procedure allows us to identify and quantify long run and 
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short run relationships between commodity prices, consumer prices and other 
relevant variables in a rigorous manner and to examine the persistence profiles of 
system-wide and variable-specific shocks on the cointegrating relations.        
The paper is organised as follows.  In section 2, we distinguish between 
commodities, whose prices are flexible, on the one hand, and consumer goods, 
whose prices are sticky, on the other.   With this characterisation, a simple two-
good, two-period model is used to show that a flexible commodity price overshoots 
its new long run equilibrium value in the first period following a change in the 
money supply, doing so to ensure equilibrium in the overall system of money and 
prices.   The extent of this overshooting acts to predict the next-period change in 
the price of the other good, namely the consumer good, whose price is unchanged 
in the first period.    
In section 3, using quarterly US data, we employ the Johansen procedure to examine 
empirically the relationship between commodity prices, consumer good prices and 
money.   Our findings are as follows.   First, commodity and consumer prices are 
each, in turn, cointegrated with the money stock and output.   Money and prices 
move in proportion in the long run.   Secondly, commodity prices overshoot their 
new equilibrium level in response to a money shock, while consumer prices do not 
overshoot.   For both price indices, the speed of convergence to equilibrium 
following a money shock is quite slow.   Output is affected only in the short run by 
the money stock.   Thirdly, one-quarter lagged values of the deviations of both the 
CPI and commodity price indices from their equilibrium values have explanatory 
power for current-quarter CPI inflation.   A number of commodity price indices are 
used in the exercise to check the robustness of the results.   Section 4 concludes by 
highlighting policy implications of these findings.    
 
 
2.   A Model of the Relationship between Consumer Prices, Commodity 
Prices and Money 
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2.1 Basic Propositions and Hypotheses 
We combine two well-known monetarist propositions and an acknowledgement of 
the varying speeds of adjustment of prices across goods markets to put forward a 
view of the interrelationship between commodity prices, consumer prices and 
money.   The first standard monetarist proposition is that exogenous changes in the 
money stock lead to equivalent percentage changes in the overall price level under 
conditions of stable money demand.   The second proposition is the related, and 
equally conventional, monetarist argument that exogenous changes in the money 
stock are neutral in the long-run steady state.   This implies that all individual prices, 
whether they be consumer goods or commodities, adjust in the same proportion as 
the money stock, thus leaving all relative prices unchanged in the new steady state 
relative to their pre-money stock change configuration.   Intuitively, the one-for-
one long run relationship between money and prices must ultimately hold for 
commodities as much as for consumer goods.   This point is perhaps best made as 
follows:  if cash (money) forms one-half of all transactions in the economy then a 
doubling of the amount of cash in the economy must result eventually, ceteris 
paribus, in the prices of all goods traded within the economy − be they commodities 
or consumer goods − increasing twofold.      
The third proposition stems from prices in commodity markets being able to 
respond much more rapidly than prices in consumer goods markets to changes in 
economic conditions, including monetary conditions, so that they can be 
characterised as flexible price goods.   Being auction-based, there are fewer frictions 
in the price-adjustment process in commodity markets because participants are 
more equally empowered with more balanced information and resources than their 
consumer goods market counterparts.   This clearly enables them to react quickly 
to changes in monetary conditions.   The subset of sluggish-adjusting, or sticky, 
goods prices can be identified as consumer goods whose prices usually respond 
only with long and variable lags to changes in monetary conditions (to use Milton 
Friedman’s characterisation).   Such goods’ prices respond slowly and gradually to 
monetary conditions but eventually adjust fully to changes in the nominal money 
stock.   This price stickiness tends to be attributed to frictions in labour and goods 
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markets that slow down price adjustment.   The CPI, in large part, comprises such 
goods.   The third proposition then is that, in response to a change in the (exogenous) 
money supply, commodity prices will compensate in the short run for CPI price 
stickiness by overshooting their new long run equilibrium values.80      
These three building blocks concerning the behaviour of prices then suggest a 
number of testable hypotheses about inflation.   First, commodity prices, as well as 
consumer prices, move in proportion to the money stock in the long run.   Secondly, 
commodity prices initially overshoot their long-run equilibrium in response to a 
change in monetary conditions to compensate for the sluggishness in consumer 
good prices.   Third, an important variable in explaining inflation in the composite 
price of sluggishly-adjusting consumer goods (the CPI) is the correction of the prior 
overshooting in commodity prices.   In other words, the mean-correction of 
commodity prices to equilibrium levels explains the subsequent adjustment in the 
price of the sluggish-price goods.81    
2.2 The Price Adjustment Process 
We now elucidate how consumer good and commodity markets interact in response 
to a change in the money supply.   We assume, in the spirit of the quantity theory, 
that all money holdings are exogenously supplied and that there is a fixed 
endowment of goods in the economy in each period.   There are two types of goods 
in the economy which are distinguished by their degree of price flexibility:  a sticky-
price (S) good (to represent consumer goods), whose price cannot adjust to a change 
                                                 
80  This is Le Chatelier’s principle as applied to price theory: if not all goods prices in the economy 
are free to adjust fully to a change in economic conditions then other goods prices must initially 
overshoot their new equilibrium values to compensate, a dynamic feature that holds until all prices 
are able to adjust to their new equilibrium values.  
81 It is well-known (see, for example, Friedman (1968)) that real output can react to a change in the 
money supply in the short run while being unaffected by it in the long run.   Variations in real output 
also can occur in response to relative price shifts in the short run, such as arises here between 
commodity and consumer prices.  The focus in this section, however, is on the relationship between 
consumer prices and commodity prices and how it responds to a change in the money stock.   For 
this reason, we do not consider the impact of such a change on output explicitly.   This means that 
we assume total output in the economy, y, as well as the velocity of money, to be unchanging in 
section 2.3.    Nevertheless, in the empirical part of the paper (section 3), we do allow real output, 
as well as the prices of consumer goods and commodities, to react to a money shock and find its 
response to be in line with that expected by Friedman and others.    
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in the money supply until the following period, and a flexible-price (F) good (to 
represent commodities), whose price is fully flexible in each period.    
Let’s consider an exogenous increase in the money stock at the start of a period.   
Initially, there is no increase in the demand for money required for purchasing the 
S good (given its fixed endowment and unchanged price in the current period).   To 
maintain overall equilibrium among goods prices, all of the additional money 
created must flow into the F good’s own market driving up its fully flexible and 
instantaneously responsive price.   Given that it only accounts for a fraction of the 
goods in the economy, its price, pF, must rise further than will be required in the 
long run, in order to clear the money market.   The price of the F good then 
overshoots its new long run value to equilibrate the money market.    
The sticky price, pS, rises in the second period.   With the level of the nominal 
money stock fixed from the previous period, some of the excess money that flowed 
into the F sector in the first period is drained away causing pF to fall.   Invoking the 
second building block of the model concerning relative price neutrality, pS rises in 
the same proportion as the money stock by the end of the second period.   The first-
round overshooting of pF is corrected and it, accordingly, falls until its net increase 
over the two periods is also in proportion to the increase in the money stock. 
2.3 A Simple Model of Price Adjustment in a Two-Good, Two-Period 
Exchange Economy 
We now illustrate the relationship between money, sticky price goods and flexible 
price goods more formally.   There are only two non-storable goods exchanged in 
the economy, whose volumes are unchanging and which together add up to total 
output in the economy, y.   The general price level, p, is a weighted combination of 
the price of both goods, pF and pS (as defined earlier), where the weights are given 
by their respective shares of trade, λ and (1-λ): 
p = λ pF + (1-λ) pS 
where 0 < λ < 1.     
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The relationship between money and the general price level is as follows: 
m v = p y 
It is assumed that this holds in each period.   The velocity of money, v, is assumed 
to be constant over time and to have a value of one.   Given that y does not change, 
this means that the overall price level always adjusts fully in the current period to 
changes in the nominal money stock.82    
We can now consider the effects of a once-off increase (of μ percent) in the money 
supply in period t.   The money-general price level identity then implies that the 
general price level in period t, pt, equals (1+μt) pt-1.    The price of the sticky-price 
good, pS, does not adjust to the change in the money stock until the following period 
(in this case, period t+1, and, by implication, it remains at its t-1 price in period t) 
while the price of F, pF, can change freely in each period.   The price relationship 
in period t then will be as follows: 
pt {= (1+μt) pt-1} =  λ pFt + (1-λ) pSt-1      (1) 
In the following period, t+1, the price of S adjusts to its new equilibrium value 
[pSt+1 = (1+μt) pSt-1].   The prices relationship in period t+1 is then: 
pt+1 = λ pFt+1 + (1-λ) pSt+1      (2) 
Now since pt+1 is equal to pt (as we are assuming no further change in the nominal 
stock of money in period t+1), we can then set the right-hand-sides of (1) and (2) 
equal to one another: 
λ pFt + (1-λ) pSt-1 = λ pFt+1 + (1-λ) pSt+1     (3) 
                                                 
82   By implication, the real money supply does not change.   There is consequently no need for an 
adjustment in the interest rate to equilibrate money demand to money supply and hence the interest 
rate does not need to be included in the money market equilibrium equation. 
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Since pSt-1 equals pSt and pFt+1 equals (1+μt) pFt-1, this can be restated as: 
λ pFt + (1-λ) pSt = λ(1+μt) pFt-1 + (1-λ) pSt+1 
=> (1-λ){pSt+1 - pSt}= λ {pFt - (1+μt) pFt-1} 
=> pSt+1 - pSt = {λ/(1-λ)}{pFt - (1+μt) pFt-1}    (4) 
The difference in the price-flexibility properties of both goods means that the size 
of the change in the price of the sticky price good (S) in period t+1 can be predicted 
in period t with knowledge of the difference between the current period known 
value of F (pFt) and the known equilibrium value to which it must adjust in period 
t+1 (i.e., (1+μt) pFt-1), which, in turn, is dependent on the change in the money 
stock in the current period (μt).   It should be obvious also that for positive values 
of μ, the left-hand-side of (4) is a positive value and so we can conclude from the 
other side of the equation that pFt must be greater than pFt+1 (the new and final 
equilibrium value of F, which is (1+μt) pFt-1).   This means that following an 
increase in the money stock the price of F must initially overshoot its new 
equilibrium value in period t before declining to that equilibrium value in period 
t+1.   The extent to which pF must overshoot its new long run value is also affected 
by the relative weights in trade of the two goods, λ/(1-λ).   At the end of period t+1, 
both S and F’s respective prices have adjusted fully, in proportion to the rise in the 
nominal money stock.   
3. Econometric Assessment 
3.1 Econometric Approach 
In this empirical part of the paper, we employ the Johansen maximum likelihood 
approach to test for the existence of cointegrating relationships among four 
variables and to estimate any cointegrating vectors in an efficient manner, where 
those variables are selected on the basis of the discussion in section 2.   The four 
variables are: a commodity price index (representing the flexible goods price, pF), 
a consumer price index (for the sticky price good, pS), the money stock (for m 
above), and a measure of national output (for y above).   In using this econometric 
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methodology, we are using a reduced form model, which allows us summarise the 
dynamics of the system of variables and the timing of those dynamics in the form 
of persistence profiles but does not allow structural interpretation per se.    
What the discussion in section 2 does is provide guidance as to how we use the 
information coming from the Johansen approach.   Thus, we are interested, among 
other things, in whether there are two cointegrating relationships present among the 
four variables and whether long-run proportionality between the money stock and 
the commodity price index and between the money stock and the consumer price 
index (CPI) is supported.   The econometric approach also allows us examine how 
long deviations (or gaps) from equilibrium relationships among these variables 
persist in response to “average” reduced form shocks and whether one quarter 
lagged values of those gaps are significant in an equation explaining current-quarter 
CPI inflation.   
3.2 Data 
We assess our model using quarterly US data.   This covers the period 1959Q1 to 
2008Q4 for all series with the exception of the Sensitive Materials Index, which is 
available up to 2004Q2.83   The “sticky” good price index series that we use in our 
study is the Consumer Price Index (CPI).   We use a number of commodity price 
indices with the basic rationale being to see if there are similar results across these 
various indices.   The selected series overlap with previous studies examining the 
relationship between commodity and consumer prices (Webb 1988, Marquis and 
Cunningham 1990, Furlong and Ingenito 1996).    
The first commodity price index is the Commodity Research Bureau Spot Index 
(CRBSI).   It is an index comprising the prices of 22 basic commodities whose 
markets are considered by the Bureau to be particularly sensitive to changes in 
economic conditions.   Along with this most broadly defined CRB spot index, one 
of the two major divisions of the index, the Raw Industrials (CRBRI) index, is also 
                                                 
83 The data series and sources are documented in the appendix. 
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used.84   The Conference Board’s Sensitive Materials Index (SENSI) is a third 
commodity price index examined.   It comprises raw materials and metals but 
excludes food and energy.   A benefit of using indices of commodity groups rather 
than individual commodity prices is that idiosyncratic factors impacting on 
individual commodity markets should have far less influence at the level of a multi-
commodity, broadly-based index.    
Given the number of price relationships being examined, we use only one nominal 
money stock variable, the M2 money stock (M2), and one scale variable, real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), to keep the analysis focussed on the relationship between 
the price indices. 
3.3 Econometric Results        
Natural logs of the aforementioned variables are treated as I(1), consistent with the 
outcome of standard unit root tests.   Johansen’s maximum likelihood procedure 
provides a unified framework for the estimation and testing of cointegrating 
relations among such variables in the context of vector autoregressions (VARs).   In 
estimating each cointegrating VAR, we are using four variables.   The consumer 
price index, CPI, the nominal money variable, M2, and the scale variable, GDP, are 
common to all sets of estimations while a different commodity price index is used 
in each VAR.   In Table 1 then, the sticky price variable in each row is CPI while 
the commodity price indices used in each row are, respectively, CRBSI, CRBRI, 
and SENSI.   In undertaking the cointegrating VAR estimation, the final eight 
                                                 
84 The CRBSI comprises commodities that are either raw materials or products close to the initial 
stage of production.   Criteria for the selection of individual commodities include that they are freely 
traded in an open market and are sufficiently homogenous or standardised so that uniform and 
representative price quotations can be obtained over a period of time.   The commodities’ spot prices, 
i.e. the price at which they are available for immediate delivery on selected major US commodity 
exchanges, are used in the construction of the CRBSI and its two major sub-divisions, the Raw 
Materials Index and the Foodstuffs Index.   These spot prices are obtained from trade publications 
and government agencies.    
The indices are calculated as an unweighted geometric mean of the individual commodity prices 
relative to their base period values.   The Raw Materials component, and that individual index, 
comprises hides, tallow, copper scrap, lead scrap, steel scrap, zinc, tin, burlap, cotton, print cloth, 
wool tops, rosin, and rubber.   The Foodstuffs component, and individual index, comprises hogs, 
steers, lard, butter, soybean oil, cocoa, corn, wheat, and sugar.  
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observations for each commodity price index are held over for predictive failure 
tests when examining short run dynamic equations.  
The results for the three commodity indices are shown in turn in rows (a) to (c) of 
Table 1.  The chosen VAR lag length is six.   We estimate with no intercepts and 
no trends in the cointegrating vectors.85   With these choices made, the first step is 
to test for cointegration among the four variables (CPI, M2, GDP, and each 
alternative commodity price index) using Johansen’s (1988) trace statistic.   The 
results are reported in column (i) of Table 1.   The trace statistic supports the number 
of cointegrating vectors being two among the variables at the 90 percent 
significance level in the case of rows (a) and (c) and at the 95 percent level for row 
(b).    Given these results and our priors, we proceed on the basis that there are 
exactly two cointegrating vectors for each of these three sets of variables.       
With these trace statistic findings, exactly-identifying restrictions are initially 
imposed in each row.   For each set of variables, CPI is set equal to one and the 
commodity price index equal to zero in the first vector while the numerical ordering 
is reversed for the second vector, i.e. CPI is set equal to zero and the commodity 
price index to one.   The maximum-likelihood estimates of these exactly-identified 
cointegrating relations are shown in column (ii) of Table 1.   
We next test the over-identifying restrictions of setting the M2 coefficient equal to 
–1 for both cointegrating relations in each of the three sets of regressions.   The log-
likelihood ratio (LR) tests of these restrictions are reported in column (iii) of Table 
1.   The restrictions receive general support across all rows with the LR statistic 
being less than the 95 percent critical value in all cases.    
                                                 
85 While the Akaike-Information selection criterion suggested a lag length of 4 across all three 
commodity price alternatives, some of the underlying VAR equations at this lag length had issues 
concerning the distribution and independence of the error terms.   A lag length of six, however, led 
to VAR estimations with well-behaved error terms.   The qualitative outturn of the econometric 
results in terms of the restrictions imposed, the signs on the error correction coefficients in the short-
run equations and the various persistence profiles and impulse responses do not differ at lag lengths 
of 4, 5 and 6. 
 The choice of no intercepts in the cointegrating vectors reflects intercept terms in the underlying 
VAR equations being in all cases statistically insignificant.   A restricted intercept and no trends 
option, however, would produce, with appropriate restrictions, similar results to that shown in Table 
1 and Figures 1 to 4.    
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Table 1:  Johansen Cointegration Analysis and Short Run Dynamic Equation Results 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
PF Trace Statistic 
 r = 
1                   2             3 
Exactly Identified Restrictions 
 
LR statistic Over Identifying Restrictions 
 
Short Run Dynamic Equations 
 
(a)  CRBSI 51.59 22.83  10.80 CPI - 0.82 M2 + 0.21 GDP  
         (0.09)       (0.10)          
CRBSI - 0.51 M2 - 0.03 GDP   
              (0.18)       (0.20)          
 1.55  CPI  - M2  + 0.42 GDP 
                      (0.03)    
CRBSI  - M2  + 0.53 GDP  
                         (0.08)         
ΔCPI = -0.0178 EC1[-1] + 0.0054 EC2[-1] …  
               (0.0072)                (0.0025) 
R-SQUARE = 0.71;  
SC: CHSQ (4) = 7.18; PF: CHSQ (8) = 31.37 
(b)  CRBRI 52.14 25.18  11.45 CPI - 0.83 M2 + 0.23 GDP  
         (0.09)        (0.10)   
CRBRI - 0.58 M2 + 0.03 GDP  
              (0.19)         (0.23)         
 1.07 CPI  - M2  + 0.42 GDP 
                     (0.03)    
CRBRI  - M2  + 0.50 GDP  
                          (0.07)         
ΔCPI = -0.0186 EC1[-1] + 0.0060 EC2[-1] …  
              (0.0076)               (0.0027)              
R-SQUARE = 0.70;  
SC: CHSQ (4) = 6.56; PF: CHSQ (8) = 26.81 
(c)  SENSI 49.01 22.57  8.64 CPI - 0.83 M2 + 0.22 GDP 
         (0.07)        (0.07)   
SENSI - 0.71 M2 + 0.21 GDP   
             (0.13)        (0.14)          
 1.50 CPI  - M2  + 0.41 GDP  
                     (0.03)    
SENSI  - M2  + 0.53 GDP  
                         (0.06)      
ΔCPI = -0.0232 EC1[-1] +0.011 EC2[-1] …  
              (0.0083)               (0.0042)              
R-SQUARE= 0.73;  
SC: CHSQ (4) = 1.75; PF: CHSQ (8) = 3.01 
The 95 per cent critical values for the trace statistic in column (i) are, for each respective r, 39.81, 24.05 and 12.36.   The 90 per cent critical values are, respectively, 
36.69, 21.46 and 10.25.      
In column (iii), the LR statistic has a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom.   The 95 percent critical value is 5.99 and the 99 percent critical value is 
9.21. 
Standard error in round brackets ( ),  Lags in square brackets [ ]. 
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Figures 1 to 4 plot the persistence profiles of system-wide shocks and a money-
specific shock on the cointegrating relations.   They also show the dynamic effects 
(including their speeds of convergence toward equilibrium) of the latter variable-
specific shock on individual variables in the cointegrating VAR model.   In Figure 
1, the time profiles of the effects of system-wide shocks on the cointegrating vectors 
are shown.86   These indicate stability in the cointegrating vectors with each relation 
converging, albeit slowly, towards their respective equilibria.   With support for 
systemic stability across each set of cointegrating vectors, we next focus on the 
response of the price variables to a M2-specific shock.   We plot first in Figure 2 
the impact of the money shock on the cointegrating vectors and then on the 
individual variables in Figure 3.   In the Figure 2 panels, it can be seen that 
convergence toward their respective equilibria is evident over time for the CPI and 
relevant commodity price index cointegrating vectors following the money shock.   
Convergence to equilibrium is quite slow, a process that would seem consistent 
with a long transmission of money to prices.    
The patterns of convergence for the cointegrating vectors in the three panels of 
Figure 2 can be understood better by looking at the impact over time of the M2 
shock on the consumer and commodity price variables in Figure 3.   The CPI and 
commodity price series plotted in each panel seem to converge toward the same, 
higher level over time.   The adjustment pattern for the two price indices is also 
similar across the three panels with the commodity price index rising quickly over 
the first 12 quarters or so to a peak while the CPI adjusts only slowly and steadily 
upwards over time.   In panels (a) and (b), there is an overshooting of its equilibrium 
value by the commodity price index followed by a subsequent decline.   For panel 
(c), where SENSI is the commodity price index, there is a sharp initial rise in the 
commodity price index but it does not overshoot its new long-run equilibrium.   It 
does, however, overshoot its medium-term values.   In all three panels, the CPI can 
be seen to adjust little in the initial quarters after the money shock and then to rise 
steadily toward its new equilibrium.    
                                                 
86 The units on the horizontal axis of all panels of Figures 1 to 4 are quarter-years. 
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The response of the GDP variable is also shown in the Figure 3 panels.   It receives 
a slight, short-lived boost from the money supply shock before reverting to its initial 
value.   This is in line with standard quantity theory, which indicates that a positive 
change in the money stock will raise real output in the short run only with no long 
run consequence for the course real output takes.   The short-run rise in total output 
may reflect output adjustments in commodity and consumer good markets in 
response to relative price changes. 
We plot the rates of change of these responses of CPI, GDP and the respective 
commodity price indices to the money shock in Figure 4.   The rate of change (or 
inflation rate) of each of the commodity price indices peaks after five quarters and 
then starts to decline.   The rate of change moves into negative territory after 12-14 
quarters, a development consistent with the correction of the overshooting.   CPI 
inflation only picks up after about five quarters, i.e. after commodity price inflation 
has peaked.   It then rises steadily to a peak at quarter 12, broadly coinciding with 
commodity price inflation turning negative in value.   This shows that with the CPI 
rising towards its new equilibrium value, the commodity price index is correcting 
the initial overshooting of its own new stable level that followed the money shock. 
CPI inflation only declines slowly and steadily after its peak and the entire CPI 
inflation rate response to the money shock can be described as one of a slow rise-
and-decline.   The peak rate of CPI inflation is quite low relative to that of the 
various commodity price indices.   The boost to GDP growth is quite small and only 
lasts about six or seven quarters.             
As the final part of our econometric analysis, we note that the Johansen procedure 
provides us with a model of the short run behaviour of the CPI, where its first 
difference (ΔCPI) is regressed on the first-quarter lags of the two error-correction 
(EC) terms and, in this case, the first five lags of the changes in the four variables 
included in the cointegrating VAR system.   The EC terms are the deviation of the 
respective price variables from their equilibrium values.   It is common to examine 
their significance in explaining changes in any of the variables under consideration. 
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Figure 1:  Persistence Profiles of Cointegrating Vectors to System-wide 
Shocks 
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Figure 2:   Persistence Profile of Cointegrating Vectors to a M2 Shock 
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Figure 3:  Response of Variables to a Shock in the M2 Equation 
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Figure 4: Response of Variables to a Shock in the M2 Equation – Rates of 
Change 
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In the equation explaining CPI inflation, the error correction term, EC1 (-1), is the 
one-quarter lagged residual from the cointegrating vector involving the dependent 
variable in the short-run model (for example, the residual from the “CPI – M2 + 
0.41 GDP” vector in column (iv), row (a) of Table 1 is the subsequent EC1 term 
used in the final column for that row).   This error term measures how much the 
CPI deviates from its own long-run value.   In line with section 2, we expect the 
first lag of this EC term, EC1 (-1), to have a negative coefficient in a model where 
the current period change in the CPI is the dependent variable.    
The second lagged EC term, EC2 (-1), is the deviation of the particular commodity 
price index under consideration from its equilibrium value (so, to continue the 
previous example, in column (iv), row (a) of Table 1 it is the residual from the 
“CRBSI – M2 + 0.49 GDP” vector).   By reference to our theoretical model and 
earlier discussion, we expect EC2 (-1) to have a positive coefficient in explaining 
the current period change in the CPI.   The pair of cointegrating vectors in each row 
then provide the two error correction terms reported in the final column, (v), of 
Table 1 for each of these respective rows. 
For space considerations, we report only the coefficients on the two lagged error 
correction terms from among all the coefficients in the CPI inflation equation in 
column (v) of Table 1.87   Both EC terms have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant in all rows.   The residual diagnostics point to well-specified 
models, although there is predictive failure in the case where CRBSI and CRBRI 
are the commodity price indices under consideration.   CUSUM and CUSUMQ 
tests of structural stability, not shown, do not detect any systematic changes in the 
regression coefficients at the 5 percent level.  
4. Conclusion              
This paper is motivated largely by recent experience of rapid commodity price 
increases, following closely on a fairly prolonged accommodating stance of US 
Federal Reserve monetary policy that was accompanied by strong money growth.   
                                                 
87  We also report R-square values, predictive failure (PF) and serial correlation (SC) statistics. 
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When combined with similar policy stances and rapid money growth in the euro 
area and Japan, it suggests a causal role for monetary developments in driving 
commodity prices and the likelihood of this spilling over to consumer good prices 
in time.    
Our key empirical findings are that there is support for: commodity and consumer 
prices each, in turn, being cointegrated with the money stock and output; long run 
proportionality between money and consumer prices and between money and 
commodity prices; a slow speed of convergence to equilibrium among the variables 
following shocks; and commodity prices reacting relatively quickly following a 
money shock and having a tendency to overshoot their new equilibrium values.    
While acknowledging the reduced-form nature of the econometric model used, we 
believe the empirical findings are supportive of the discussion in section 2. 
From a policy perspective, we would conclude that it is important that monetary 
aggregates are brought into analyses of the commodity price-consumer price 
relationship and that it is unsurprising that commodity price rises can lead consumer 
price inflation.   Generalised commodity price increases lead consumer price 
inflation as a manifestation of the differing speeds of adjustment of the prices of 
both types of goods to monetary developments and not necessarily the result of 
exogenous, commodity market-specific events.    
Our results also suggest that the trend towards downplaying monetary aggregates 
in the broad formulation of monetary policy could usefully be re-examined.   This 
point is being restated of late, with papers such as Reynard (2007), Hafer, Haslag 
and Jones (2007), and Hafer and Jones (2008) showing that monetary shocks – 
measured as changes in money supply – statistically affect or predict economic 
activity.   We believe our paper complements and adds to that literature by showing 
that a money shock affects output in the short run and causes different, but related, 
responses in the prices of commodities and consumer goods over the short-to-
medium term.   
The findings in the paper may also help to explain the role monetary shocks played 
in the recent financial crisis.   It was preceded by strong money growth, relatively 
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low CPI inflation and a rapid rise in commodity prices, the kind of short-to-
medium-term price behaviour associated with positive money shocks in our 
empirical results.   Given that the prices of most asset classes rose substantially 
from around mid-2003 to late-2007, it can also be asked whether the overshooting-
followed-by-a-correction relationship between money and commodity prices 
documented in this paper may also exist between money and asset classes more 
generally.   Future research in this area could look at using and adapting the 
methodological approach employed here to examine and understand better the 
relationship between money, consumer prices, and the price behaviour of various 
asset classes.   Modelling the supply of money explicitly could also play a part in 
the development of the approach.    
Finally, it should be pointed out that a substantial correction in asset prices and 
associated uncertainty may in itself be seen as a significant negative shock by 
policymakers and the public alike.   This may put the central bank under pressure 
to ease monetary policy and increase the money supply.   If it is not able to sterilise 
such a rise in the money stock when the uncertainty eventually dissipates, there is 
then likely to be a large residue of a monetary overhang.   In turn, this may instigate 
a fresh round of asset price increases and overshooting of equilibrium asset values.   
The way in which the central bank reacts (or is forced to react) to a sharp decline in 
asset prices then could have the effect of propagating a new asset price cycle.                 
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Appendix:  Description and Sources of Data  
Consumer Price Index 
for All Urban 
Consumers: All Items  
Index: 
1982-84 
= 100 
 
SA 
 
US Department of Labor:  
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
CRB Spot Index Index: 
1967 = 
100 
NSA Commodity Research 
Bureau 
CRB Raw Industrials 
Sub-Index 
Index: 
1967 = 
100 
NSA Commodity Research 
Bureau 
Index of Sensitive 
Materials Prices 
Index: 
1992=100 
SA The Conference Board 
M2 $ billion SA Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve 
System 
Gross Domestic Product Billions 
of 
Chained 
2005 
Dollars 
SAAR US Department of 
Commerce: Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
SA: Seasonally-Adjusted;  NSA: Not Seasonally-Adjusted;  SAAR: Seasonally Adjusted Annual 
Rate. 
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consumer prices and their differing, but related, short-to-medium term responses to 
monetary pressures may help explain US CPI and commodity price index 
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draw on a recent paper of ours (Browne and Cronin, 2006), and an overshooting 
model therein, for our analysis.   It is argued, firstly, that a long run proportional 
relationship should exist between commodity prices and the money supply on the one 
hand and between consumer prices and the money supply on the other.   Secondly, 
following a change in the money supply commodity prices will overshoot their new 
long run value before readjusting back toward it while consumer prices will move 
slowly toward their new equilibrium.   These arguments are supported by the US data 
used. 
We also make a new application of the model to the constituent components of the 
US CPI and find that it can also explain recent price behaviour in this case.   Our 
analysis suggests that the food component of the CPI should not, at least in the US 
case, be seen as a “nuisance” variable in monetary policy analysis.       
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1. Introduction 
Money growth and real interest rates have been respectively high and low by 
historical cyclical precedent since the start of the current decade.   Their failure to 
show up in subsequent headline (e.g. CPI) inflation in developed countries has been 
a source of puzzlement.   At the same time, commodity prices have risen 
considerably.   Why has headline inflation behaved as it has when two supposedly 
key influences on it – commodity prices and monetary pressures – are behaving in 
a way that might be associated with higher inflation rates?    
In this article, we argue that long run monetary determination of both commodity 
and consumer prices and their differing, but related, short-to-medium term 
responses to monetary pressures may help explain their price behaviour since the 
early 2000s.   Our theoretical argument is that in a world comprising goods whose 
prices are highly flexible, like commodities which are traded on exchanges, and 
other goods whose prices are sluggish, such as consumer goods which are subject 
to longer-term contracts and menu costs, the prices of the former initially over-
adjust (overshoot) in the face of monetary pressures to compensate for the prices of 
the latter not being able to respond immediately.   This overshooting, however, is 
not long-lived as consumer good prices begin to respond to changes in the money 
stock.   As consumer good prices start to adjust, the overshooting of commodity 
prices is corrected.   Ultimately, both types of goods prices change by the same 
percentage amount as the money stock.    
We draw on a recent paper of ours (Browne and Cronin, 2006) as the basis for the 
arguments in this article.   There, as well as discussing and formalising our 
perspective on the relationship between commodity prices, consumer prices and 
money, we used econometric techniques and US data to investigate our model’s 
empirical relevance.  We found that both consumer prices and commodity prices 
move in proportion to the money stock in the long run.   In the short-to-medium 
term though, commodity prices are much more responsive than consumer prices to 
changes in the money stock.   It takes time for money growth to manifest itself in 
consumer prices while the more flexible commodity prices overshoot their long run 
values.   Over time, consumer prices duly respond to money growth and the 
commodity price overshooting is corrected.   Eventually both adjust in proportion 
  
 
210  
 
to the money stock.   The empirics, therefore, provide broad support for our prior 
views in this area, with the temporal behaviour of both consumer prices and 
commodity indices comprising agricultural and raw material prices being explained 
by money.     
In section 2, we provide a review of the literature that has previously examined the 
relationship between money, commodity prices and the CPI.   In section 3, we 
expand on the outline of our own theory of their interrelationship given above and 
summarise the econometric evidence that supports our view.   We also look at 
developments in commodity prices and the US CPI since 2001 and identify some 
patterns therein that we believe can be explained by our perspective.       
We make a new application of our model in section 4 by examining the constituent 
components of the US CPI and seeing whether the model can explain their 
behaviour.   We find that both the CPI less food and energy (sometimes referred to 
as “core CPI”) and the food component of the CPI move in proportion to the money 
stock in the long run.   While the CPI food component does not overshoot its long 
run value in response to a change in the money stock, it does move more quickly 
towards it than the core CPI does.   As a result, the food component of the CPI 
should not, at least in the US case, be seen as a “nuisance” variable in monetary 
policy analysis.   We conclude in section 5 with a number of suggestions that we 
believe arise for monetary policy analysis from our research.    
2. Commodity Prices, Inflation and Monetary Policy: A Literature Review  
The interaction between consumer prices, commodity prices and monetary policy 
has been the subject of numerous papers over the past twenty-five years or so.   
Many US studies of the commodity price-consumer price relationship, written 
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, often give little attention to the role of 
monetary variables in the relationship between commodity and consumer prices.88   
Instead, they tend to examine the signalling or predictive power of commodity 
prices for consumer price inflation as a basis for assessing how commodity prices 
could serve as an input into monetary policy formulation.   The papers were written, 
                                                 
88 See Webb (1988), Garner (1989), Marquis and Cunningham (1990), Cody and Mills (1991), 
Pecchenino (1992), Blomberg and Harris (1995), and Furlong and Ingenito (1996). 
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in many cases, in response to actual prices behaviour in the 1970s and early 1980s 
when rising commodity prices seemed to lead a pickup in CPI inflation.   In the 
main, they examine whether commodity prices actually lead and have predictive 
power for CPI inflation.   Their evidence is quite mixed.   A notable feature of these 
papers is that the existence of a long-run relationship between consumer and 
commodity prices is often examined in a bivariate context, where commodity prices 
are identified beforehand as the variable driving consumer good prices.   Most 
studies do not find a cointegrating relationship existing between the two price 
variables.    
Monetary variables as drivers of related movements in both commodity and 
consumer prices is considered in Jeffrey Frankel’s overshooting theory of 
commodity price behaviour (Frankel 1984, 1986).   His thesis is that real interest 
rates exert an important influence on real commodity prices because of the 
stickiness of what he terms “manufactured goods”, or finished goods (these would 
encompass consumer goods).   Accordingly, monetary policy has an impact on 
commodity prices through its effect on real interest rates.    
A monetary policy-induced rise in the real short-term interest rate, for example, 
causes commodity prices to fall according to Frankel’s model.   This occurs because 
a rise in nominal interest rates effected by monetary policy, for instance, will be 
associated with a higher real interest rate as the price of finished goods are sticky 
in the short run.   Since the real interest rate represents the opportunity cost of tying 
up resources in commodities then, all other things being equal, an increase in the 
real interest rate reduces the demand for commodities leading to a drop in their real 
prices.   This price change occurs quickly as commodities are traded in auction 
markets, which are particularly responsive to policy measures.    
The extent of the decline in commodity prices is dictated by an arbitrage condition.   
This requires that they fall sufficiently far to ensure that their subsequent 
appreciation to their equilibrium value compensates their holder fully for the 
increased cost of carrying them.   They “overshoot” their long run value in order to 
ensure equilibrium is maintained in financial markets.   Eventually, as all prices 
adjust fully to the monetary policy action, the real interest rate and the real 
commodity price return to their equilibrium values.    
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Frankel’s focus is primarily on the impact real interest rates have on real commodity 
prices, with the stickiness of finished goods prices relative to commodity prices 
playing a key role in the dynamic response of commodity prices to monetary policy.   
Boughton and Branson (1991) derive a number of empirically testable propositions 
from an extension of Frankel’s model where the CPI is used as the measure of 
manufactured or finished goods.   Their propositions find mixed empirical support.   
There is no evidence of a long run relationship between the level of consumer prices 
and commodity prices while the inclusion of commodity prices does not improve 
post-sample forecasts of the CPI.   They do find that turning points in commodity-
price inflation frequently precede turning points in CPI inflation.  
Following a hiatus in the late1990s, recent years have seen renewed interest in the 
links between commodity prices and consumer prices, as well as the role monetary 
policy may be playing in their movements over time.89   Barsky and Kilian (2002) 
revisited the Great Stagflation of the 1970s and show that monetary contractions 
and expansions can explain stagflation.   This runs counter to the traditional view 
that oil price rises owing to supply shocks were the main force driving high inflation 
in goods and services and lower output in the 1970s.   Barsky and Kilian’s 
econometric evidence indicates that monetary conditions can account for the rise in 
the price of oil and other commodities at that time.   They conclude that stagflation 
is first and foremost a monetary phenomenon.    
Frankel (2007) reasserts the relevance of his overshooting theory to developments 
in commodity prices.   The key point made in his earlier contributions, he stresses, 
is that real commodity prices will respond in the opposite direction to changes in 
real interest rates.   For this reason, he argues that declining real interest rates may 
help explain rising commodity prices during 2002-4.    Frankel illustrates this 
relationship by graphing annual observations of the US real interest rate against an 
annual series of US real commodity price indices over the period 1950 to 2005, 
which shows a negative relationship existing between the real interest rate and those 
price series.   We replicate this relationship in Figure 1, fitting a trend-line to the 
                                                 
89 Frankel (2007) suggests that interest in commodity prices’ impact on the economy tends to rise and 
fall in line with actual commodity prices.  
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scatter-plot.90   His own theory, Frankel emphasises, attributes this empirical 
phenomenon to monetary policy increasing or decreasing real interest rates in the 
short run with predictable knock-on effects for commodity prices.   Among the 
implications for monetary policy, Frankel suggests that central banks must monitor 
real commodity prices as their values may reflect whether real interest rates are at 
an appropriate level for meeting policy objectives.   He specifically points out that 
high real commodity prices can be a signal that monetary policy is too loose. 
3.     A New Model of the Relationship between Money, Commodity Prices and 
Consumer Prices 
- The Overshooting Model 
In our 2006 paper, we offer a fresh, monetary-based perspective on the relationship 
between commodity prices and consumer prices.   We argue, on the basis of a 
number of propositions and a formal model, that, firstly, a long run proportional 
relationship exists between commodity prices and the money supply on the one 
                                                 
90 For the real commodity price index, we use an annualised average of the CRB Spot Index, a broadly-
based US commodity index, deflated by the CPI.   The real interest rate is calculated as an annualized 
average of the (nominal) rate on a one-year constant-maturity US T-bill less the annualized average 
of the CPI inflation rate in the same year.   Our sample period is shorter than Frankel’s, covering the 
years 1954-2006. 
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hand and between consumer prices and the money supply on the other.   Secondly, 
we contend that, following a change in the money supply commodity prices will 
overshoot their new long run value before readjusting back toward it while 
consumer prices will move slowly toward their new equilibrium.    
The three propositions on which we base our model and subsequent empirics are:  
(i) exogenous changes in the nominal money stock lead to equivalent percentage 
changes in the overall price level, which comprises commodity and consumer 
prices, under conditions of stable money demand; 
(ii) exogenous changes in the money stock are neutral in the long-run steady state, 
implying that all individual prices, whether they be consumer goods or 
commodities, adjust over time in the same proportion as the money stock, thus 
leaving all relative prices unchanged in the new steady state; and 
(iii) in response to a change in the (exogenous) money supply, commodity prices 
will compensate in the short run for CPI price stickiness by overshooting their new 
long run equilibrium values. 
The first two propositions are essentially monetarist in nature.   The one-for-one 
relationship between money and the overall price level must hold at all times to 
maintain monetary equilibrium and it must also hold for commodities and consumer 
goods in the long run.   A doubling of the money stock, for instance, must, all other 
things being equal, have as its final outcome the prices of all goods traded within 
the economy increasing twofold.   The third proposition stems from commodity 
goods being traded in auction markets, allowing them to respond quickly to 
monetary stimuli.   In contrast, consumer prices are “sticky” in nature, responding 
slowly to changes in monetary conditions.   A rise in consumer prices proportional 
to an increase in the money stock occurs gradually and is only completed with a 
considerable lag.   Our third proposition then reflects the view that flexible 
commodity prices will overshoot their new long run value following a change in 
the money stock to maintain proportionality between money and the overall price 
level.91   This overshooting will be corrected over time as consumer good prices 
                                                 
91  This is the well-known Le Chatelier’s principle as applied to price theory: if not all goods prices in 
the economy are free to adjust fully to a change in economic conditions then other goods prices must 
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adjust.   The correction is complete when both sets of prices have adjusted 
proportionally to the change in the money stock.       
Chart 1 illustrates how, according to this model, commodity and consumer prices 
react over time in response to a once-off change in the money supply.   It is assumed 
that there are only two types of goods in the economy, commodities (or commodity 
goods) and consumer goods.   Three price indices are shown on the prices axis (the 
y-axis).   The first is the index of commodity goods prices, PF, denoted with the 
superscript “F” to reflect its flexible price nature, while the second is the index of 
consumer prices, PS, with the “S” superscript reflecting consumer prices being 
sticky in nature.   The third index represents the overall index of goods prices in the 
economy, P, comprising commodity and consumer good prices.   It is assumed, for 
the sake of simplicity, that both PF and PS have the same nominal value in the initial 
period (0).   This means that their weighted average, the overall index P, will also 
have the same value at that time.   This allows us plot all three indices in the initial 
period (0) at the same point on the price axis (as P0F, P0S, and P0).   The overall 
index, P0, is further designated with an asterisk to indicate that it is an equilibrium 
value, that is a price level determined by the size of the money stock at that time.   
Both P0F and P0S can also be considered to be at their long run money-determined 
values at that particular time. 
Suppose now that in the next period, there is a one-off increase in the money stock 
of µ percent.   The first proposition above indicates that the overall price level will 
also increase in that period by µ percent to PT*.   This price level is designated with 
a “T” subscript to indicate that, in the absence of any further changes in the money 
stock, which we assume to be the case, this is the overall price level that will hold 
indefinitely into the future.   In Chart 1, a dotted line denoting this new long run 
level of P is drawn off PT* on the y-axis and it runs parallel to the time axis (x-axis) 
in all subsequent periods.       
 
Chart 1:  The Overshooting Model    
                                                 
initially overshoot their new equilibrium values to compensate, a dynamic feature that holds until all 
prices are able to adjust to their new equilibrium values.  
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       TIME 
The second proposition above points to both PF and PS rising in proportion to the 
money stock in the longer run, i.e. by µ percent.   This means, given their initial 
values at time 0, the price of both categories of goods will eventually converge on 
the dotted horizontal line in Chart 1.   The third proposition, however, is that in the 
short-to-medium term the commodity price, PF, will respond to the change in the 
money stock by initially overshooting its new long run value owing to the price of 
the consumer good being unable to adjust immediately to its new equilibrium value, 
which is also on the dotted line.   In other words, the commodity price will lie above 
the dotted line for some time after the monetary stimulus while the consumer good 
price lies below it.   As the consumer price starts to rise, the commodity price begins 
to decline downwards towards the dotted line, thus correcting the overshooting of 
its price.   Eventually, at time j in Chart 1, both prices converge on the dotted line 
and the adjustment of both to the change in the money stock is complete. 
Another feature of this perspective on commodity and consumer price adjustments 
over time in response to changes in the money stock is that the deviations of both 
consumer prices and commodity prices from their equilibrium values should 
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contain information on subsequent changes in consumer prices.   These two gaps 
are shown in Chart 1.    At time i (it would be possible to choose any point along 
the y-axis up to j), the gap between the current commodity price and its equilibrium 
value is given by bc.   This is deemed a positive gap because the current commodity 
price (at b on the solid red line) exceeds its long run value (at c on the dotted line).   
In contrast, there is a negative consumer price gap (of cd) as the long run price of 
this good (of c on the dotted line) exceeds its current price (of d on the solid blue 
line).    
It can be seen in Chart 1 that PS is rising in the quarters subsequent to time i so that 
its rate of change must be positive.   This connection between a negative gap in 
consumer prices, such as exists at time i, and subsequent positive consumer price 
inflation has previously been made in monetary economics in the so-called P-star 
theory (see Hallman, Porter and Small (1991)).   Our theory, summarised in Chart 
1, makes this connection as well and also suggests that a positive commodity price 
gap, such as bc in that chart, will be followed by a rise in consumer good prices.   
Commodity price gaps then should be an indicator of consumer price pressures and, 
if quantifiable, could provide a useful tool in monetary analysis. 
- An Empirical Investigation of the Overshooting Model  
In our 2006 paper, we undertake an econometric analysis to test whether our 
perspective on the relationship between commodity prices, consumer prices and 
money finds support empirically.   The details of that analysis and the specific 
methodology used are included in that paper.   Here, we report the principal 
findings.    
Initially, we found that, for US data, long run proportional relationships exist 
between a number of commodity price indices and money and, in turn, between the 
CPI and money.92   This means that a ten percent rise in the money stock, for 
example, manifests itself in the long run in a matching ten percent increase in both 
the CPI and the respective commodity price index under consideration.    
                                                 
92 We also examined euro area data but found its features did not lend itself to the econometric 
methodology we use.    
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We also examined how both types of price index adjust over time to a change in the 
money stock, en route to their long run, proportional relationships with the money 
stock being re-established.   Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the patterns of adjustment 
for the CPI and one of the three commodity price indices considered in the 2006 
paper, the Commodity Research Bureau Spot Index (CRBSI).93   Figure 2a shows 
the indices’ response over time while Figure 2b plots the rate of change per quarter 
in those responses, i.e. the rates of inflation/deflation in the respective indices. 
Figure 2a shows patterns of adjustment over time in the actual data that are 
qualitatively close to those in Chart 1 above.   Following an exogenous increase in 
the money stock, the CRBSI initially rises very quickly, reaching a maximum value 
after 13 quarters.   At first, the CPI changes little, then starts to rise, and does so at 
an accelerating pace after about 5 quarters.   Figure 2b shows CPI inflation peaking 
after about 12-14 quarters just as the rate of change in the CRBSI moves into 
negative territory.   Obviously, a negative rate of change means that the level of the 
CRBSI is falling: an overshooting of the CRBSI in response to the money 
disturbance is being corrected.   Eventually, as Figure 2a shows, both the CPI and 
CRBSI are converging to the same level. 
Some further observations can be made on Figure 2b.  The CRBSI reaches much 
higher rates of inflation than the CPI.   It also has a prolonged episode of negative 
inflation rates, or deflation, between 14 and 33 quarters after the initial money 
disturbance.   Its range of inflation rates is much larger than that of the CPI.   The 
CPI inflation rate is initially unresponsive to the money shock but starts to rise 
steadily after 5 quarters or so before reaching a peak between quarters 12 and 14.   
Its decline thereafter is also slow.   The overall system of prices starts to settle down 
after about 40 quarters or so.94   The impact of a money shock on prices then is quite 
long, a familiar finding from studies of the interaction between money and prices.95   
A final feature of the empirical analysis in our 2006 paper is that lagged values of 
the gap between the observed CPI and its long run, equilibrium value and the gap 
between the observed commodity price index and its long run value each have 
                                                 
93 The CRB Spot Index is a broadly-based index comprising 22 food and raw material commodities. 
94 It is for this reason that the number of quarters on the horizontal axis differs between Figures 2a 
and 2b. 
95 See, for example, Batini and Nelson (2001). 
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explanatory power, with the expected sign, in an equation explaining current period 
CPI inflation. 
These empirical results are based on US data from 1959q1 to 2004q1.   An obvious 
question is whether the patterns initially hypothesised and then broadly supported 
over that sample period can help explain CPI and commodity price behaviour in the 
current decade.   In Figure 3, we plot year-on-year rates of growth in the CRBSI, 
the US CPI and US M2 on a quarterly basis from January 2001 to October 2007.   
The starting date is chosen because that was the month when the Federal Reserve 
began to lower its Federal Funds rate target from a 9-year high of 6½ percent in the 
wake of the dotcom collapse.   This interest rate continued to decline in an 
intermittent fashion to a rate of 1 percent in mid-2003, where it remained for close 
to a year before a subsequent, progressive raising of that interest rate commenced 
in mid-2004.   That concluded in mid-2006 and the target rate remained at a level 
of 5¼ percent up to September 2007.   The target rate was then lowered in two steps 
to 4½ percent by end-October 2007.   
Figure 3 shows that as interest rates were lowered in 2001, money growth rates started 
to rise and remained relatively high, on a year-on-year basis, up until mid-2003 as 
the policy target interest rate declined.   The graph indicates that the CPI inflation 
rate was initially unresponsive to the monetary stimulus then occurring.   A sustained 
rise in CPI inflation seems only to commence in early 2004, some 3 years, or 12 
quarters, after the initial loosening of monetary policy.   While M2 growth in the 
period covered in Figure 3 peaked in 2001q4, the subsequent peak in CPI inflation 
occurs in 2005q4, implying a peak-to-peak delay of 16 quarters.   This is a broadly 
similar lag to the peak response of CPI inflation following a rise in the money stock 
in Figure 2b. 
The CRBSI seems more responsive to money growth.   Its rate of inflation peaks in 
the second quarter of 2004.   After this, it starts to decline through late-2004 and 
early-2005 before its rate of inflation turns negative, albeit briefly, in mid-2005, just 
as CPI inflation is rising toward a four-year high.   This pattern is comparable to that 
in Figure 2b.   We also see that the CRBSI inflation rate fluctuated across a greater 
range than the CPI rate during the 2001-7 period covered in Figure 3 – also in keeping 
with the pattern shown in Figure 2b.   Finally, we note that since mid-2006, a gap 
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between the year-on-year rate of change in M2 and the CPI has re-emerged and has 
been accompanied by CRBSI inflation rising substantially. 
4.     The Core CPI and Other CPI Components: Another Application of the 
Model 
Our model was initially applied, in our 2006 paper, to studying the relationship 
between commodity prices and the CPI.   Commodities and consumer goods are 
considered to have starkly contrasting price properties, with commodity prices 
being determined in auction markets and consumer goods, as the final output of 
production, being impacted much more slowly by economic events.   This 
dichotomy places commodities and consumer goods at opposite ends of the price 
adjustment spectrum.   There are many goods and goods indices, however, that lie 
somewhere in between commodities and consumer goods in terms of how quickly 
they are likely to respond to economic developments.   These include wholesale 
price indices, producer price indices, as well as deflators used in measuring nominal 
changes in economic activity, such as trade deflators.    
Even within the CPI, there are goods whose prices are more flexible than others.   
Using micro data, Alvarez et al (2006) find that energy and unprocessed food have 
the most flexible prices among consumer goods within the euro area while services 
have the lowest.   For the United States, Bils and Klenow (2004) find energy-related 
and fresh food products in the CPI to display frequent price changes.   They also 
find durable goods show more frequent price changes than the overall consumer 
bundle while goods sold in more competitive markets change more often than other 
goods.   
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In relation to monetary policy, a conceptual demarcation is often made between 
“core” and “non-core” CPI inflation, with core inflation reflecting monetary 
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developments and non-core inflation owing to market-specific and other non-
monetary events.   In other words, there is a monetary and non-monetary component 
to the overall, or “headline”, CPI.   It follows from this perspective that the 
monetary-driven, core CPI inflation should be extracted from overall CPI inflation 
and be given particular attention in monetary analysis.   One means of undertaking 
this is to remove transitory elements from the aggregate index or the prices of the 
various goods and services that make it up.   The factor driving the remaining 
component(s) is taken to be monetary policy and, therefore, the adjusted CPI 
provides a measure of monetary or core inflation.  
Such measures of core inflation, however, by often requiring statistical analysis of 
individual good price series, are computationally involved and have their own 
drawbacks.   A more pragmatic suggestion for measuring core inflation is based on 
the notion that while monetary policy will transmit an impulse to the prices of all 
the goods that make up the overall CPI, the prices of some of its components are 
excessively volatile owing to the impact of other transient, non-monetary 
influences.   The food and energy components of the CPI are considered particularly 
volatile relative to the other components of the CPI.  For this reason, a CPI less 
food-and-energy index is often published and is usually referred to as “core CPI”.        
This convenience, however, can lead to the perception that the food and energy 
components of the CPI are not determined in the long run by money and, 
accordingly, have little relevance for monetary policy analysis.   Our discussion in 
sections 2 and 3, would lead us to surmise that volatile movements in the food and 
energy components of the CPI may reflect a swifter response of those components 
of the CPI to changes in the money stock.   Figure 2b shows that, in reality, 
commodity inflation can indeed be much more volatile than headline CPI inflation 
while still being driven by money.   If this holds true also for the food or energy 
components of the CPI then it is not appropriate to discard either or both from 
monetary analysis, rather it is imperative to see what valuable information may be 
extracted from them for policymaking purposes. 
We reapplied our empirical methodology, substituting CPI less food and energy and 
a second CPI component for the overall CPI and commodity price index used in our 
2006 paper.   US data are again used, covering the period 1959q1 to 2007q2.   
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Ideally, the second CPI component would comprise both the food and energy 
components excluded from the core measure would be used but such a measure is 
not published by the relevant source, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.   It only 
publishes separate “Food” and “Energy” components.   We examined each, in turn, 
as the respective second index alongside core CPI.    
While the results for the Energy component were disappointing, those for the Food 
component, however, were both satisfactory from a statistical perspective and 
illuminating, as will be discussed.   The poor performance of the Energy component 
may be attributable to it being exceptionally volatile, relative to both CPI Food and 
core CPI.    
The results where CPI-less-Food-and-Energy and CPI Food are used are 
statistically well-behaved and show long-run proportional relationships arising 
between CPI-less-Food-and-Energy and the M2 money stock and between CPI 
Food and the same money stock.96   Figure 4a shows how both price indices adjust 
to a positive change in the money stock.   While both converge over time towards 
their new long run values and do so without any obvious overshooting, CPI Food 
responds more quickly to the change in the money stock.   It leads CPI-less-Food-
and-Energy in adjusting to a monetary stimulus.   Figure 4b shows CPI Food 
inflation peaking earlier and at a higher rate than CPI-less-Food-and-Energy 
inflation.   Also, the adjustments of both indices to the change in the money stock 
involve sharper changes in CPI Food inflation.   This may go some way to 
explaining the observed higher volatility of CPI food inflation relative to core CPI 
inflation while underlining that this feature of the data is money-driven. 
Bryan and Cecchetti (1994, p. 197) identify the term core CPI in many economists’ 
minds with “the long-run, or persistent, component of the measured price index, 
which is in some way tied to money growth”.   Using this yardstick, CPI-less-Food-
and-Energy and the CPI Food component should, according to our results, both be 
classified as core CPI components.   The obvious follow-on suggestion is that it 
would be worthwhile examining, at least in the US case, whether only the energy 
                                                 
96 Those particular results are not shown here but are available on request from the authors.  
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component of the CPI should be excluded from the overall CPI in arriving at a 
measure of core CPI and in studying underlying inflationary trends.97    
It is again interesting to look at developments in CPI-less-food-and-energy and CPI 
Food inflation in the current decade and compare them with the longer-sample 
based plots in Figure 4b.   Year-on-year changes in both indices are shown in Figure 
5 from 2001q1 onwards, the same starting point as that in Figure 3.   The rate of 
CPI Food inflation can be seen to have fluctuated more than that of CPI-less-Food-
and-Energy.   There is also some indication that the pattern in CPI Food inflation 
has led that in core CPI inflation in recent years.   This seems evident between late-
2001 and early-2004 when a fall in the CPI Food inflation rate up to mid-2002 led 
a decline in core CPI inflation up to early-2004.   In the period from mid-2003 to 
mid-2005, CPI Food inflation rose sharply and then declined, a pattern that also 
appears to be occurring in a milder form for CPI-less-Food-and-Energy inflation 
between early-2004 and end-2007.   These developments are close to those in Figure 
4b where the rise-and-fall in CPI Food inflation occurred before that in CPI-less-
Food-and-Energy.    
Finally, we note that year-on-year CPI Food inflation has, like CRBSI inflation, 
picked up sharply in 2007.         
5.    Conclusion 
In this article, we have discussed a model that we believe can account for the long 
run and dynamic behaviour of commodity prices and consumer prices and that may 
go some way toward explaining how both sets of prices have behaved in recent 
years.   The building blocks of the model invoke long-run monetary neutrality 
conditions pertaining to relative prices along with the observation that commodities, 
being traded on auction markets, have prices that adjust quickly to economic events 
while consumer prices are subject to rigidities in the short-to-medium term arising 
from menu costs and contracts.   This leads, among other things, commodity prices 
to overshoot long run values in response to exogenous money growth.   In sections 
3 and 4, we related empirical findings from an earlier paper of ours, along with new 
                                                 
97 Using a different form of analysis, such a proposal has already been made by Gavin and Mandal 
(2002). 
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results, that, we believe, back up our perspective on the relationship between money 
and different price indices.   
There are a number of key points that emerge from the model and the empirical 
results.   First, monetary developments would seem to have a strong bearing on how 
price indices behave.   Our results suggest money determines the price of both 
commodity and consumer price indices in the long run.   Likewise, it can explain 
their behaviour in the short to medium term.   The indices’ individual responses to 
monetary pressures seem, in our view, related and can be explained by their varying 
degrees of price stickiness.   It is noteworthy that monetary developments can help 
explain the behaviour of agricultural and raw material commodity prices over time.        
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Another point we would make is that commodity prices can provide some 
indication as to how the CPI or a similar final goods price index will behave in the 
near future.   A sharp pickup in commodity prices (particularly if it is occurring 
across a broad range of commodity classes) may reflect a monetary policy that is 
too loose.   A sudden fall-off in commodity prices (including negative rates of 
change) may actually precede a rise in CPI inflation.   Commodity and CPI gap 
variables can explain next-quarter CPI inflation. 
Finally, the behaviour of what many commentators consider one of the two non-
core components of the US CPI, CPI Food, can be explained by money.   This 
means that it cannot be classified as a nuisance or be easily discarded in monetary 
analysis.   Indeed, if core CPI is a useful means of assessing longer-term price 
adjustment then our results suggest that, at least in the US case, there may be 
grounds for examining whether CPI’s food component should be included in it.       
We would conclude by observing that the pickup in commodity inflation rates in 
recent years should, according to our perspective, start to translate into higher CPI 
inflation rates.   We would also note that the rise in commodity prices in recent 
years has been broadly based across commodity classes.   This suggests some 
common factor behind these movements, which we would expect to be strong rates 
of global money growth.    
At the same time, another account of money and price developments in recent years 
seems to be losing its force.   It explains low headline inflation occurring against a 
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backdrop of strong money growth and low real interest rates by emerging markets, 
especially China, “exporting” deflation to the developed world in the form of lower-
priced finished goods with this acting to offset inflationary pressures worldwide 
(reference).   Deflation in Japan would also be considered to have had a similar 
impact (reference).   These factors, however, seem to have fallen away and been 
reversed in the last year or so.   Between October 2006 and October 2007, the 
annualised rate of change in US import prices from China went from -1.3 per cent 
to 2.2 percent.   China’s domestic inflation rate has accelerated from moderately 
negative levels to 6½ percent in August 2007.   Much of this increase has been 
attributed to raw material and basic commodity price increases but more especially 
to food price increases.   Japan also now seems to be facing big hikes in food prices 
after a long period of extreme monetary accommodation.   Some of the benign 
influences on inflation in developed countries, it seems, are being removed, with 
possible adverse implications for developed countries’ inflation prospects. 
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Introduction 
The interaction between commodity prices, general inflation and monetary policy has re-
emerged in recent years as a topic of interest among academic economists, central 
bankers, and financial market participants alike.   A sustained, broadly based increase in 
commodity prices started in the mid-2000s, and rising prices have been evident also in 
other major asset classes (stocks, bonds, property).   These price increases occurred 
against a monetary policy stance, in the major advanced industrial countries, that was 
viewed as broadly accommodating in many quarters at that time, and as being appropriate 
given that general inflation rates, e.g. consumer price index (CPI) inflation rates, were 
relatively low, and within or close to targets set for, or by, central banks.   Moreover, 
rising commodity prices were not seen as having any substantial impact on consumer 
prices. 
Most asset prices started to decline in late 2007.   Commodity prices fell rapidly and 
steeply in the second half of 2008.   Ironically, this occurred against a background of 
policy interest rates being reduced close to zero, and an unconventional monetary policy 
tool, quantitative easing, being introduced by the main central banks.   Since then, and 
against a background of a continuing accommodative monetary policy stance, 
commodity prices have regained upward momentum.    
While the pickup in commodity prices in recent years has had an effect on the headline 
consumer inflation rate, its “core inflation” component, as measured by headline CPI 
inflation less its food and energy components, remains close to acceptable values in the 
major developed countries.   Commodity price developments, then, do not seem to be 
translating into a broadly based effect on consumer prices, in contrast to the 1970s, and 
early 1980s.   This feature of recent data, and indeed the ability of core inflation to remain 
anchored at low values through the 1990s and the 2000s regardless of the shocks hitting 
the economy, has been attributed to the adoption of a monetary policy framework, 
inflation targeting, that has as one of its main goals stopping one-off price pressures 
becoming embedded in inflation expectations.   Of course, another factor behind the 
diminishing pass-through from commodity prices to consumer prices is the smaller role 
raw materials, most notably oil, play in economic activity in modern developed 
economies. 
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It is, nevertheless, clear now that the inflation targeting framework was found wanting in 
the financial crisis.   It did not provide any advance warning of the effect of collapsing 
bubbles, and the massive deflationary forces unleashed as a consequence.   This stemmed, 
in our view, from its neglect of the role of asset prices, as well as the vast changes that 
have occurred in the financial system over the last few decades, which have enhanced 
the substitutability between money and financial assets. 
This short overview points to the need to examine a number of specific issues in coming 
to understand better the nexus between commodity prices, CPI inflation, and monetary 
policy.   Setting an explicit numerical target for inflation, or at least a target of low and 
stable inflation, plays a critical role in monetary policy today.   This practice of  “inflation 
targeting” anchors price expectations, by requiring central banks to set out their inflation 
target, how they intend to achieve it, and holding them accountable for meeting that 
target.   As well as explaining the rationale for and practice of inflation targeting, we also 
provide an overview of criticism of this monetary policy strategy, in particular versions 
of it that ignore developments in financial markets, and in money and credit variables.   
This strategy meant that central banks, by remaining steadfast to inflation targeting in the 
face of imbalances and distortions evident in asset markets, contributed to the financial 
instability of recent years. 
The challenges in addressing and rectifying the current difficulties in financial markets, 
and the wider economy, are acute for leading central banks, such as the Federal Reserve 
and the European Central Bank.   Policy interest rates are close to zero, thus limiting their 
scope as instruments of monetary policy.   As discussed later, one policy innovation 
brought in, in response to the loss of leverage from conventional monetary policy 
instruments, has been quantitative easing. In increasing the amount of liquidity in the 
economy, and in reducing the yield on a competing asset class, government bonds, 
quantitative easing may have stoked the surge in commodity prices since 2009.    
It may also be that a “super-cycle” is present in commodity markets in recent years, with 
rising prices therein not a temporary phenomenon, but part of a long period of sustained 
high commodity prices.   This is owing to countries such as China and India emerging as 
industrial superpowers, leading to an increased demand for commodities as industrial 
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inputs, and in building up capacity in those economies.98   At the same time, there appears 
to be a stronger co-movement in the prices of different commodities.   This suggests that 
there may be common factors at play in commodity markets.   One such possibility is 
that the growing treatment of commodities as a separate asset class in recent years, and 
their being added to asset portfolios as a means of reducing the risk of those portfolios, 
may have increased co-movement in their prices.    
Another viewpoint, discussed in detail later in this chapter, stresses the capacity of 
commodity prices in general to respond quickly to changes in monetary policy and, 
indeed, to overshoot equilibrium values, so as to maintain overall prices in the economy 
in line with the level of the money stock (Frankel 2008, Browne and Cronin 2010).   High 
commodity prices then can occur in response to loose monetary policy conditions, such 
as have existed over much of the last ten years or so, and are consistent with a low CPI 
inflation rate in the short-to-medium term, with that inflation rate rising subsequently.    
Inflation-targeting and modern monetary policy-making  
The 1970s and early 1980s proved to be difficult times for central banks.   High inflation 
rates and low, and even on occasion negative, growth rates – a phenomenon known as 
“stagflation” – were a feature of the economic environment in many western countries.   
Cost-push-related policy measures (direct control of wage and price increases) were 
pursued in the 1970s to address this malaise, but were unsuccessful in bringing inflation 
down from high rates.   Later, however, a form of the quantity theory of money,99 labelled 
monetarism and most closely associated with economist Milton Friedman, came to form 
the basis for reducing inflation. The so-called Volcker disinflation (named after the 
former Federal Reserve chairman) in the United States saw the Federal Reserve 
aggressively raise interest rates in the early 1980s, with inflation subsequently declining.       
The intervening quarter of a century, up to the late 2000s, saw a decline in inflation rates 
to low single-digit figures, occurring alongside generally buoyant economic growth.   
Furthermore, the variability of inflation, and output growth rates, fell progressively. 
                                                 
98 Using an econometric technique called band-pass filtering, Cuddington and Jerrett (2008) provide 
evidence consistent with there being three super cycles in metal prices in the past 150 years or so and with 
world metal markets currently being in the early stages of a fourth super cycle. They note that the latter is 
being attributed to Chinese urbanisation and industrialisation. 
99 The quantity of money theory links money supply with overall price levels. 
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While there is an acknowledgement that “good luck” in the form of fewer large shocks, 
such as oil price shocks, played its part, it is commonly accepted that improvements in 
macroeconomic policy, in particular monetary policy, were central to the economic 
stability and prosperity achieved during this period. 
As might be expected, the negative experiences of the 1970s stimulated a lot of research 
in how monetary policy could be improved in practice.   Among the earliest advances in 
that research was the identification of structural credibility problems in the conduct of 
monetary policy.   Specifically, it was found that rules were better than discretion in 
guiding policy.   Adherence to rules leaves the public more assured as to how the central 
bank conducts itself and, accordingly, guides its own expectations and behaviour that are, 
in turn, key to the success of monetary policy.   In practice, rules-based monetary policy 
was supported by the granting of independent statutes to central banks.   This often 
included specific inflation targets to be achieved. In essence, three “Cs” came to underlie 
central banking: credibility, consistency and continuity (Stark, 2007). 
A clear focus on the need to maintain price stability became the centre-point of central 
banks’ activities.   Through the late 1980s and into the 1990s, central banks were 
increasingly successful at achieving price stability.   With inflation reduced to moderate 
levels, and their standing high, central banks faced a new set of challenges in the 1990s.   
First, having reduced inflation, over the previous ten years or so, to low levels, central 
banks now needed to maintain inflation rates close to the price stability benchmarks 
explicit or implied in their statutes.   Secondly, the high standing of central banks meant 
that their statements and comments were carefully scrutinised by the public.   
Communication was vital to the success of monetary policy, and openness and 
transparency were recognised as key elements of the communication policy.   At the same 
time, central banks had to be careful and precise in explaining their monetary policy 
actions and intentions, so that the public would not misinterpret, or be confused about, 
what was being said.    
A number of concurrent developments in academic research and policy analysis seemed 
to provide a mean of conducting and communicating monetary policy.   Explicit 
numerical inflation benchmarks were often set for, or by, central banks, and those 
inflation targets became the focal point of decision-making.   The Taylor Rule, named 
after its proposer Professor John Taylor (1993), was initially used as a descriptive tool, 
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but was promoted in some circles as a means of setting monetary policy.   Under this 
rule, the central bank would mechanically set the short-term interest rate as a function of 
the deviation of the actual inflation rate from its target rate, and the deviation of output 
(GNP/GDP) growth from its long-run potential growth rate.   The Taylor Rule became 
one of the three key elements of the so-called “New Keynesian” model of the economy, 
which offered, according to its advocates, a parsimonious, but integrated and realistic, 
description of aggregate demand and inflation determination.   Even where central banks 
do not explicitly follow the Taylor Rule, it is accepted as playing a prominent role in how 
many go about devising their monetary policy stance.  
There is no need for a money demand function or, indeed, for any money variable within 
the inflation-targeting paradigm.   Instead, inflation is seen as originating in the labour, 
rather than money, market.   A version of the Phillips’ curve,100 where the size of the 
output gap indicates inflationary pressures within the economy, plays an important 
analytical role in the inflation-targeting approach.   These developments in 
macroeconomic modelling happened to coincide with increased difficulties in assessing 
and forecasting the public’s demand for holding money balances.   In the United States 
especially, where the New Keynesian perspective is particularly popular among 
academics, financial innovation and liberalisation made it difficult to model the demand 
for money successfully.   The development of near-money substitutes, such as mutual 
funds, made it hard to ascertain the public’s demand for money if it shifted its liquid 
wealth between money and near-money assets.   Consequently, the information coming 
from the monetary sphere was not as helpful to monetary policy formulation as 
previously.   Accordingly, what could be termed “economic analysis”, i.e., analysis 
focussing on the real economy, became increasingly stressed as the basis for monetary 
policy decision-making.   Aggregate demand (and its components), potential 
output/aggregate supply, unemployment and inflation expectations are the key variables 
to be assessed in this sphere. 
Inflation targeting appears to have been a success, at least in terms of inflation 
performance.   In a review of emerging market economies, the IMF (2005) found that 
                                                 
100 Uncovered by the seminal work of A.W. Phillips, the original Phillips’ curve refers to the inverse 
relationship between unemployment and money wage rates. Other versions of the model were later 
introduced, linking inflation with various measures of broad economic activity and, later, inflation 
expectations. 
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those countries that followed an inflation-targeting approach had a better inflation 
performance than non-targeting countries, both in terms of average inflation rates and 
volatility of those rates.   Habermeier et al (2009) find that inflation-targeting countries 
appear to have done better than others in minimising the inflationary impact of the 2007 
surge in commodity prices.      
This approach has benefited the investment community.   The forward-looking approach 
taken by central banks to assessing inflationary pressures, their willingness to disclose 
publicly the basis for their monetary policy decisions, and their determination to ensure 
any price developments do not become embedded in inflation expectations, have 
provided investors with confidence that swings in inflation rates are not likely to impact 
on financial outturns.   Furthermore, to the extent that price stability leads to a better 
allocation of resources in the economy (one of the main rationales for its pursuit), the 
waste that is thereby obviated should accrue to investors in the form of an enhanced risk-
adjusted rate of return.    
The culmination of events in the new millennium, however, has seen the inflation-
targeting approach to monetary policy come under the spotlight.   Most importantly, the 
question arises as to whether inflation targeting itself played a role in the shocks and 
events that have impacted severely on developed economies.   Advocates of inflation 
targeting do not see monetary policy having to react to changes in asset prices, other than 
to use any information they may provide as to how final goods inflation rates will develop 
over time.   Likewise, as long as central banks remain focussed on the long term path of 
the inflation rate, and maintain it close to target values, periodic variations in headline 
inflation rates owing to commodity prices are not of great concern.   The credibility 
afforded to monetary policy by inflation targeting can also diminish economies’ 
vulnerability to the inflationary impact of commodity price shocks, by ensuring those 
shocks do not become embedded in expected inflation. 
The narrow focus on the real economy and performance associated with inflation 
targeting nevertheless means that important information concerning developments in 
money and financial market variables may have been ignored in setting monetary policy.   
Moreover, inflation targeting operates through one policy variable – the central bank 
policy interest rate.   Whether that interest rate is a sufficiently robust instrument in 
avoiding or addressing major disturbances to economic and financial performance is 
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open to question.   Taylor (2009) apportions part of the blame for the financial crisis that 
emerged in 2007 to monetary policy having pursued persistently low interest rates for an 
extended period.   He shows (2009, p. 2), that “monetary excesses” were the main cause 
of the boom and subsequent bust that occurred in the mid-2000s. 
While inflation targets were being met in most developed countries during the mid-
2000s, monetary policy, mainly through the provision of cheap credit, was contributing 
to excessive risk-taking in financial markets, and an over-pricing of financial and real 
assets such as property.   Eventually, this led to substantial falls in asset prices, as well 
as the threat of deflation hanging over western economies.   The inflation targeting 
framework could not have foreseen this, because of its belief in the second-order 
importance of asset markets for monetary policy. 
Besides raising potential issues for the maintenance of price stability, an accommodative 
monetary policy stance, if maintained over a long period, can pose a threat to financial 
stability.   This view that financial imbalances, especially excess money and credit 
growth, brought about by monetary policy pose a threat to the well-being of economies 
was most prominently expressed by Bank for International Settlements economists (e.g., 
Borio and Lowe, 2002, and Borio and White, 2004) in the years leading up to the current 
economic crisis.   They argue that the simultaneous development of imbalances in 
monetary variables, such as credit, and in asset prices should be of concern to central 
banks.   Financial liberalisation and innovation can generate such imbalances, and 
encourage greater procyclicality in financial markets.   This can occur against a 
background of low and stable inflation.   Excess demand can show up first in asset prices 
rather than consumer prices, which may explain why financial imbalances and rising 
asset prices occur in a low inflation environment.   The concerns expressed by BIS and 
other economists underline the need for central banks to monitor monetary and financial 
developments, as well as those in the real economy, closely.  
 
 
Monetary policy in the financial crisis  
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Inflation targeting, which seemed to do a good job in the not too distant past, has been 
found wanting in recent years.   As others have noted - for example, Canuto (2009) - well 
behaved inflation and output performance, which were features of advanced industrial 
economies leading up to the crash, are no guarantee against a dangerous upward asset 
price spiral developing and then collapsing, with enormous implications for the central 
bank and its ability to maintain a stable monetary and financial system. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, central banks, faced with either a liquidity trap or the 
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, had to turn to using an alternative policy 
instrument, quantitative easing.   This has been utilised because nominal interest rates 
were already close to zero, and thus the scope for reducing them further was limited.   
Quantitative easing involves proactively buying up a large fraction of the stock of 
government bonds, at whatever price is needed for holders to be willing to engage in 
exchange.   Its purpose is to accommodate the need for liquidity in financial markets, and 
the economy more generally.    
It goes beyond, however, a normal accommodating monetary policy, which tends to 
occur at a positive value for the nominal rate of interest, when the central bank makes 
funding available in infinitely elastic amounts at that rate (subject to good collateral).   
The difficulty with conventional monetary policy is that the amount of liquidity injected 
into the financial system may be deemed to be inadequate, even with full accommodation 
and at a zero rate of interest, in the type of distressed state in which financial markets 
found themselves in in the wake of the financial crisis.   This is where the need for 
quantitative easing comes in.   It involves purchasing what has turned out to be an 
extremely large amount of government securities outright, as a way of injecting liquidity 
into the banking system, with the ultimate objective of kick-starting the economy, and 
obviating deflation. 
Quantitative easing was employed by the Bank of Japan during the early-to-mid 2000s 
in its attempts to tackle deflation in the Japanese economy.   Assessments of the impact 
of this policy are that it had limited effect in raising aggregate demand and prices, but 
provided some support to the country’s banking sector (Spiegel (2006), Ugai (2007)). 
The Federal Reserve and other central banks have introduced extremely large amounts 
of funds into the financial system through quantitative easing.   The sizes of their balance 
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sheets have increased considerably since 2007.   This expansion of liquidity has so far 
been largely contained to the banking sector.   It has not yet, for the most part, resulted 
in a corresponding improvement in the supply of credit and liquidity to the retail non-
banking sector.    
Quantitative easing might also affect behaviour in financial markets in another way.   
Large purchases of government securities by the central bank will likely drive their prices 
to levels that reduce, if not eliminate altogether, their attractiveness as an investment 
option.   Koo (2011) argues that, with the private sector deleveraging due to balance-
sheet difficulties, fund managers, devoid of both private sector and public sector 
borrowers, will turn to commodities as an alternative investment option.   This effect may 
have been at play in commodity price behaviour in recent years.    
It is important to remember that this is a portfolio rebalancing effect and may not have a 
lasting effect on commodity prices, given that other asset markets should be expected to 
return to normality at some time in the future.   The portfolio rebalancing effect, however, 
is distortionary in the short run, as investors are effectively constrained into purchasing 
commodities.   This cannot be beneficial to commodity markets, and to the efficient 
allocation of investment resources more generally within the economy. 
The acceleration in the growth of the money stock in the latter half of 2008 while the US 
economy was still in recession is likely to have helped maintain momentum to 
commodity prices.   In the next section, we discuss how a monetary shock has a 
proportionate impact on commodity prices and consumer prices in the long run, while 
causing an overshooting of equilibrium commodity values in the nearer term. 
The Influence of Commodity Prices on Final Goods Inflation  
Developments in commodity markets routinely and directly impact on final good prices, 
as commodities constitute an input into the production of those goods.   The impact of 
commodity prices, however, is less strongly felt nowadays than, say, in the 1970s, as 
commodities account for a smaller share of final expenditure.   This reflects the changing 
structure of the economy over time, away from manufacturing and towards services.   It 
also reflects improved production techniques, requiring less raw material and energy 
inputs.   As already mentioned, central banks are also now more skilled in ensuring that 
large commodity price increases do not become embedded in the inflationary process.   
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Econometric assessments made around 2010 supported the diminished influence of 
commodity prices on overall final good prices.   Blanchard and Gali (2010), for example, 
find that the pass-through from oil price changes to overall inflation rates has declined 
over time in a set of industrialised economies. 
The origin of commodity price changes is debated in the economics literature.   One 
perspective sees developments in commodity prices arising from market-specific, 
supply-demand shocks.   There may, for instance, be some new or enhanced source of 
demand for a commodity, a sudden disruption to supply due to weather affecting crop 
harvests, or political events threatening the availability of a raw material.   The 
commodity price changes that result are ultimately relative price changes, and may often 
be transitory.   They can have direct price effects on the CPI, if the commodities are a 
part of the consumer basket, and indirect pass-through effects when the commodities 
affected are part of the production process of consumer goods.   
Market shocks can have a rapid and sizeable effect on the prices of the particular 
commodities affected.   This follows from the fact that they are traded on open markets, 
which helps make commodity prices relatively flexible.   Since final goods prices are less 
flexible, and adjust slowly to economic developments, commodity prices may contain 
useful information as to how consumer prices will behave in the future.101   Many older 
US studies of the commodity price-consumer price relationship focussed on the 
predictive power of commodity prices for CPI inflation.102   The evidence presented in 
these studies with regard to the predictive power of commodity prices is mixed.      
The price-flexibility attribute of commodity markets may also contribute to the view that, 
since market-specific shocks are short-lived, the resulting pronounced directional 
changes in commodity prices will be a temporary, and self-correcting, phenomenon.   
This view, and the recognition that relative price shifts are a necessary and valid part of 
economic activity, may contribute to the aforementioned monetary policy perspective 
that commodity price shocks can be ignored.    
                                                 
101 Within the CPI, there are goods whose prices are more flexible than others. Bils and Klenow (2004) 
find the fresh food, energy-related products, and durable goods components of the CPI to change relatively 
frequently.  In the euro area, energy and unprocessed food have the most flexible prices among consumer 
goods, while services have the lowest (Alvarez et al, 2006).   
102 See Webb (1988), Garner (1989), Marquis and Cunningham (1990), Cody and Mills (1991), Pecchenino 
(1992), Blomberg and Harris (1995), and Furlong and Ingenito (1996). 
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An alternative viewpoint starts from the premise that the level of prices in the economy 
is determined in the long run by the money supply, and that the central bank, through its 
ability to control the money supply by monetary policy, has an influence on how 
commodity prices and final good prices develop over time.   Commodity price increases 
then may be seen as not originating exclusively in market-specific shocks but as arising, 
in part at least, from the monetary policy stance.   Insofar as commodity price 
developments feed through into CPI inflation rates from this source, it has a monetary 
basis.    
This perspective, focussing on the role of money supply, and monetary policy more 
generally, in effecting commodity price changes, has re-emerged in the 2000s.   Barsky 
and Kilian (2002), for instance, examine the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, and produce 
econometric evidence that monetary conditions explain the rise in the price of oil and 
other commodities at that time.   This runs counter to the more orthodox perspective that 
supply shocks impacted oil prices and caused both high inflation in goods and services, 
and lower output.      
Frankel (2008) revisits an overshooting theory of commodity prices that he first put 
forward some twenty years previously (Frankel 1984, 1986).   This theory follows from 
the view that monetary policy-induced changes in interest rates affect real/inflation-
adjusted interest rates because the CPI is “sticky”, i.e. inclined to change only slowly.   
Suppose that monetary policy causes a rise in the nominal interest rate.   This will also 
lead the real interest rate to increase, since the CPI inflation rate is fixed in the short run.   
The relevance of the real interest rate for commodities is that it represents the opportunity 
cost of holding them.   A rise in the real interest rate then reduces the demand for 
commodities, causing their real prices to fall. In this way, monetary policy has an impact 
on commodity prices through its effect on real interest rates. 
In the Frankel model, the amount by which commodity prices decline is determined by a 
no-arbitrage condition.   Commodity prices must fall to the extent that their subsequent 
appreciation to long-run values compensates their holders fully for the increased cost of 
carrying them.   Prices, then, “overshoot” equilibrium values to meet this market 
requirement.   Subsequently, the CPI inflation rate will itself adjust (slowly) upwards, 
and the real interest rate will decline, acting to restore equilibrium to the commodity 
market. 
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In his 2008 article, Frankel emphasises the relevance of his overshooting theory to 
developments in commodity prices around that time.   He attributes the rise in commodity 
prices in 2002-4 to declining real interest rates.   A number of other recent studies find a 
similar relationship between commodity prices and real interest rates. Using quarterly 
data covering the years 1990-2007, Akram (2009) finds commodity prices increase 
significantly in response to reductions in real interest rates. The econometric results of 
Anzuini et al. (2010) indicate that expansionary US monetary policy shocks increase 
commodity prices, albeit to a limited extent.   
In Browne and Cronin (2010), we also provide an overshooting theory of commodity 
prices.   Whereas Frankel’s perspective draws on the Dornbusch (1976) theory of 
exchange rate overshooting in framing his model, we use two (essentially Friedman-
style) monetarist propositions to develop ours.   Those are that exogenous changes in the 
nominal money stock lead to equivalent percentage changes in the overall price level 
(comprising commodity and consumer good prices); and that exogenous changes in the 
money stock are neutral in the long run, implying that all individual prices, whether they 
be of consumer goods or commodities, adjust over time in the same proportion as the 
money stock, thus leaving all relative prices unchanged. 
When these two propositions are combined with an acknowledgement that commodity 
prices are more flexible than consumer prices, commodity prices are shown to overshoot 
their new long run equilibrium values in response to a change in the exogenous money 
supply, to compensate for the inability of consumer prices to adjust in the short run.   In 
this way, the overall price level moves at the same rate as the money stock, but, initially, 
commodity prices move more than they do in the long run to offset the stickiness of 
consumer prices.   
A Theory of Overshooting 
A simple two-period model might help develop some insight, and guide a more formal 
statistical approach (see also Browne and Cronin 2010).   We assume there are two 
exchangeable goods, that is commodities and the CPI basket, which together add up to 
the real output Y of the economy.   At any time, the overall price level P will be the 
weighted average (with weight w, 0<w<1) of the commodities price index F, which is 
flexible, and the consumer price index S, whose price is sticky.   For example at time t: 
  
244 
 
Pt=   wFt+ (1-w)St 
The relationship between the money stock, M, and the overall price level is given, at 
each time t, by the Fisher identity, that is: 
MtVt= PtYt 
We assume that the velocity of money Vt is constant and equal to 1, and that the volumes 
of the two goods in our economy, and thus the real output Yt, do not change (this 
restriction is relaxed in our econometric analysis, where real GDP is one of the statistical 
variables).   When the assumptions about the exogeneity of Y and the constancy of V 
(equal to 1) are added to the exogeneity of M (controlled by monetary policy) then the 
Fisher identity becomes the so-called quantity of money theory, and the overall price 
level Pt moves in line with the nominal money stock Mt.  
Assume all prices are in equilibrium at time t-1, and Pt-1 is the overall price level, as 
determined by the size of the money stock at that time, i.e. Mt-1: 
Pt-1=  Mt-1Vt-1/ Yt-1 
Next, suppose there is a one-off increase in the money stock of μ> 0 percentage points 
(of course a similar analysis can be done for a negative shock): 
Mt  =  (1 + μ) Mt-1 
Pt =  MtVt /Yt 
The overall price level also rises by the same percentage amount, given the proposition 
that it moves contemporaneously with the size of the money stock (Vt-1 = Vt = 1; Yt-1 = 
Yt= Y).   Without other shocks, the new equilibrium overall price level PNEW EQ will hold 
indefinitely into the future: 
Pt = (1 + μ) Pt-1 = PNEW EQ = w FNEW EQ + (1-w) SNEW EQ 
Over time, both commodity and consumer price indices converge to their equilibrium 
levels FNEW EQ and SNEW EQ, but it is what happens in the meantime that is of most interest.   
In particular, we assume that the consumer price index is sticky for one period after the 
money shock, that is: 
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St = (1 + σ) St-1              with σ < μ 
while commodities prices, which are traded on spot auction markets, are fully flexible, 
and move φ percentage points in order to maintain overall price equilibrium, i.e.: 
Pt  = (1 + μ) Pt-1   = w Ft + (1-w) St      = w (1 + φ) Ft-1  + (1-w)(1 + σ) St-1 
or rearranging the terms above: 
 
Thus, it is clear that if μ> 0, and σ < μ, then: 
φ > μ 
which means that commodity prices initially overshoot equilibrium, to compensate for 
the interim stickiness of consumer prices.   Next, if we assume that in period t+1, 
commodity prices and consumer prices both adjust to their new respective equilibrium 
levels, i.e.: 
F t+1 = (1 + μ) Ft-1 = FNEW EQ 
S t+1 = (1 + μ) St-1 = SNEW EQ 
Then, from the overall price equation that holds at all times: 
w Ft + (1-w) St      =  w Ft+1+ (1-w) St+1   = w FNEW EQ + (1-w) St+1    
so that: 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡   =   𝑤𝑤1 − 𝑤𝑤 �𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡  −  𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸� =  −�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸� 
which tells us that the overshooting of commodity prices (or the undershooting in 
consumer prices) at time t, coupled with our knowledge of reversion towards equilibrium, 
should help to forecast the change in the CPI price index in period t+1. 
Econometric Findings 
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In Browne and Cronin (2010), we tested this intuitive formal theory empirically as a basis 
for shedding light on the nature of both short-term dynamics and long-term relationships 
among four US variables: (1) the M2 money stock; (2) the Consumer Price Index (CPI); 
(3) the Commodity Research Bureau spot Index (CRBSI), which comprises 22 basic 
commodities; and (4) Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to measure output in the US 
economy.   (The data used in the empirical estimations and the figures are outlined in 
Table 1.)   These correspond to M, S, F, and Y above, respectively.   The sample period 
covered was 1959q1-2008q4. 
We initially undertook standard unit root tests on natural logs of the four variables, which 
indicated that they could be treated as integrated of order one.   This property of the series 
allowed us to use the Johansen cointegration technique to assess the existence of a long-
run proportional relationship between M2 and each of the two price variables and to 
assess the short-run dynamics relationship between the variables. 
 
Table 1:  Description and Sources of Data  
Consumer Price Index for 
All Urban Consumers: All 
Items  
Index: 
1982-84 
= 100 
 
SA 
 
US Department of Labor:  
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
CRB Spot Index Index: 
1967 = 
100 
NSA Commodity Research Bureau 
M2 $ billion SA Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
Real Gross Domestic 
Product 
Billions 
of 
Chained 
2005 
Dollars 
SAAR US Department of 
Commerce: Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
SA: Seasonally Adjusted; NSA: Not Seasonally Adjusted; SAAR: Seasonally Adjusted Annualized Rate. 
 
Figure1: Response of Variables to a M2 shock 
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Source: Browne and Cronin (2010) 
 
Our empirical results provide support for the theory (and are summarised in Figure 1). In 
summary, we find the following:  
(i) commodity and consumer prices each move in proportion to the money stock in 
the long run, although convergence is rather slow (measured in quarters on the x-
axis in Figure 1);  
(ii) commodity prices initially overshoot their new equilibrium value in response to 
a money supply shock; the CPI is initially slow to adjust, but eventually picks up 
after commodities prices have peaked;  
(iii) one–quarter lagged values of the deviation of the commodity price index from its 
equilibrium/money-determined value have explanatory power for current-quarter 
CPI inflation;  
(iv) the sign of the coefficient for the lagged commodity price gap is positive, as to be 
expected from the theory;  
(v) GDP receives a temporary boost from an increase in money stock, lasting about 
two or three quarters, but it then reverts to its initial value. 
For this chapter, we revisited the relationship between the variables, extending the dataset 
up to 2011q1, and present the results in a new way.   Figure 2 contains two series.   The 
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first is the year-on-year rate of CPI inflation on a quarterly basis from 1960q1 to 2011q1, 
with the 1960q1 value reflecting the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters, i.e. 
the percentage change in the CPI between 1959q1 and 1960q1, and so forth.   The second 
series is a measure of the commodity price gap, where the commodity index is the 
CRBSI, and the gap is defined as the percentage difference between the actual index 
value and our estimate of the corresponding equilibrium value, as determined by the 
money equation at that time.   A positive gap indicates actual commodity prices being 
above equilibrium.   Given the discussion above, the expectation is that when the gap is 
positive, the rate of CPI inflation will subsequently increase. 
Figure 2: Year-on-year CPI inflation rates (solid line, right-hand-side scale) and 
Commodity Price Gap, 1960q1-2011q1 (left-hand-side scale) in percentage points 
 
 
As a general observation, the co-movement between CPI inflation rates and the 
commodity price gap is noticeable.   Looking at how the two variables behaved over 
time, the period up until the early 1970s was one when the commodity price gap was 
usually negative and CPI inflation relatively low.   A large positive commodity price gap 
emerged in 1973-4 and the CPI inflation rate responded accordingly, moving into double-
digit values.   This situation prevailed through the rest of the 1970s.   The CPI inflation 
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rate declined steadily between 1980 and 1983, as the positive commodity price gap was 
also eroded.   Thereafter, through the 1980s and 1990s, the CPI inflation rate remained 
at low values and the commodity price gap moved around the origin.    
The 2000s proved a more interesting decade.   A large negative commodity price gap had 
developed up to the end of 2001/early 2002.   Over the next six years, however, the gap 
first closed and then moved into positive values, reaching a local high value in 2008q3.   
CPI inflation increased slowly from a rate just above 1% in 2002q2 to a value close to 
5% in 2008q3.    
Figure 3 helps to illustrate how our overshooting theory can explain these developments 
in the early- to mid-2000s, as well as those that have occurred since 2008.   It shows year-
on-year rates of change in US M2, US CPI and the CRSBI commodity index, from 
2001q1 to 2011q1 (so, for example, the 2001q1 observations are the year-on-year 
changes in the respective variables between end-2000q1 and end-2001q1).   A vertical 
line is added at 2008q3.   Prior to that quarter, the rate of M2 growth can be seen to have 
been in excess of that of the CPI from the early 2000s.   The money stock grew by 68% 
between 2000q1 and 2008q2, while CPI increased by just 28%.   The difference could 
not be explained by the greater need for real money balances for transactions purposes 
associated with real GDP growth, which totalled 20% over that period.   In these 
circumstances, it is unsurprising to us that the CRBSI rose strongly in value.   It more 
than doubled during this timeframe, increasing by 115% between 2000q1 and 2008q2.   
With the rate of change in the CPI not keeping pace with that in M2, the monetary 
impulse affected commodity prices.  
The differential between the M2 growth rate and the CPI inflation rate is particularly 
noticeable between 2001 and 2003, as can be seen in Figure 3.   The rate of change in the 
CRBSI did not pick up until 2003 and was maintained into 2005.   The overshooting 
theory would explain this by noting that the response of commodity prices to a monetary 
stimulus is not instantaneous, but rather occurs with a lag; however, that lag is relatively 
short and the response is faster than that of consumer prices. 
There was some pickup in the CPI inflation rate in 2004-5, as the rate of commodity price 
inflation declined.   This would be consistent with the eventual catch-up in CPI inflation 
rates that would be expected in the wake of strong money growth, and in the initial 
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momentum to commodity prices from that monetary source falling away.   The period 
from early-2006 to mid-2008 saw a fresh surge in commodity prices taking place.   
Money growth was also above the CPI inflation rate at that time. As in 2005, the decline 
in the rate of increase in commodity prices that was occurring just prior to 2008q3 
coincided with a steady rise in the CPI inflation rate to a value of 5% in 2008q2.    
 
Figure 3: Year-on-year rates of change in M2 and price indices, 2000q1-2011q1, in 
percentage points 
 
 
The vertical line at 2008q3 in Figure 4 marks the start of a sudden collapse in commodity 
prices in the second half of that year.   Year-on-year rates of growth in the CRBSI 
remained negative until 2010q1.   Given that the rate of money growth was much greater 
than the rate of the CPI inflation rate in late-2008 and 2009 when commodity prices were, 
in general, falling, this commodity price behaviour may appear unusual.103   We would 
suggest that a flight from risky assets, such as commodities, to “safe haven” assets, like 
money (accommodated by monetary policy), by consumers and investors was the 
                                                 
103 Another factor at play here is that the massive amount of hoarding of liquid balances induced by the 
crisis has undermined the assumption of constant velocity, as often happens in recessions. 
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predominant force at work in financial markets in late-2008/early-2009 and goes a long 
way towards explaining the money and commodity price growth rates in Figure 3 during 
that time.   Since the level of uncertainty and investor nervousness in the economy has 
receded somewhat since then, it is unsurprising that strong money growth manifests itself 
in rising commodity prices. A positive commodity price gap is now evident (see Figure 
2).   This raises the prospect of CPI inflation rates rising from current levels in the years 
ahead. 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, we described how inflation targeting became a central plank of modern 
monetary policy.   It contributed to a reduction in inflation rates from the high values that 
prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s, and did so mainly through succeeding in anchoring 
inflation expectations close to low levels.   Inflation targeting’s biggest shortcoming, in 
our view, is that it has not taken account of the vast changes that have occurred in the 
financial system since the 1990s.   These have enhanced substitutability between money 
and financial assets.   These patterns of substitution vary with the boom/bust cycle in 
asset prices.   Indeed, they are an important ingredient of the boom/bust cycles of the 
1980s and 1990s.   This has had the effect of enhancing the role of money in the economy, 
but arguably in a disruptive way, something which has been at the heart of the 2007-9 
financial crisis, but which most advocates of inflation targeting regard as something of a 
sideshow.   
Our overshooting model provides some input into understanding the potential for money 
to affect prices, including relative prices between different classes of goods, such as 
commodities and consumer goods.   It shows that monetary shocks can cause commodity 
prices to react quickly to maintain equilibrium in the overall price level.   This can 
arguably prove unsettling for investors, as rising commodity prices may be interpreted 
as signalling a higher sustained level of real demand for a commodity or commodity class 
when, in fact, their prices are only reacting to a generalised, i.e. monetary, stimulus to 
prices in the economy.   Monetary policymakers, mistakenly reading rising commodity 
prices as caused by market-specific demand or supply shocks, might thus adopt 
inappropriate monetary policy responses, including no response at all.   For both investors 
and central banks, money is a variable that needs to be analysed and understood, and not 
neglected. 
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US inflation and output developments since the 1970s are considered using the P-star 
model and the VAR-based Diebold-Yilmaz spillover index approach.   Shocks to 
monetary variables explain a substantial share of US GDP deflator inflation shocks over 
time, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s but also in recent years, a time when 
quantitative easing was employed by the Federal Reserve.   Monetary factors, and not oil 
shocks, underlie price developments in the 1970s and early 1980s.   Monetary shocks’ 
influence on oil prices has become noticeably stronger over the past ten years or so, 
supporting the greater attention being paid of late to the impact of the monetary 
environment on commodity markets.   Shocks to the velocity-of-money variable affect 
output developments, with the exception of the 1970s and early 1980s when inflation 
shocks and, to a lesser extent, oil inflation shocks dominate the cross-variance share of 
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1  Introduction 
Given that inflation has been widely acknowledged as a monetary phenomenon, the 
absence of models of inflation involving monetary variables, specifically money 
aggregates, in the recent economics literature is noteworthy.   This is particularly the case 
for studies of US inflation.   An emphasis in the profession on New Keynesian models 
of inflation, within which money usually plays no role, is one factor explaining this 
absence.   Another is the breakdown of the relationship between money aggregates and 
inflation in econometric studies, particularly during the 1990s, and the related issue of 
instability in money demand functions.      
In this article, the P-star model of inflation, introduced by Hallman, Porter and Small 
(1991) and based on a link between money, economic activity and prices, is revisited 
using an empirical framework that utilises forecast-error variance decompositions from 
vector-autoregressive regressions (VAR) to provide measures of the spillover of shocks 
between variables over time (Diebold and Yilmaz 2009; 2012). 
The P-star model posits a lagged adjustment of the actual price level to an equilibrium 
value (the P-star, or P*) consistent with the current money stock.   The difference between 
the actual and equilibrium price level (the price gap) at any time captures the extent of 
inflationary, or deflationary, pressure in the economy.   The (lagged) gap variable will 
then have explanatory power for inflation in a dynamic least-squares regression.   The 
price gap is equivalent to the sum of a velocity (of money) gap and an output gap so that 
lags of both could be substituted for it in econometric applications.   Inertia in inflation 
is captured through the inclusion of lagged inflation rates in the regression specification.             
The VAR econometric approach used here is different to the dynamic least-squares 
regression specification usually employed in empirical applications of the P-star model.   
The VAR output allows the error variance in forecasting a variable at a chosen horizon 
to be explained by its own shocks (own-variance share) and shocks in other variables 
(cross-variance shares).   It can then be ascertained whether the velocity gap and output 
gap account for a sizeable share of inflation’s forecast error variance.   Quarterly US data, 
covering the period from 1959 onwards, are used.   Two different money aggregates, M2 
and MZM, provide alternative velocity gap measures.       
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The forecast-error-variance decompositions are estimated on a rolling-window basis, 
with the first window ending in 1975Q3 and the final one in 2016Q2.   One can then 
observe the extent to which the gap variables’ influence on inflation, both collectively 
and relative to one another, varies over time.   Both gaps accounting for a substantial 
share of the forecast error variance decomposition of inflation provides support to the P-
star model.   The velocity gap and output gap’s relative share of the decomposition would 
indicate whether monetary policy was operating more strongly through the money market 
or good market channels.   The own-variance share of the inflation decomposition reveals 
the influence of past inflation shocks.    
Oil price inflation is also included in the VAR estimations so as to consider how cost-
push factors compare to monetary variables in influencing inflation.   The cost-push (or 
supply-shock) view attributes inflation to an increase in the price of inputs feeding 
through to the price of goods.   Such exogenous shocks can also have an impact on output 
growth.   The relative influence of cost-push factors (in particular, oil market 
developments) and monetary variables on inflation and output in the 1970s and early 
1980s have received considerable attention in the economics literature (see, for example, 
Bohi 1989; Bernanke et al. 1997; Barsky and Kilian 2002).    
The main finding here is that shocks to the monetary variables (the velocity gap and 
output gap) explain a large share of US GDP implicit deflator (GDPD) inflation shocks 
over time and particularly so in the late 1980s-early 1990s and in recent years, a time 
when quantitative easing, raising the money supply, was undertaken by the Federal 
Reserve.   Oil price shocks have a low share of the inflation decomposition.   The 
econometric evidence also points to the gap variables’ combined share of the forecast 
error variance of GDPD inflation being much higher than that of oil price inflation in the 
1970s, indicating monetary factors and not oil shocks underlying the inflation rates of 
the period.   Oil price shocks maintain a low share of the decomposition of inflation after 
the 1970s.   The results then are supportive of a P-star/monetary explanation of inflation.  
The definition of the money stock is found to be important to the strength of the link 
between money and inflation at different points in time.   This is illustrated by MZM 
velocity gap shocks accounting for a particularly large share (at times well over half) of 
the forecast error variance decomposition of inflation in the late-1980s and early-1990s.   
The influence of the M2 velocity gap is below that of the MZM velocity gap at that time 
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and its decomposition share experiences a trend decline from the early 1990s through to 
the early 2000s.   This is consistent with Carlson et al. (2000), which finds a breakdown 
in the M2 money demand function around 1990 while at the same time a stable MZM 
money demand function is evident throughout the 1990s.    
The VAR output also provides an assessment of the relative importance of shocks from 
the two gap variables to oil price developments.   It points to their combined influence 
on oil prices diminishing from the mid-1970s through to the mid-1990s before increasing 
thereafter.   It has become noticeably stronger over the past ten years or so, which 
supports the increased emphasis that is being given to the impact of the monetary 
environment on commodity markets.104    
Finally, a decomposition of the forecast error variance for the output gap is also 
considered.   It is included here as the P-star model indicates changes in the money stock 
having effect on output, at least over the short term.   While the velocity gap is generally 
found to have an impact on output developments, the 1970s and early 1980s prove to be 
an exception.   At that time, it is inflation shocks and, to a lesser extent, oil inflation 
shocks that dominate the cross-variance share of output gap shocks.   After the Volcker 
disinflation of the early 1980s, the influence of both inflation and oil price shocks on the 
output gap decomposition wane and those of velocity gap shocks increase.      
2  The P-star model of inflation 
The P-star model of inflation was formulated in Hallman et al. (1991).105   They propose 
a dynamic model of inflation derived from the quantity theory of money equation.   They 
note that the equilibrium price level, 𝑃𝑃∗, consistent with the current money stock, 𝑀𝑀, can 
be defined as: 
𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉∗
𝐸𝐸∗
        (1) 
                                                 
104 The relevance of monetary conditions to commodity price changes was highlighted in the financial 
press during the mid-2000s; see, for example, Clover and Fifield (2004) and Fifield (2004).   Academic 
contributions that have considered the influence of monetary conditions on commodity markets include 
Frankel (2008) and Browne and Cronin (2010).   
105 Humphrey (1989) identifies precursors to the P-star approach in the older economics literature, 
stretching as far back as David Hume. 
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Where 𝑉𝑉∗ is the long-run equilibrium value of the velocity of money and 𝑄𝑄∗ is potential 
real output.   The long-run equilibrium of velocity is not directly observed, can differ 
from current velocity, and could be expected to have a varying value over time, 
reflecting, among other factors, changing transactions technology.   Potential real output 
will also vary over time and usually differs from observed real output.    
The money stock, 𝑀𝑀, also satisfies the determination of the current price level, 𝑃𝑃: 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉
𝐸𝐸
     (2) 
Where 𝑉𝑉 is the velocity of money and 𝑄𝑄 is real output. 
For the money stock, 𝑀𝑀, and using a natural log representation (denoted in lower-case 
variables), combining the two identities above leads to: 
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝∗ = (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑣𝑣∗) + (𝑞𝑞∗ − 𝑞𝑞)    (3) 
If the money stock implies an equilibrium price value that is above the actual price level 
then it will either cause the velocity of money (𝑣𝑣) to be below its equilibrium value (𝑣𝑣∗) 
or output (𝑞𝑞) to be above potential (𝑞𝑞∗), or both.   These deviations, or gaps, from 
equilibrium values for velocity and output will exercise upward pressure on the price 
level (i.e., it will cause inflation) such that the gap between it and the equilibrium price 
level closes over time.   Deflationary pressure will arise when 𝑣𝑣 > 𝑣𝑣∗ and/or 𝑞𝑞 < 𝑞𝑞∗, 
with 𝑝𝑝 declining towards 𝑝𝑝∗ over time.   When the price level is at its long-run value then 
equilibrium will also be prevailing in goods and money markets, i.e. the two gap 
variables, (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑣𝑣∗) and (𝑞𝑞∗ − 𝑞𝑞), will have zero values. 
From this relationship, Hallman et al. (1991) and others (for example, Tatom 1990) 
estimate single-equation models where inflation (or the change in inflation from the 
previous period) in period 𝑡𝑡 is a function of the price gap, 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝∗, in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1.   A 
richer approach involves the velocity (𝑣𝑣) gap and the output (𝑞𝑞) gap both being used in 
place of the price gap.   Among the additional explanatory variables that have been used 
in the econometric estimation of the P-star model are lags of the inflation rate itself and 
a measure of cost-push/non-monetary pressures, such as oil price inflation. 
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The P-star model of inflation then has been translated to the following form for 
econometric estimation: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓((𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡−1∗ − 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡−1), (𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡−1∗ ),∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖=1 ,∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖)𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖=1    (4)  
The two gap variables are lagged one period to inflation, 𝜋𝜋.106   Lags of a cost-push 
variable, 𝑧𝑧, can also be included in the specification as it may account for a fraction of 
the short-term variability in inflation.   Its inclusion allows the explanatory power of a 
cost-push view of inflation to be compared to that of the P-star model.   Lags of the 
inflation rate are also included. 
The specified regression equation is typically estimated using an ordinary-least-squares 
procedure over a single sample period or a number of sub-samples.   The estimated 
coefficients indicate whether the lagged gap variables have the posited sign and are 
statistically significant, and whether, accordingly, support for the P-star model arises or 
not.   
The output gap is emphasised in Phillips-curve models of inflation, with a positive output 
gap generating inflationary pressure within the economy.   In the P-star model, the output 
gap represents one of the two forms of disequilibrium that arise (in the goods market; the 
other being in the money market and represented by the velocity gap) when the price 
level differs from the equilibrium value implied by the existing money stock.   Thus, the 
two gap variables are complementary within the P-star model and in what follows a 
deviation in output from equilibrium and its influence on inflation is viewed as stemming 
from changes in the money stock, and not from a Phillips-curve based model of 
inflation.107 
3  Diebold-Yilmaz measure of spillover between variables  
In this article, a different econometric approach to assessing the P-star model is taken to 
the one based on a least-squares regression of equation (4).   A VAR estimation is applied 
                                                 
106 Note that the two gap variables are mostly usually stated as (𝑣𝑣∗ − 𝑣𝑣) and (𝑞𝑞 − 𝑞𝑞∗) in regression 
specifications with the estimated sign on both expected to have a positive value in explaining inflation, or 
changes in it. 
107 Variants of the P-star model have been presented over the years.   For example, Gerlach and Svensson 
(2003) put forward a real money gap, i.e. the gap between the current real money stock and the long-run 
equilibrium money stock, alongside the output gap in a model of inflation and find it to have significant 
predictive power for inflation in the euro area.   Trecroci and Vega (2002) present a model of inflation 
where both a money gap and an output gap are explanatory variables.  
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to time series of the four variables in (4), i.e. inflation, a velocity gap, an output gap, and 
a cost-push variable, with each of the variables having a common number of lags within 
the VAR.   A forecast error variance decomposition is then provided for each variable at 
a given horizon as part of the “innovation accounting” that is at the centre of the VAR 
econometric approach.   The decomposition shows the proportion of a variable’s shocks 
that are accounted for by past innovations, or shocks, to the other variables (cross-
variance shares) in the VAR and by past shocks to the variable itself (the own-variance 
share).      
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009; 2012) propose using the sum of the cross-variance shares for 
each variable in the VAR, aggregated across all variables in the VAR, to produce a total 
spillover index (TSI) for the system of variables as a whole.   The higher the value of the 
TSI, the greater the spillover, or interaction, that is occurring among the variables.   This 
is particularly useful when a rolling-regression approach is used: it allows periods of 
higher, and lower, spillover to be identified.    
The components of the TSI can also prove informative and it is those that are the focus 
of attention here.   For each rolling window, the proportions of the error variance in 
forecasting N-quarter-ahead GDPD inflation that are attributable to past innovations in 
the two gap variables and in the cost-push variable are provided.   A substantial combined 
share for the two gap variables, including relative to the share of the cost-push variable, 
would provide support for a monetary influence on, or determination of, inflation.   The 
share of one gap variable relative to the other will shed light on whether that influence is 
emanating more strongly from the velocity gap (money market) or output gap (goods 
market).     
The Diebold-Yilmaz approach then does not focus on the significance and sign of 
regression coefficients that arise with a standard least-squares estimation of equation (4) 
but rather it allows one to judge the influence of the gap variables on inflation, and 
whether it is rising or falling over time, through the size of their share of its forecast error 
variance decomposition.   In Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), the TSI and its components are 
constructed on the basis of orthogonalised shocks, so that the ordering of the variables in 
the VAR matters to the decomposition.   In their later, 2012 article, the error variance 
decompositions are invariant to the ordering, i.e. generalised, as opposed to 
orthogonalised, forecast error variance decompositions are provided.   In this article, the 
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orthogonalised approach is used for economic reasons outlined in section 5, although the 
generalised version of the spillover index is used as part of a suite of robustness tests. 
4  Data and related issues 
Following on the discussion above, empirical analysis of the P-star model requires time 
series for a number of variables: the velocity of money, real GDP, real potential GDP, a 
cost-push variable (oil price), and a measure of inflation.   Series relating to the velocity 
of money on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database are calculated as 
quarterly nominal GDP divided by the average money stock within the quarter.   This 
informs the choice of real GDP as the measure of economic activity in the econometric 
work undertaken here and, likewise, the GDP implicit deflator as the appropriate price 
level, and percentage changes in it as the measure of inflation.   Series for these variables 
and for real potential GDP and oil prices (West Texas Crude spot price) are also available 
on a quarterly basis from 1959Q1 onwards on FRED. 
Two measures of money velocity are used.   The first is that of M2.   The M2 money 
stock has been used in many studies of money’s relationship to nominal economic 
developments (for example, Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Feldstein and Stock 1994).   
It is also a money aggregate where a previously stable relationship between it and 
nominal output appeared to break down during the 1980s and 1990s (Friedman and 
Kuttner 1992; Estrella and Mishkin 1997).   The role of M2 in monetary policy was 
downgraded by the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993.   In using M2 velocity in 
the econometric analysis here, the innovation accounting provided by the Diebold-
Yilmaz approach may indicate whether shocks to this money variable, captured through 
its velocity gap, had a declining share in explaining inflation shocks during the 1980s or 
early 1990s, as might be expected if there was a breakdown in the M2 money demand 
relationship at that time.    
The other velocity measure used is that of the MZM (Money Zero Maturity) money stock.   
It is also a broad money aggregate and is defined as M2 less small-denomination time 
deposits plus institutional money funds.   Using alternative measures of the velocity of 
money provides a check on the sensitivity of the results to the choice of money aggregate.   
Moreover, Carlson et al. (2000) provides evidence that the stability of the standard M2 
demand function was undermined around 1990 by households reallocating a portion of 
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their money holdings from time deposits to mutual funds, whereas that of MZM was not.   
Using the velocity of MZM as an alternative to that of M2 in the VAR analysis could 
provide further insight on this episode.   In particular, it is of interest whether the Carlson 
et al. finding that MZM had a more easily established link to nominal economic activity 
than M2 in the 1990s is mirrored by its velocity gap accounting for a larger share of 
inflation’s forecast error variance decomposition than M2’s share at that time.108          
A preliminary consideration for the empirical work is that the equilibrium velocity value 
is not directly observed and, unlike potential GDP, an estimated series is not provided by 
the St. Louis FRED database.   In Hallman et al. (1991), velocity is noted as being 
trendless over the sample period and, consequently, its sample mean provides a single 
measure of equilibrium velocity.   The rise-and-fall in both M2 and MZM velocity over 
time, as shown in natural log form in panels (i) and (ii) of Figure 1, render such an 
approach inappropriate here.   Orphanides and Porter (2001) acknowledge the challenge 
to measuring equilibrium velocity when such variation in observed velocity arises.   To 
account for the upward movement in M2 velocity during the 1990s, they incorporate a 
smooth underlying trend in their specification for estimating equilibrium velocity.   
Subsequent to the timeframe they studied, M2 velocity declined, further complicating the 
extraction of an equilibrium series from actual velocity.   The approach taken here is to 
apply a Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a lambda value of 1600 (the value for quarterly data 
suggested by Hodrick and Prescott (1997)), to the natural log of the M2 and MZM 
velocity series.109   Projections for both velocity series are made beyond 2016Q2, up to 
2017Q4 using an autoregressive forecasting process.   When the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
is then applied to the extended velocity series, the initial six values (1959Q1-1960Q2) 
and final six (2016Q3-2017Q4) are discarded to address the end-point problem 
associated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.   The fitted values – the measures of 
equilibrium velocity - are shown by the dotted lines in panels (i) and (ii) of Figure 1.  
The various series in Figure 1 are plotted over the period 1960Q3-2016Q2.   The two 
velocity gaps, measured as percentage deviations of actual from equilibrium values, are 
shown in panels (iii) and (iv) of Figure 1.   Both gap variables are, in effect, error- 
                                                 
108 Carlson et al. also use M2M as a third money aggregate in their study.   It is not available over a 
sufficiently long period (data are available from 1967 to 2013 only) for the rolling-window estimations 
used here.  
109 This atheoretical approach to estimating an equilibrium value from a series is often applied to real output 
data, with the difference between the two series providing measures of the output gap.   
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correction terms within the P-star model.   Standard unit root tests indicate the series for 
both to be stationary processes.   The other variables used in the VAR estimations are 
also plotted in that figure: the real GDP gap (the difference between actual and potential 
output, stated as a percentage of potential real GDP) and the percentage rates of change 
in oil prices and in the GDPD from one quarter to the next.110  The shaded areas in Figure 
1 and subsequent charts are those quarters where the NBER has identified the US 
economy to have been in recession. 
5  Econometric results 
5.1 Full sample results               
VAR estimations are undertaken according to two groupings of variables.   The first 
comprises GDPD inflation, the M2 velocity gap, the output gap and oil inflation, while 
in the second, the MZM velocity gap substitutes for its M2 counterpart.   Information 
criteria for selecting the order of the VARs (which include constant terms) point to a lag 
length of 4 (i.e., lags of each variable from 1 to 4 are included in the regressions) for both 
sets of variables.   The variables are also arranged in the VAR in the order given above 
(i.e., inflation, velocity gap, output gap, oil inflation) to allow orthogonalised forecast 
error variance decompositions to be used in constructing the spillover index.   The placing 
of GDPD inflation as the first variable ensures that shocks to the other three variables do 
not affect its decomposition until the quarter after the shocks occur.   This is consistent 
with the P-star model where the gap variables only have an effect on inflation with a lag.   
The ordering of the VAR allows the two gap variables to have contemporaneous effect 
on oil price inflation.   The velocity gap is placed before the output gap in the VAR in 
line with Milton Friedman’s argument that a change in the money stock first affects the 
velocity of money and then output before those variables, and the price level, return to 
equilibrium values (see Humphrey 1989).    
 
                                                 
110 The GDP implicit deflator, velocity and real GDP series are all seasonally-adjusted, while those of 
potential real GDP and oil prices are not.        
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Fig. 1  Variable series 
ii. M2 Velocity and filtered series  ii.      MZM Velocity and filtered 
series 
  
iv. M2 Velocity Gap (%)   iv.     MZM Velocity Gap (%)   
  
vi. Output Gap (%)    vi.  Oil price inflation (%) 
  
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
M2 velocity (natural log) HP fit
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
MZM velocity (natural log) HP fit
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
  
266 
 
Fig. 1 (contd.) Variable series 
vii. GDPD inflation (%)             viii. Change in Openness 
  
 
The forecast horizon for the decompositions is 10 quarters ahead.  This reflects both 
econometric (a longer forecast horizon could be expected to see the decomposition shares 
between variables stabilise) and economic (monetary policy will have effect on inflation 
with a lag – a 10-quarter ahead horizon would be broadly in line with some of the 
empirical findings as to when policy has its peak effect on inflation in the US case) 
considerations.111    
Table 1 provides the full sample (1960Q3-2016Q2) estimate of the TSI and its 
components.   The results are of less interest than the rolling-window estimations that 
follow but provide the reader with an insight, through a practical example, into the 
information provided by the Diebold-Yilmaz framework. 
The TSI and its components have broadly similar values in both panels of Table 1, so 
only the results where the M2 velocity gap is used (i.e., panel (i)) are discussed.   The 
index has a value of 22.9%, pointing to relatively low spillover (or, alternatively, own 
variance shocks being dominant).112   The first row of the table indicates that 18.3% of 
the forecast error variance decomposition of GDPD inflation is explained by shocks to 
the M2 velocity gap, while the share of the output gap is 15.5%.   Oil price inflation has 
a cross-variance share of 9%.   The own-share variance for GDPD inflation comes in at 
                                                 
111 See Friedman (1961; 1972); Batini and Nelson (2001). 
112 The 22.9% value is arrived at by dividing the sum of the “directional from others” entries for each of 
the four variables (located above it in that column and totalling 91.4%) by four (the number of variables in 
the VAR). 
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57.2% (the own-variance shares for each variable can be found on the diagonal of the 
table).   The decomposition for the other price variable, oil inflation, is shown in the 
fourth row of the table.   It can be seen that oil inflation has the highest own-variance 
share (highest diagonal entry) of all the variables, at 90.3%.   The two monetary variables 
(i.e., the gap variables) have a combined value of 6.2% in that row, much lower than their 
combined value in the decomposition of GDPD inflation (33.8%). 
Table 1   Spillover index and components: full sample estimation (%) 
(i) 10-quarter horizon 
 
GDPD 
inflation 
M2 Velocity 
Gap 
Output 
gap 
 
Oil 
inflation 
Directional 
from 
others  
    
 
 
GDPD inflation 57.2 18.3 15.5 9 42.8 
M2 Velocity  
Gap 11.9 85.6 0.4 2.1 14.4 
Output Gap  5.2 10.3 75.5 9 24.5 
Oil inflation 3.5 3.1 3.1 90.3 9.7 
      
Directional  
to others 20.6 31.7 19 20.1 91.4  
     
 
Total Spillover 
Index: 
Directional  
including own 77.8 117.3 94.5 110.4 22.9 
 
(ii) 10-quarter horizon 
 
GDPD 
inflation 
MZM 
Velocity 
Gap 
Output 
gap 
 
Oil 
inflation 
Directional 
from others  
    
 
 
GDPD inflation 61.7 18.2 11.5 8.5 38.3 
MZM Velocity 
 Gap 8.3 85.2 3.1 3.4 14.8 
Output Gap  2.1 5.6 81.9 10.4 18.1 
Oil inflation 4.1 1.8 2 92 8 
      
Directional  
to others 14.5 25.6 16.6 22.3 79.2  
     
 
Total Spillover 
Index: 
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Directional 
 including own 76.2 110.8 98.5 114.3 19.8 
5.2  Rolling window TSI 
When estimated on a rolling window basis, the TSI provides a measure of how interaction 
among a set of variables varies over time.   Figure 2 provides the rolling measure for this 
index.   As with all subsequent figures, the charts in the left-hand-side column of each 
page refer to those VARs where the M2 velocity gap measure is utilised alongside the 
GDPD inflation, output gap and oil inflation variables (i.e., they are the variables used in 
panel (i) of Table 1).   In the right-hand-side charts, the MZM velocity gap measure is 
that used with the inflation, output gap and oil inflation variables (i.e., mirroring panel 
(ii) of Table 1).   The rolling window size chosen is 60 quarters.   This means that the 
first data-point in each chart covers the initial window (ending in 1975Q3), with the 
window end-date being indicated on the horizontal axis of the chart, while the final 
window ends in 2016Q2.   Index values are recorded for all windows except for that 
ending in 1983q1 in the case where the M2 velocity gap is used in the VAR and for three 
windows, those ending in 1983Q2-Q4, where the MZM velocity gap is employed.   
In Figure 2, both TSIs have similar values throughout the rolling-window sequence.   
They decline after the initial window, ending in 1975Q3, through to the mid-1980s and 
move in a narrow range thereafter.   These values indicate total spillover among the 
variables remaining relatively stable over time.   The most noticeable change in both 
panels occurs from about the start of the 1981-82 recession through until late-1983 or 
early-1984.   This was a period when there was a sharp fall in inflation rates (see Figure 
1, panel (vii)), which coincided with a tight-money policy being adopted by the Federal 
Reserve (the so-called “Volcker disinflation”).113    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 In the appendix, robustness tests of the impact on the TSI values of different choices of lag length, 
forecast horizon, window size, form of shocks, and number of variables used are considered. 
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Fig. 2   Total spillover index (%) 
i.    M2 velocity as money variable          ii.      MZM velocity as money variable  
  
 
5.3  Spillover to GDPD inflation 
The forecast error variance decomposition of GDPD inflation allows the impact of 
velocity gap shocks and output gap shocks over a ten-quarter-ahead horizon to be 
assessed.   The entries in panels (i) and (ii) of Figure 3 are labelled “monetary impulse”.   
They are the sum of the shares of the decomposition attributable to the velocity gap and 
to the output gap.   In other words, in panel (i), it is the sum of the entries, for each 
particular estimation window, in panels (iii) and (v), and in the case of panel (ii), the sum 
of the entries in panels (iv) and (vi).   This seems to be an appropriate summation to 
provide as the P-star theory indicates the gap variables together capturing the influence 
of monetary developments on inflation.    
In panel (i) of Figure 3, where the velocity gap component is that of M2, the combined 
forecast error variance share of the two gap variables is close to 40% in the initial 
windows and then increases, reaching a peak of 60% in 1990Q4.   It experiences a trend 
decline thereafter up to 2008Q3.   It rises sharply after 2008Q3 and reports values of 
close to 40% up to 2014Q4 before declining.   This period, 2008Q3-2014Q4, bookends 
the three programmes of quantitative easing undertaken by the Federal Reserve after the 
2008 financial crisis.   The goal of quantitative easing was to stimulate the economy 
through an increased money supply.  The evidence here is that shocks to M2 velocity 
have a strong influence on inflation during the period when quantitative easing was 
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occurring.   The rise-and-fall in the monetary impulse between 2008 and 2014 also holds 
when MZM is used (panel (ii) of Figure 3).     
The respective shares of each of the gap variables are shown in panels (iii)-(vi) of Figure 
3.   In both the left-hand-side and right-hand-side columns, the output gap can be seen to 
be exercising a stronger influence on inflation shocks than the velocity gap prior to the 
1980 recession.   Subsequently, the velocity gap has the higher share of the 
decomposition for most of the rolling windows up until the mid-to-late-1990s.   The 
influence of the M2 velocity gap (panel (iii)) is strong during the 1970s and 1980s but 
declines during the 1990s and has very low values in the early 2000s.   The percentage 
share of GDPD inflation’s forecast error variance accounted for by MZM velocity (in 
panel (iv)) rises during the 1980s and is at its strongest during the early 1990s, peaking 
at over 60% at that time.   In comparison, the share of the M2 velocity gap (in panel (iii)) 
is lower than MZM’s during the same period and up until the early 2000s.   These results 
appear consistent with the findings of Carlson et al. (2000) that M2’s link to nominal 
economic activity became unstable at that time, while MZM’s was stable.    
In general, output gap shocks’ influence on inflation shocks (shown in panels (v) and (vi) 
of Figure 3) is low or declining prior to the late-1990s and is usually below that of the 
velocity gap, thus indicating the money market to be more important than the goods 
market to the transmission of monetary policy to inflation.   The output gap’s error 
variance share increases thereafter and is particularly high in the early 2000s.   In more 
recent years, the output gap’s percentage share of the decomposition for inflation is low 
in panel (v) but much higher in panel (vi).   The M2 velocity gap’s share (panel (iii)) is 
high since the 2007-9 recession and above its historical average, while that of the MZM 
velocity gap is low by comparison (panel (iv)).   The M2 velocity gap then appears to be 
dominating the output gap in describing inflation shocks in recent years, while the MZM 
velocity gap’s explanatory power is relatively low.    
In panels (vii) and (viii) of Figure 3, the influence of oil inflation shocks on GDPD 
inflation is low for most of the windows in those two panels.   Higher values are recorded 
for windows ending in quarters in the 1970s and after the mid-2000s compared to other 
periods but are, nevertheless, mostly below those of the velocity gap and output gap and 
always well below those gap variables’ combined share (with the exception of the two 
windows ending in 2008Q2 and 2008Q3 in the left-hand-side column of Figure 3).    
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The 1970s is a period of particular interest in relation to the influence of oil market 
developments on goods markets, with a popular view being that exogenous oil supply 
shocks caused high and variable inflation at that time.   In contrast, Barsky and Kilian 
(2000; 2002) attribute high and variable inflation and low or negative output growth 
during this period to monetary expansions and contractions.   They argue that oil prices 
cannot explain the sustained inflation in the GDP deflator in the 1970s.114   While the 
decomposition shares in panels (vii) and (viii) of Figure 3 are high (close to 20%) at that 
time relative to later years, they are lower than their respective monetary counterpart in 
panels (i) and (ii).   Monetary variables then are more important than oil price 
developments in accounting for inflation shocks during the 1970s and, indeed, over 
almost all of the 164 rolling windows shown in the charts.   Finally, panels (ix) and (x) 
capture the own-shocks share of the forecast error variance for GDPD inflation.   It 
indicates that share accounting for, on average, about 50% of the total decomposition.     
To sum up, Figure 3 indicates the P-star gap variables together accounting for, on 
average, just over one-third of the decomposition of inflation shocks over the 152 rolling 
windows; the velocity gap accounts for a larger share of the decomposition than the 
output gap on average;115 the MZM velocity gap has higher explanatory power than M2’s 
in the late 1980s-early 1990s; the M2 velocity gap has had increased influence on 
inflation since the 2007-9 recession; the monetary impulse in the current decade is close 
to, or slightly above, its historical average. 
 
                                                 
114 They point out that only two of the five major oil price shocks between 1970 and the time of their study 
were followed by significant changes in GDPD inflation rates. 
115 When M2 is the money stock used, the velocity gap accounts for an average 21% of the inflation 
decomposition over all the windows, compared to 17% for the output gap.    When MZM is used, the 
velocity gap has a 21% average share, while that of the output gap is 14%.  
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Fig. 3 Spillover to GDPD inflation (%)  
i.   Monetary impulse             ii.  Monetary impulse 
  
iii. from M2 velocity gap shocks  iv.   from MZM velocity gap shocks     
  
v. from output gap shocks    vi.  from output gap shocks 
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Fig. 3 (contd.)   
viii. from oil inflation shocks   viii.     from oil inflation shocks 
  
 
ix. from own shocks    x.     from own shocks 
  
 
The results then are supportive of the P-star model.   In most rolling windows, velocity 
gap shocks account for a larger share of the inflation decomposition than the output gap’s, 
thus indicating the money stock to be informative about price developments.   The choice 
of money aggregate is important, however, to the velocity gap’s share.   This resonates 
with concerns that “missing money” can undermine the establishment of a link between 
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money and inflation in practice and that the measurement of the money stock is thus 
important to that link.116   
5.4  Spillover to oil price inflation       
The other change-in-price variable included in the VARs is oil price inflation.   Frankel 
(2008) argues that commodities, such as oil, are subject to monetary influences, while 
Browne and Cronin (2008, 2010) explain changes in their value over time by money 
supply shocks.   Gattini et al. (2015) consider money demand shocks relevant to inflation 
and commodity prices.   In their studies of 1970s stagflation, Barsky and Kilian (2000; 
2002) contend that the rise in oil prices at that time was, at least in significant part, a 
result of an economic boom driven by monetary expansion.   The decompositions of oil 
price inflation will indicate the effect that monetary conditions have on it.   The spillovers 
from the two gap variables to oil inflation are shown in Figure 4 (with the panels being 
arranged in a similar manner to those in Figure 3).   The share of oil inflation shocks 
attributable to GDPD inflation shocks are also shown in panels (vii) and (viii). 
Panels (ix) and (x) of Figure 4 show the own-variance share of the decomposition for oil 
price inflation is high in comparison to that for GDPD inflation in the corresponding 
panels of Figure 3.   Own-market developments then have considerable influence on 
changes in oil prices over time.   Supply factors, in particular, are likely to be important, 
with the decision by oil exporters to increase or decrease supply having an impact on oil 
prices.    
A smaller proportion of the decomposition here is then left to be explained by the cross-
variance factors than in the case of GDPD inflation.   The two gap variables, and their 
combined “monetary impulse”, can be seen to be less than 20% for most of the windows 
in panels (i)-(vi) of Figure 4.   The initial windows in panels (i) and (ii), however, show 
the monetary impulse to oil prices being strong in the mid-1970s compared to many of 
the years that followed and being mainly accounted for by velocity shocks (panels (iii) 
and (iv)).   After the 1970s, monetary influence declined slowly over time.    
                                                 
116 The definition and refinement of the broad money stock has been an important feature of studies relating 
the real money to economic activity since, at least, Goldfeld (1976).   The particular money stock affecting 
the results at different junctures here is then unsurprising.       
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The values in panels (i) and (ii) of Figure 4, however, have increased since the mid-
1990s.   The combined share of the two gap variables is at its strongest in recent years 
and is coming predominantly from the money channel (panels (iii) and (iv)) rather than 
the goods market (panels (v) and (vi)).   One explanation of this development is the 
loosening of monetary policy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis affecting 
commodity markets.   Koo (2011) argues that these policy measures, including 
quantitative easing, forced fund managers to invest liquid balances in commodities in a 
search for yield and, thus, monetary policy is causing price developments in those 
markets.117 This is not to deny that supply shocks have also likely been prominent in 
recent years.   Azezki and Blanchard (2014) identify surprises in oil production and the 
publicly-announced intention by Saudi Arabia that it did not intend to counter the rising 
supply of oil from other producers as contributing to oil price developments in 2014.118 
The strong monetary impulse to oil prices in recent years is also noteworthy in the context 
of the Bank for International Settlements and its staff (see, for example, Borio and Lowe 
2002; Borio and White 2004; Borio 2014; Bank for International Settlements 2015) 
identifying a link between monetary and asset price developments.   Its view is that 
financial liberalisation has strengthened the role of financial factors in the economic cycle 
and that excess liquid balances show up first in asset prices (including commodity prices) 
rather than consumer prices.   The results here indicate monetary developments having a 
strong effect, by historical comparison, on oil prices in recent years, with that occurring 
in parallel to the P-star gap variables exercising continuing influence on final goods 
prices. 
  
                                                 
117 The effects of quantitative easing on asset prices more generally is considered in Cronin (2014). 
118 The remaining two panels of Figure 4, (vii) and (viii), show the impact of GDPD inflation rate shocks 
to oil price inflation.   It is generally low but does pick up in the windows ending in the 1990s and has a 
share of the forecast error variance decomposition of over 20% for most of the second half of that decade, 
before falling off thereafter.  
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Fig. 4 Spillover to oil inflation (%) 
i.    Monetary impulse                      ii.  Monetary impulse 
  
iii. from M2 velocity gap shocks         iv.  from MZM velocity gap shocks     
  
v. from output gap shocks          vi.    from output gap shocks 
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Fig. 4 (contd.) 
 
vii. from GDPD inflation shocks  viii.     from GDPD inflation shocks 
  
ix. from own shocks    x.     from own shocks 
  
 
5.5  Spillover to the output gap       
A final set of charts is presented in Figure 5, showing the spillover to the output gap from 
the other variables in the VAR, as well as its own-variance share.   While the P-star theory 
is a model of inflation, it also indicates that changes in money aggregates are not neutral 
in their impact on output in the short run, with the output gap expanding or contracting 
in response to changes in the money supply.   The extent to which the velocity gap 
accounts for the output gap’s error variance decomposition over the forecast horizon is 
then of interest.   The Diebold-Yilmaz approach and dataset employed here also allows 
the relative importance of GDPD inflation and oil inflation to output gap developments 
to be assessed.      
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Panel (iii) of Figure 5 shows M2 velocity gap shocks having their highest share of the 
output gap’s decomposition around the time of the 1990-1991 recession and during and 
just prior to the 2001 recession.   The share for the MZM velocity gap (panel (iv)) is often 
much higher than for its M2 counterpart.   As in the case of Figure 3 and the explanation 
of the decomposition of GDPD inflation, its effect is particularly strong in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.   Thus, the MZM velocity gap accounts more strongly for both inflation 
shocks and output shocks than the M2 velocity gap at that time.   This may be because 
MZM captures transaction balances, or spending power, in that period more accurately 
and, thus, is more closely linked to developments in inflation and real activity.   The 
results indicate money mattering to macroeconomic developments and the measurement 
of money balances being an important consideration in establishing and quantifying that 
relationship. 
The 1970s and early 1980s was a time when both high and variable inflation and low or 
negative growth arose for much of the period.   The economics literature has since 
debated whether the principal cause of that situation was monetary policy or aggregate 
supply shocks (with oil market shocks to the fore among the latter).   A comparison of 
panel (iii) with panel (v) in Figure 5, and of panel (iv) with panel (vi), points to oil price 
shocks accounting for the greater share of output gap shocks up to the end of the 1981-
82 recession.    Inflation shocks (panels (i) and (ii)), however, have the largest cross-
variance share of the three variables at that time.   There is a sharp decline in inflation’s 
influence at the end of that recession, when inflation rates were falling rapidly.   The 
impact of oil price shocks on the output gap also declines and is quite low subsequently, 
even though episodes of rapid rises and/or falls in oil prices occurred in later years.119   
When inflation declined to lower and less volatile values after the Volcker disinflation – 
and policy shift - of the early 1980s, the influence of velocity shocks on the output gap 
increases with higher spillover values arising in the 1980s and 1990s in panels (iii) and 
(iv).   In recent years, both inflation shocks and oil inflation shocks have a very low share 
of the output gaps’ forecast error variance decomposition and most of the cross-variance 
share is from velocity gap shocks.     
                                                 
119 For example, the price of West Texas Crude tripled between 1998Q4 and 2000Q3.   It fell sharply from 
a value of $133 per barrel in 2008Q2 to €41 per barrel two quarters later.   The lesser impact of oil market 
developments on the output gap in recent decades, however, should not be unexpected given its diminished 
role in economic activity compared to, say, the 1970s.    
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Fig. 5 Spillover to the output gap (%) 
 
i.   from GDPD inflation shocks                         ii.  from GDPD inflation shocks 
  
iii. from M2 velocity gap shocks        iv.  from MZM velocity gap shocks     
  
v. from oil inflation shocks         vi.       from oil inflation shocks 
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Fig. 5 (contd.) Spillover to the output gap (%) 
vii. from own shocks    viii.     from own shocks 
  
 
The final pair of charts in Figure 5 (panels (vii) and (viii)) indicates the output gap’s own-
variance share trending upwards over time.   Stock and Watson (2003) argue that an 
absence of large shocks has been part of output growth developments in recent decades.   
Blanchard and Simon (2001) emphasise structural changes in the economy 
systematically altering the propagation mechanism of shocks, which they view as not 
getting smaller.   In other words, the economy is better able to absorb shocks and 
attenuate their effect on output.   Whether arising from smaller shocks or an improved 
capacity of the economy to withstand their effects, the charts in Figure 5 point to inflation 
shocks and oil shocks having little influence on output since the 2007-2009 recession.   
Velocity gap shocks alone among the three seem to matter to output developments in 
recent years. 
6  Conclusion 
The econometric evidence presented in this article is supportive of a P-star model of 
inflation over a cost-push determination of price changes.   The velocity gap, on average, 
has a greater influence on inflation over time than the output gap.   Its explanatory power 
over both inflation and output developments is, however, sensitive to the choice of money 
aggregate used in the velocity gap, emphasising the relevance of how the stock of 
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transactions balances is calculated to the establishment of a link between money, inflation 
and economic activity.         
Looking at specific periods, the gap variables have a greater share of the inflation 
decomposition than oil price changes in the 1970s and early 1980s, a period often 
associated with events in the energy market contributing to high and variable inflation 
rates.   The velocity gap, however, has little influence on output developments at that 
time, with inflation shocks and oil price shocks having a particularly high share of the 
output gap decomposition up to the end of the 1981-2 recession.   The period after the 
2007-9 recession is one where the monetary influence on inflation is high even though 
inflation rates are at low values.   Alongside that, the gap variables’ impact on oil prices 
is at its strongest in recent years.   Overall, the results indicate monetary variables 
continuing to matter to price developments. 
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284 
 
Tests of the sensitivity of the TSI to the choices required in estimating the VAR model 
are reported in Figures 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.   In each figure, the solid line represents that 
found in the same column of Figure 2, where (a) the VAR lag length is 4, (b) the forecast 
horizon is 10 quarters, (c) the estimation window is 60 quarters, (d) the forecast error 
variance decomposition is of the orthogonalised form, and (e) there are four variables.   
In turn, each of these five settings is changed in turn in Figures 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 while 
holding the other four unchanged.       
The lag length of the VAR was allowed vary from 4 lags, to 3, 5 and 6 lags.   The 
minimum and maximum TSI value at each window from the four lag options, 3 to 6, are 
then plotted in Figure 6.   The TSI moves in a similar pattern for all three lines in that 
chart, albeit with some variation in values.   Figure 7 reports minimum and maximum 
values where the forecast horizon varies between 8-quarters-ahead and 12-quarters-
ahead.   The TSI values are in a narrow range.   This is reassuring as it indicates variance 
shares being broadly unchanging at longer forecast horizons.    
In Figure 8, the rolling windows are 40 quarters, 60 quarters and 80 quarters in size.   One 
feature of the 40-quarter rolling-window TSI series is that there are many windows where 
no TSI is generated.   That arises when there is a lack of convergence in decomposition 
shares as the forecast horizon lengthens.   This supports the selection of the longer, 60-
quarter window (where only 1 or 3 windows out of the estimated 152 windows do not 
provide decompositions) over the shorter window.   The differences in TSI values 
between the 60-quarter windows and the 80-quarter windows are relatively small.   An 
advantage of using 60 quarters over 80 quarters for the window size is that with the latter 
the first TSI value is not provided until a sample period ending in 1980Q3, thus excluding 
the 1970s.   Figure 9 shows that the TSI is not particularly sensitive to the choice of 
orthogonalised or generalised decompositions.   Finally, in Figure 10, a comparison is 
made with a five variable system where the additional variable is a measure of the 
openness of the US economy.   It is the quarterly change in a ratio, that of the sum of US 
exports and imports divided by US GDP (shown in panel (viii) of Figure 1).   The addition 
of this variable does not have any noticeable effect on the pattern of the TSI over time.     
Fig. 6   Total spillover index (%) – different lag lengths 
i.   M2 velocity as money variable          ii.      MZM velocity as money variable 
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Fig. 7   Total spillover index (%) – different forecast horizons 
i.   M2 velocity as money variable          ii.      MZM velocity as money variable 
  
Fig. 8   Total spillover index (%) – different window sizes 
i.     M2 velocity as money variable          ii.      MZM velocity as money variable 
  
 
Fig. 9   Total spillover index (%) – orthogonalised vs. generalised decomposition 
i.    M2 velocity as money variable          ii.      MZM velocity as money variable 
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Fig. 10   Total spillover index (%) – four variable vs. five variable 
i.    M2 velocity as money variable           ii.      MZM velocity as money variable 
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